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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three individual works on dynamic economic deci-
sion problems which go beyond expected utility maximisation in complete markets. The
first chapter introduces an asset liquidation model under prospect theory preferences. We
demonstrate that the probability weighting component of the model can predict liquidation
strategies which better fit the empirical patterns of investors’ stock trading behaviours, when
compared to models which do not incorporate probability weighting. The second chapter
explores the role of randomised strategies in an exit-timing problem faced by a prospect
theory agent. Several new insights are o↵ered: in a discrete model, access to randomisation
can strictly improve the economic value to the agent; in a continuous time counterpart,
allowing randomisation will significantly alter the prediction of an agent’s behaviours and
more realistic exit-strategies would be observed in contrast to the results from the existing
literature. The final chapter studies an extension to the Merton’s optimal investment and
consumption problem under transaction costs, where the agent can also dynamically invest
in a liquid hedging asset without a trading fee. We provide a complete solution. Important
properties of the problem such as well-posedness conditions and comparative static results
are derived.
xi
Preface: an overview of the
thesis
In a typical mathematical model of investment, it is commonly assumed that the under-
lying agent is an expected utility maximiser with trading access to a frictionless market.
Whilst the assumptions of an expected utility criteria and a perfect market help simplify
the analysis, these specifications are not always good descriptions of the real world. On the
one hand, the paradigm of expected utility hypothesis is under constant challenges by both
designed experiments in laboratories and empirical anomalies in financial markets. On the
other hand, trading can be costly in view of transaction fees. It may thus be ine cient
to implement the optimal strategies advocated by standard economic models which often
involve continuous portfolio rebalancing.
This thesis attempts to expand the classical theory by studying three di↵erent dy-
namic economic decision problems featuring behavioural preferences and market imperfec-
tions. The unifying goal is to investigate whether the extra features introduced can better
reconcile the model predictions and real world phenomena. Ultimately, the results docu-
mented in this thesis will be useful for advancing our understanding to individuals’ decisions
in di↵erent economic contexts such as stock trading, exit-timing of casino gambling and port-
folio choice. The first two chapters share a common theme involving an optimal stopping
problem under prospect theory (PT), arguably the most popular behavioural model of de-
cision making under risk proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The final chapter
considers a separate topic on market friction where trading in a certain asset class incurs
a proportional transaction cost. While each chapter is structured in a rather self-contained
manner and thus can be read in any order in principle, readers might find Chapter 1 a useful
prerequisite to Chapter 2.
In Chapter 1, we investigate the implications of PT preferences in an asset liqui-
xii
dation model. In the literature of empirical finance, the price disposition e↵ect is a well-
documented anomaly which refers to the tendency that investors hold losing stocks for too
long but sell winning stocks too early. However, standard models of asset sale often fail to
calibrate the strength of the price disposition e↵ect satisfactorily. Very often they either do
not predict voluntary sale at losses, or the price disposition e↵ect implied is too extreme
in comparison to the empirical data. We focus on the probability weighting component of
PT which is typically omitted in the existing literature. On the theoretical side, we apply
and extend the recent mathematical results regarding optimal stopping with probability
weighting. A few extra but mild su cient conditions on the agent’s preference functions
are provided which can lead to an optimal trading strategy with simple structure. We then
explain with theoretical justifications how to extract di↵erent measures of the price disposi-
tion e↵ect within our modelling framework and provide some numerical results. It is found
that the inclusion of probability weighting can produce much more reasonable levels of the
disposition e↵ect under a range of asset performance, and this serves as an improvement
over the existing asset sale models.
Chapter 2 considers the impact of allowing PT agents to follow randomised strategies
in an exit-timing decision task. We demonstrate a feature which has not been considered to
date. In presence of probability weighting, an agent may benefit from adopting a randomised
strategy. In a finite horizon discrete model of casino gambling of Barberis (2012), we show
that allowing an agent to follow randomised strategies can lead to strict improvement in the
game value. Allowing randomised strategies also leads to drastic change in prediction in an
infinite horizon continuous time setup. In an optimal stopping model under a general PT
framework, Ebert and Strack (2015) show that a naive agent can always find a non-trivial
gambling strategy at every wealth level which is strictly preferred to stopping immediately.
From this, it is inferred that a naive agent will never stop voluntarily, and this casts doubts
over the applicability of PT in a dynamic context. When randomised strategies are allowed,
however, we show that the optimal strategy of a naive agent may involve stopping with
positive probability. Through detailed analysis of two stylised examples as well as numerical
studies on a more general model, we show that voluntary cessation of gambling with naive
agents is possible which is a more realistic prediction.
A multi-asset Merton’s investment and consumption problem with transaction costs
is studied in Chapter 3. In general it is di cult to make analytical progress towards a
solution in such a problem, but we specialise to a case where transaction costs are zero
except for sales and purchases of a single asset which we call the illiquid asset. Leveraging
xiii
the analysis of Hobson et al. (2016) for the model with a single risky asset only, we show
that the underlying HJB equation can be transformed into a first order boundary value
problem. The optimal strategy is to trade the illiquid asset only when the fraction of the
total portfolio value invested in this asset falls outside a fixed interval. Important properties
of the multi-asset problem (including when the problem is well-posed, ill-posed, or well-posed
only for large transaction costs) can be inferred from the behaviours of a quadratic function
of a single variable and another algebraic function. We also discuss some comparative static
results and their financial interpretations.
xiv
Chapter 1
Probability weighting and price
disposition e↵ect in an asset
liquidation model
“Take care to sell your horse before he dies. The art of life is passing
losses on.”
— Robert Frost, The Ingenuities of Debt
1.1 Introduction
Despite the attractiveness of the principles of expected utility theory (EUT), it has long
been recognised that it fails to fully explain individuals’ attitudes towards risk. One of
the most prominent alternatives to EUT is prospect theory (PT), originally proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and extended later by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). PT
features the following key ingredients. First, utilities or values are derived in terms of gains
and losses relative to a reference point rather than the final wealth level. Second, the value
function exhibits concavity in the domain of gains and convexity in the domain of losses,
and is steeper for losses than for gains to capture a phenomenon known as loss aversion.
Finally, the most distinctive feature of PT is that cumulative probabilities are re-weighted
such that individuals overweight tail events.
In recent years, probability weighting has been successfully linked, both theoreti-
1
cally and empirically, to a wide range of financial phenomena.1 Barberis and Huang (2008)
show that, in a financial market where investors evaluate risk according to prospect the-
ory, probability weighting leads to the prediction that the skewness in an asset’s return
distribution will be priced. This idea has been used to explain low average returns of IPO
stocks (Green and Hwang (2012)), the apparent overpricing of out-of-the-money options
and the variance premium (Polkovnichenko and Zhao (2013), Baele et al. (2014)), the lack
of diversification in household portfolios (Polkovnichenko (2005)), why riskier firms grant
more stock options to non-executive employees (Spalt (2013)), and many other puzzles. On
an aggregate scale, De Giorgi and Legg (2012) show that probability weighting is useful
in generating a large equity premium - and can do so independently of loss aversion (Be-
nartzi and Thaler (1995)). Probability weighting has also been helpful in understanding
betting behaviour - the favourite long-shot bias (see Schneider and Spalt (2016) who show
CEOs allocate capital with a long-shot bias) and the popularity of casino gambling (Bar-
beris (2012)). In this chapter, we contribute to this broad agenda by showing that in the
setting of dynamic models of investor trading, probability weighting can, in combination
with the other elements of prospect theory, generate more realistic trading behaviour and
satisfactorily explain an empirical anomaly known as the price disposition e↵ect.
The disposition e↵ect is one of the most robust e↵ects in the empirical literature on
investors’ behaviours. It refers to the stylised fact that investors have a higher propensity to
sell risky assets with capital gains compared to risky assets with capital losses (Shefrin and
Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Genesove and Mayer (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001),
Feng and Seasholes (2005), Dhar and Zhu (2006), Kaustia (2010), Jin and Scherbina (2011),
Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012), Birru (2015)). Odean’s well known study computes the
frequency with which individual investors sell winners and losers relative to opportunities
to sell each and finds gains are realised at a rate around 50% higher than losses. Although
prospect theory provides a leading explanation of the disposition e↵ect (Odean (1998),
Shefrin and Statman (1985)),2 the literature linking the two is largely silent on the impact
of the probability weighting feature of prospect theory. We fill this gap in the current
chapter.
1See Barberis (2013) for a discussion and overview.
2Odean (1998) explicitly considers expected utility explanations for the asymmetry across winners and
losers based on richer specifications of the investor’s problem, finding that portfolio rebalancing, transaction
costs, taxes, and rationally anticipated mean reversion cannot explain the observed asymmetry. Weber and
Camerer (1998) find that incorrect beliefs concerning mean reversion cannot explain the disposition e↵ect
either.
2
The well known intuition from Shefrin and Statman (1985) linking PT to the dis-
position e↵ect argues that PT’s risk seeking over losses encourages investors to continue
gambling when losing, whilst risk aversion over gains means investors tend to sell assets
which have increased in value. Since this is a static argument, there has been a recent
program in the literature attempting to build rigorous models formalising this link in a dy-
namic setting. Despite the intuition, it is a challenge for existing prospect theory models to
explain the disposition e↵ect (Kyle et al. (2006), Kaustia (2010), Barberis and Xiong (2009),
Barberis and Xiong (2012), Henderson (2012), Li and Yang (2013)).3 Indeed, the jury is still
out. The di culty is that although the convexity over losses and loss aversion do indeed act
to encourage the investor to continue gambling in the domain of losses, this e↵ect tends to
be too strong. In many models the investor rarely (or even never) stops voluntarily, giving
an extreme disposition e↵ect.4 Progress has been made by Ingersoll and Jin (2013) who
study a realisation utility model with reference dependent S shaped preferences and show
that consideration of reinvestment improves the range of parameters over which losses are
taken. The model of Ingersoll and Jin (2013) gives an improved fit to the disposition e↵ect,
but requires considerable adjustments on the Tversky-Kahneman (TK) value functions and
how they are applied.5
In this chapter we show the inclusion of probability weighting makes it easier for
prospect theory to deliver a realistic level of the disposition e↵ect. Intuitively, overweighting
of extremely poor outcomes encourages the investor to stop-loss earlier in the loss region,
while overweighting of extremely good outcomes provides him the incentive to let the profit
run when winning. In isolation, therefore, probability weighting would work in the opposite
direction to the disposition e↵ect. When used in tandem with the other ingredients of PT
(S shaped value function, loss aversion), probability weighting moderates the level of the
disposition e↵ect predicted by the model to give values which are much closer to observed
3There are other theories of the reference point that can potentially generate a disposition e↵ect, such as
a reference point given by a weighted average of recent prices (Weber and Camerer (1998), Odean (1998)),
or by investors’ expectations (Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), Meng and Weng (2016), Magnani (2015)).
4Most of this literature finds the investor never sells at a loss. An exception is Henderson (2012), who
shows that under the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value function, there is a loss threshold at which
the investor will sell, but this only occurs for ranges of parameters where the stock has very poor expected
returns, ie. where the investor gives up despite her loss aversion and convex preferences. For higher expected
returns, an extreme disposition e↵ect still emerges as loss aversion and convexity are dominant forces.
5First, the value function is applied over rates of return rather than dollar changes. Second, the TK
value function is altered so that the marginal utility at the origin is finite. Further, an implausibly high risk
seeking parameter is needed to obtain a good fit. To obtain a better fit for plausible parameters Ingersoll
and Jin (2013) mix 50-50 realisation utility investors with random Poisson traders.
3
empirical levels. Indeed, we show the model can match Odean’s measure of the disposition
e↵ect with realistic parameters.
Researchers studying the disposition e↵ect have also recently examined how the rate
of sale of stocks depends upon the relative magnitude of gains or losses (Feng and Seasholes
(2005), Seru et al. (2010), Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012), Barber and Odean (2013)
and An (2016)). There is broad agreement amongst researchers that the estimated hazard
rate, as a function of returns since purchase, is higher on gains than on losses. This is an
evidence in favour of a disposition e↵ect amongst investors because the higher level over
gains means that the average propensity to sell is higher for gains than for losses. In our
model we derive a trading rule - expressed as a price-level dependent selling rate per unit
time - which is consistent with the optimal behaviour of a PT investor. We generalise this
model-based selling intensity to multiple heterogeneous investors with di↵erent preferences.
We demonstrate that with heterogeneous investors with TK value and weighting functions,
and di↵ering loss aversion levels, the model’s implied selling rate matches the qualitative
features of the empirical data including the disposition e↵ect. Furthermore, the model is
able to get reasonably close on magnitudes - including the daily probabilities of sale in the
empirical data.
Probability weighting has two main impacts on the optimal trading strategy of a
PT investor. First, the PT investor no longer aims for a simple threshold strategy on
gains. Instead, probability weighting on gains encourages the investor to aim for a long-
tailed distribution, placing some probability mass on extremely high gains precisely because
these are the outcomes that are overweighted by the investor under probability weighting.
Second, overweighting of extreme losses encourages the investor to stop - and thus we see
a finite stop-loss threshold for a wider range of parameters than those found in the absence
of probability weighting. Taken together, we show that the optimal target distribution of
asset sale price for a PT investor consists of a single stop-loss threshold and a continuous
distribution over gains. The distribution over gains is long right tailed, because the investor
wishes to gamble on the very best returns, which he overweights. This can be contrasted to
investor behaviour in PT models without probability weighting (Ingersoll and Jin (2013),
Henderson (2012) and Barberis and Xiong (2012)) which produce two-sided thresholds.
The new solution structure could explain two other well documented phenomena: the use of
trading strategies which are of stop-loss form but not stop-gain and the gambling preferences
implicit in the investment choices of retail investors for right-skewed asset returns.
Underpinning our results on the disposition e↵ect is the important technical progress
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we make on the form of the optimal prospect for a PT investor. We work in a continuous
time, infinite horizon, dynamic optimal stopping model of asset trading where investors have
PT preferences and probability weighting. A mathematical building block for our work is
Xu and Zhou (2013) who also focus on characterising the optimal strategy for a PT investor
who can precommit but most of their results are for gains (or losses) separately.6 Our results
are proved under a condition on the value function and the weighting function applied to
losses which we call the elasticity condition. Under this assumption, and with general asset
price processes, we characterise the investor’s optimal prospect or distribution as a single
loss threshold together with a continuous distribution over gains.7 This characterisation is
valid for all of the popular functions in the literature, including the value and weighting
functions of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) since each of these specifications satisfies the
elasticity hypothesis.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2 we formulate our problem of
asset liquidation under PT preferences and state the main result. We take the Tversky and
Kahneman value and weighting functions as the base model in Section 1.3 and provide some
numerical results to highlight the features of the optimal trading strategies. To measure the
disposition e↵ect within our theoretical model, we present two approaches in Section 1.4
and Section 1.5 respectively based on the Odean’s disposition ratio and a selling intensity
function. Finally, we give our closing remarks in Section 1.6. Proofs and some supplementary
results are given in an appendix.
1.2 Model of asset liquidation under prospect theory
preferences
1.2.1 Elements of prospect theory
Under prospect theory, utility is evaluated in terms of gains and losses relative to a reference
point, rather than over final wealth. Denote by Z a random variable and by R the reference
6Although Xu and Zhou (2013) consider a variety of shapes of value and weighting functions, they do not
treat Tversky and Kahneman (1992) inverse-S shaped weighting functions together with S shaped utility.
Furthermore, although we can deduce from their results that the optimal prospect on losses places mass on
at most three points, they do not obtain a single loss threshold, and they do not consider implications for
the disposition e↵ect. Thus, they cannot speak to the questions we answer in this chapter.
7We believe this structure for the solution holds more generally, but the elasticity condition provides a
simple su cient condition which can be checked on the value function and probability weighting function
separately. This decoupling makes the su cient condition relatively simple to check.
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point or level and let Y = Z   R denote the gain or loss relative to the reference level.
Let U be the (continuous, strictly increasing, twice di↵erentiable away from zero) utility or
value function defined over the range of Y such that U(0) = 0. Under prospect theory, U is
concave over gains and convex over losses. It also exhibits loss aversion, whereby a loss has
a larger impact than a gain of equal magnitude.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose power functions of the form
U(y) =
8><>:y
↵+ , y > 0,
 k( y)↵  , y < 0,
(1.1)
where 0 < ↵± < 1. The parameters 1   ↵+ and 1   ↵  represent the coe cients of
risk aversion and risk seeking, respectively. The parameter k > 1 governs loss aversion,
introducing an asymmetry about the origin. Experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) give estimates of ↵+ = ↵  = 0.88 and k = 2.25.
The final ingredient of prospect theory is that the probabilities of extreme events
are overweighted where the degree of distortion can di↵er for gain and loss outcomes. Let
w± : [0, 1] 7! [0, 1] be a pair of (continuous, strictly increasing, di↵erentiable) probability
weighting functions with w±(0) = 0, w±(1) = 1. Then the prospect theory value of Z is
given by (see Kothiyal et al. (2011))
E(Z) =
Z 1
0
w+(P(U(Z  R) > y))dy  
Z 0
 1
w (P(U(Z  R) < y))dy. (1.2)
Many experimental studies (e.g. Camerer and Ho (1994), Wu and Gonzalez (1996),
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) and recent empirical estimates (Polkovnichenko and Zhao
(2013)) find that individuals typically overweight the events in the tails of the distribution.
Overweighting of small probabilities on extreme events suggests the probability weighting
functions w± should be inverse-S shaped functions. In particular there exist q± such that
w± is concave on [0, q±] and convex on [q±, 1]. Moreover, experimental studies typically
demonstrate that w±(1/2) < 1/2. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the probability
weighting functions
w±(p) =
p ±
(p ± + (1  p) ±)1/ ± (1.3)
for 0.28 <  ± 6 1.8 Median estimates of  ± are reported to be  + = 0.61 and    = 0.69.
Alternative forms of w± proposed in the literature include Goldstein and Einhorn (1987)
and Prelec (1998).9
8A lower bound on  ± is required to ensure monotonicity of w±.
9The Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Prelec (1998) weighting functions are given by:
wGE± (p) =
 ±pd±
 ±pd± + (1  p)d±
, wP±(p) = exp( b±(  ln p)a± ) (1.4)
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1.2.2 Model formulation
Our model is a partial equilibrium framework with an infinite horizon. An investor holds an
asset whose price at time t is given by Pt. He can sell or liquidate the asset at any time in
the future. At the liquidation time ⌧ of his choice,10 he receives the price P⌧ and compares it
to his reference level R, which may be the breakeven level or price paid for the asset.11 The
realised gain or loss to the investor at the sale time is the di↵erence between the asset price
and reference level, P⌧  R, which he evaluates at the outset by (1.2) on setting Z = P⌧ .
The goal of the investor is to choose the best time ⌧ to sell the asset to maximise
the PT value:12
sup
⌧
✓Z 1
0
w+ (P (U (P⌧  R) > y)) dy  
Z 0
 1
w  (P (U (P⌧  R) < y)) dy
◆
. (1.5)
Note that if w±(p) = p so that there is no probability weighting, we recover the model of
Henderson (2012) (see also Kyle et al. (2006)).
In general, we can model the asset price P = (Pt)t>0 by a time-homogeneous di↵u-
sion with state space J , given by
dPt = P (Pt)dt+  P (Pt)dBt. (1.6)
Here B = (Bt)t>0 is a standard Brownian motion and P : J ! R and  P : J ! (0,1) are
Borel functions. We assume J is an interval with endpoints  1  aJ < bJ  1 and that
P is regular in (aJ , bJ). We will later specialise to the most popular asset price specification
where P is a geometric Brownian motion (or equivalently P is lognormal). In that case
J = (0,1), P (p) = p and  P (p) =  p for constants  and  .
Following Henderson (2012) it is convenient to reformulate the objective (1.5) by
transforming the asset price into a martingale. We define Xt := s(Pt) where the scale
function s ensuresX is a (local) martingale.13 We are free to normalise s such that s(R) = 0,
respectively, for parameters 0 <  ± < 1, 0 < d± < 1 and a± > 0, 0 < b±  1.
10The liquidation time ⌧ must be a stopping time.
11In common with the prospect theory models we compare to, we consider a fixed reference level.
12In common with Kyle et al. (2006), Henderson (2012), we take zero interest rate for tractability reasons.
If we were to include time discounting, the discounting of losses will encourage sale delay, but this will not be
due to the prospect theory preferences or probability weighting. Indeed, Barberis and Xiong (2012) show a
piecewise linear realisation utility investor with positive time discounting will never sell at a loss voluntarily.
13The scale function of P can be identified as the increasing, non-degenerate solution (which is unique
up to positive a ne transformation) to the ordinary di↵erential equation
1
2
 2P (p)s
00(p) + P (p)s0(p) = 0.
Then X = (Xt)t 0 defined by Xt := s(Pt) is a (local) martingale. We assume that P (.) and  P (.) are
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and hence Xt > 0 when Pt > R and Xt 6 0 when Pt 6 R. Then Xt represents the
transformed gains and losses relative to the reference level. If we take the reference level to
be the initial asset price R = P0, then X0 = 0.
The state space of X is an interval with endpoints L = s(aJ) and M = s(bJ). Then
L < 0 represents the potential maximum loss. We assume L >  1 to ensure the problem
is non-degenerate or well-posed. Define
v(x) := U
 
s 1(x) R  = U (p R) .
Then the investor’s objective (1.5) can be rewritten as
sup
⌧
 Z v(M)=U(bJ R)
0
w+ (P (v(X⌧ ) > y)) dy  
Z 0
U(aJ R)=v(L)
w  (P (v(X⌧ ) < y)) dy
!
.
(1.7)
One of the insights of Xu and Zhou (2013) is that the argument in (1.7) only depends on
the law of X⌧ . Hence, (1.7) can in turn be rewritten as
sup
⌫2A
 Z v(M)
0
w+
 
1  F⌫(v 1(y))
 
dy  
Z 0
v(L)
w 
 
F⌫(v
 1(y))
 
dy
!
(1.8)
where A is the set of attainable laws of X⌧ and F⌫ is the cumulative distribution function of
the law ⌫. The set of attainable laws A can be characterised by A = {⌫ : R y⌫(dy) = X0}.14
Our investor evaluates (1.8) at the outset and commits today to achieve the desired target
distribution or prospect.
1.2.3 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value and weighting func-
tions: the base model
Our aim, once we have some general characterisations to guide us, is to apply our results
to study the most popular value and weighting functions. We will consider the Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) value function in (1.1), which is of piecewise power S shape together
su ciently regular that there exists a weak solution to the stochastic di↵erential equation (1.6) and that
the scale function s exists (see Revuz and Yor (1999)).
14At this point the fact that X is a local martingale is important since it allows us to give a simple
characterisation of the space of attainable laws. Since L >  1 such that X is bounded below, it is a
supermartingale and any attainable law ⌫ must satisfy
R
y⌫(dy) = E[X⌧ ]  X0 = s(P0); conversely the
theory of Skorokhod embeddings tells us that for every law ⌫ with
R
y⌫(dy)  X0 there is a stopping rule
⌧ such that X⌧ ⇠ ⌫. Finally, since U is increasing, in searching for the supremum in (1.8) we may restrict
attention to laws satisfying
R
y⌫(dy) = X0. Hence we may set A = {⌫ :
R
y⌫(dy) = X0}. If ⌫⇤ is the
optimal law arising in (1.8), so that the optimal prospect for the process in natural scale is ⌫, then the
optimal prospect for P has law µ⇤ where Fµ⇤ (p) = F⌫⇤ (s(p)).
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with the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) inverse-S shaped weighting functions given in (1.3).
In the base model we will take the price to follow a geometric Brownian motion, so that
P = (Pt)t 0 solves
dPt = Pt(dt+  dBt) (1.9)
for constant expected return  and volatility   with  <  2/2. The hypothesis that  <  2/2
ensures the price does not reach arbitrarily high levels with probability one. (The case
    2/2 leads to a degenerate problem whereby the investor never sells.)
Define the constant parameter   := 1   2 2 which involves the return-for-risk-per-
unit-variance / 2 and thus reflects the expected performance of the asset. We assume
   0 so that in expectation P is non-decreasing and then    1. Our assumption  <  2/2
implies that   > 0. The scale function is given by s(p) = p    R  . Then, since   > 0 we
have L = s(aJ) = s(0) =  R  >  1, consistent with our non-degeneracy assumption, and
the scaled value function is given by
v(x) = U(s 1(x) R) =
8><>:
 
(x+R )1/   R ↵+ , x > 0,
 k  R  (x+R )1/  ↵  ,  R   x < 0, (1.10)
where we use M = s(1) =1.
In addition to   > 0 we require some further restrictions on parameter values to
avoid situations leading to infinite PT value and to obtain a well defined optimal strategy.
First, if the growth rate or Sharpe ratio on the asset is too large relative to risk aversion, the
investor simply waits indefinitely to take advantage of the favourable asset. To rule this out,
we need that ↵+ <  .15 Under this assumption (together with the condition that   6 1) it
can be checked by di↵erentiation that v is concave on [0,1) and convex on [L, 0]. In fact,
the following result shows that for well-posedness we require a slightly stronger condition
incorporating the strength of probability weighting on gains. The proof is given in Appendix
1.C.
Proposition 1.1. In our base case model with Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value and
weighting functions, ↵+/ + <   is a su cient condition for there to be a finite value function
and a well defined optimum. On the other hand, if ↵+/ + >   then the problem is ill-posed.
The inclusion of probability weighting over gains has increased the set of scenarios
whereby the investor waits indefinitely. Rewriting the condition for a non-degenerate solu-
15A similar condition also arises in standard infinite horizon portfolio problems.
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Figure 1.1: A graphical illustration of the elasticity measure E(x; f, c). The left and right sketch
correspond to cases with x > c and x < c respectively. Consider a reference point on f given by
(c, f(c)). Then f(x) f(c)x c is the slope of the straight line L2 joining the reference point and (x, f(x)),
while f 0(x) is the slope of the tangent to f at x denoted by L1. Hence, for a fixed c, E(x; f, c) can
be interpreted as the ratio of slope of L1 and L2 as x varies.
tion as  + > ↵+/ , we see that we cannot have probability weighting over gains to be too
strong, as this will cause the investor to simply continue waiting.
1.2.4 Elasticity measure
We end this section by introducing an elasticity measure which will be useful in allowing us
to characterise the optimal solution.
Definition 1.2. For a monotonic and continuously di↵erentiable function f : S ! R, the
elasticity measure (parameterised by x) relative to a reference point c is defined as
Ef,c(x) = E(x; f, c) =
(x  c)f 0(x)
f(x)  f(c) =
f 0(x)
f(x) f(c)
x c
where x, c 2 S and x 6= c. At x = c, and provided f 0(c) 6= 0, we define E(c; f, c) = 1 by
L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
For a graphical interpretation of this measure, see Figure 1.1.
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The elasticity measure in Definition 1.2 has several useful properties, the derivations
of which are straightforward, but are given in Appendix 1.D.
Proposition 1.3. Let ◆ denote the identity function ◆(x) = x, and suppose f and g are
monotonic and continuously di↵erentiable. Let a 6= 0 and b be constants. Then E(x; a◆ +
b, c) = 1 and E(x; g   f, c) = E(x; f, c)E(f(x); g, f(c)).
The above results are key in proving the following.
Proposition 1.4. 1. Suppose 0 < ↵  < 1 and 0 <    1. If v(x) =  k
 
R  (x+R )1/  ↵ 
for  R  = L  x  0 then E(x; v, c) is increasing in x for x 2 [L, 0] for fixed c 2 [L, 0).
2. If the weighting function w is of the form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) or Prelec (1998) and has inflexion point q then E(p;w, r)
is decreasing in p for 0  p  min{r, q} for any r in [0, 1].
1.2.5 The main result
In what follows we assume that U is S shaped, w± is inverse-S shaped with inflexion point
q±, L = s(aJ) >  1 and M = s(bJ) =1. Recall the definition v(x) := U(s 1(x) R).
Assumption 1.5 (S shaped assumption on v). v is concave on [0,1) and convex on [L, 0].
Further, v0(0+) =1 and limx"1 v0(x) = 0.
Note that this assumption is satisfied in our base case, and more generally whenever
U 0(0+) = 1, limp"bJ=1 U 0(p) = 0 and P is a martingale whence the scale function is the
identity function. More generally it depends on the interplay between the value function U
and the dynamics of the price process.
Assumption 1.6 (Elasticity assumption). E(x; v, L) is increasing in x for x 2 [L, 0] and
E(p;w , r) is decreasing in p for 0  p  min{r, q } for any r in [0, 1].
By Proposition 1.4 both parts of the Elasticity Assumption are satisfied in the base
case model. They are satisfied for a range of other probability weighting and value functions
as well.
Our main theoretical result is the following where a full proof is presented in Ap-
pendix 1.B.
Proposition 1.7. Suppose Assumptions 1.5 and 1.6 hold. Then the optimal prospect has
a distribution which consists of a point mass in the loss regime and a point mass at some
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point a in the gains regime, together with a continuous distribution on the unbounded interval
(a,1).
More precisely, the quantile function of the optimal prospect P⌧ is given by GP :=
s 1 GX where GX represents the quantile function of the optimal scaled prospect X⌧ = s(P⌧ )
taking the form
GX(u) =
8>>><>>>:
  11  
hR  
0 (v
0) 1
⇣
 
w0+( ^y)
⌘
dy  X0
i
, u  1   ,
(v0) 1
⇣
 
w0+( )
⌘
, 1    < u  1   ,
(v0) 1
⇣
 
w0+(1 u)
⌘
, 1   < u  1,
(1.11)
for some   > 0,   2 [0, 1],   q+ ^   such that
X+0 
Z  
0
(v0) 1
✓
 
w0+( ^ y)
◆
dy  X0   (1   )L.
It follows that the optimal strategy for a PT investor is a stop-loss combined with
a strategy yielding a long-tailed distribution on gains.
1.3 Numerical results under the base model
We now examine the optimal sales strategies for the investor with Tversky and Kahneman
value and weighting functions. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated the preference
parameters as: ↵+ = ↵  = 0.88, loss aversion k = 2.25. The TK parameters arise from
experimental settings with small gamble sizes and we would expect higher levels of risk
aversion in a financial trading setting. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) estimate ↵+ = 0.5 when
they use the TK parameterisation. Furthermore, Ingersoll and Jin (2013) consider ↵+ =
0.5,↵  = 0.9 as one of their base parameter sets. For consistency, we will also adopt
↵+ = 0.5, ↵  = 0.9 as our base case. Our base loss aversion parameter level is k = 1.25.
For all parameters we will consider a range of values when we look at comparative statics.
Estimates of the TK probability weighting parameters have been quite consistent across
experimental and empirical studies. TK estimate the probability weighting parameters
as  + = 0.61,    = 0.69. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) find experimentally that  + = 0.71.
Recently Baele et al. (2014) estimate the degree of probability weighting from S&P 500
equity and option data and report a range of 0.72-0.79. Reflecting these findings, we take
base parameters of  + =    = 0.7.
As described in Proposition 1.7, the optimal prospect consists of a single loss thresh-
old together with a distribution over gains. Figure 1.2 illustrates the results for our base
set of parameters. Note the reference level is taken to be R = P0 = 1, so prices above 1
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represent gains and below 1, losses. In panel (a), we display the optimal quantile function.
The distribution on losses is a point mass. The investor places just over 0.4 of the proba-
bility mass onto the single loss threshold of about 0.7, which is a 30% loss relative to the
reference level. The remainder of the probability mass is distributed over the gains, starting
just above the reference level of one, and tailing o↵ at around 2.4. (More precisely, the level
2.4 represents the upper 99th percentile of the distribution.) We see the distribution over
gains is highly positively skewed, in that the investor puts most weight on the value of the
stock close to the reference level, and the distribution has a long right tail. We will take a
closer look at skewness measures in Section 1.3.2.
We first recap the form of the solution in the absence of probability weighting, when
 + =    = 1. In this case (see Henderson (2012)), the optimal strategy is a threshold sale
strategy. There will be a gain threshold level and a loss threshold level, and the optimal
strategy is to stop the first time the price process leaves this interval. The corresponding
prospect is a distribution on exactly two points. Typically the gain threshold is very close to
the reference level. For some price parameters, the loss threshold is at zero, and it is never
optimal to sell at a loss. (Instead, sale is postponed indefinitely). For other parameters,
there will be a loss threshold, which is usually much further from the reference level than the
gain threshold. Thus, if losses are realised, they are much larger in size than gains. Why?
The marginal utility of a gain or loss is decreasing with size, so small gains and large losses
are preferable. When the asset price parameters are such that    1, there is no lower loss
threshold and the investor avoids voluntary losses. This is the case in panel (b) of Figure
1.2 for  + =    = 1. In this case, the convexity of the utility and loss aversion together
mean that the investor prefers to continue to gamble and delay any losses.
Now we can look at the impact of probability weighting on the distribution. In panel
(b), the probability weighting parameter  + =    is varied on the x-axis. For varying values
of  + =   , we display the single loss threshold together with the lower bound and upper
99th percentile of the distribution over the gains regime. Note that a loss threshold of zero
in the figure e↵ectively represents the situation where the investor never voluntarily realises
losses. The vertical dashed line on the figure represents the base parameters for probability
weighting and thus corresponds to the values used in panel (a).
We can now see the key impact of probability weighting. As we introduce probability
weighting by reducing the values of  +,   , we see the optimal prospect on gains completely
changes character and switches from a point mass to a distribution with unbounded support.
The tail of this distribution gets larger as probability weighting increases in strength. Why
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is this the case? Risk aversion alone makes small gains attractive. However now the investor
overweights extreme events - in particular extreme gains - and this encourages him to place
some probability mass on these extreme wins. His distribution over gains is right-skewed in
that most mass is still concentrated on lower gain levels, but probability weighting causes
him to want to gamble on the best wins by placing some mass there. As probability weighting
becomes stronger, the investor places mass on more and more extreme wins and hence the
upper 99th percentile increases as  + decreases.
As probability weighting becomes su ciently large ( ± below about 0.75 in panel (b)
thus including our base parameter of 0.7), we see that there will also be a strictly positive
lower loss threshold at which the investor voluntarily takes losses. There are two forces
driving this. First, the convexity and loss aversion are encouraging the investor to wait and
avoid taking a loss. But now the investor overweights extreme events - in particular - extreme
losses - which encourages him to cut-losses at some threshold. Importantly, the parameter
region where a non-trivial loss threshold is present includes the levels of probability weighting
commonly estimated in experimental and empirical studies.
We now return to the optimal distribution generated by our model and perform
some comparative statics. We focus on the analogs of Panel (b) in Figure 1.2, and the
location of the threshold on losses, together with the location of point mass on gains, and
the 99% upper quantile of the distribution. In Figure 1.3 we investigate the impact of the
probability weighting on gains and losses separately, the e↵ect of risk aversion on gains and
risk seeking on losses, and the impact of loss aversion on the investor’s behaviour. Panels
(a)-(e) plot the investor’s optimal distribution as we vary each of the parameters in turn.
In each panel, we indicate the location of the base parameter with a vertical dashed line.
Panels (a) and (b) vary one of the probability weighting parameters whilst keeping
the other fixed. We see that it is    that is governing whether there is a lower loss threshold
and that we need enough weighting but not too much. If probability weighing on losses is
not su ciently strong, then the investor never takes a loss. However, panel (b) also shows
that if    is too low, ie. weighting on losses is too strong, then again, the investor never
stops at a loss threshold.
Panels (c) and (d) vary the risk aversion and seeking parameters separately, whilst
holding all other parameters fixed at their base values. In panel (c) we observe that higher
levels of risk aversion results in the distribution over gains being pulled down closer to the
reference level. If risk aversion over gains is su ciently strong, below about 0.4 in the panel,
the investor no longer realises losses. At the other extreme, we know that if risk aversion over
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gains is not strong enough, it violates the condition in Proposition 1 and the investor instead
waits indefinitely. For the parameters in the graph, this would occur for values of ↵+ > 0.63.
In particular, we see that under the original TK parameters ↵+ = ↵  = 0.88 (particularly
low levels of risk aversion/seeking), the investor violates the condition in Proposition 1.1 and
thus waits forever to sell, unless the expected return on the asset is unrealistically large and
negative. A similar observation has been made by Ingersoll and Jin (2013) in the absence
of probability weighting.
In panel (d) we see that as we increase the risk seeking parameter on losses (decrease
↵ ) the convexity of the utility becomes stronger and encourages the investor to avoid taking
a loss. Precisely where the convexity becomes the dominant force will depend upon other
parameters. If the asset was less attractive, then the investor would sell at a loss threshold
for a larger range of ↵ , and if the probability weighting on losses was stronger (but not
too strong), the investor would again stop at a loss threshold for a larger range of ↵ .
In panel (e) we vary loss aversion. As loss aversion becomes stronger, the investor
chooses a loss threshold which is closer to the reference level as he is less willing to wait in
the domain of losses. Larger values of k also reduce the long right-tail on gains.
1.3.1 PT trading and stop-loss strategies
We have shown that a prospect theory investor with S shaped utility, loss aversion and
probability weighting will trade to achieve a distribution over gains but will desire a stop-
loss threshold over losses. This di↵erence in how the investor trades gains and losses matches
very well how investors behave in financial markets. Stop-loss strategies are in widespread
usage in practice but stop-gain or take-gain strategies are much rarer.
Despite the popularity of stop-loss strategies in financial markets, they are not that
easily justified by financial theory. Kaminski and Lo (2014) derive the impact of a stop-
loss rule on the return characteristics of a portfolio and find stop-loss rules can increase
the expected return if returns are non-random walks. Shefrin and Statman (1985) discuss
stop-loss strategies in the context of self control - a stop-loss allows an investor to make
loss realisation at a predetermined point automatic. Fischbacher et al. (2015) test this idea
by investigating in a laboratory experiment whether the option of automatic selling devices
causally reduces investors’ disposition e↵ect. Investors who had access to the automatic
selling devices had significantly smaller disposition e↵ects, which was driven by a significant
increase in realised losses. They show it is the opportunity to ex ante commit to selling losses,
which reduces the disposition e↵ect. In contrast, neither the proportion of winners realised,
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Figure 1.2: The optimal distribution in the model with Tversky and Kahneman value and weighting
functions. The optimal distribution consists of a single loss threshold together with a distribution
over the gains region. In panel (a), we display the optimal quantile function with asset price P
on the y-axis. In panel (b), the probability weighting parameter  + =    is varied on the x-axis.
Displayed are the single loss threshold together with the lower bound and upper 99th percentile
of the distribution over gains. The vertical dashed line indicates the base parameter value of
 ± = 0.7 corresponding to panel (a). Base parameters used in both panels are ↵+ = 0.5, ↵  = 0.9,
 + =    = 0.7, k = 1.25,   = 0.9, R = 1 and P0 = 1.
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Figure 1.3: Comparative statics with respect to parameters with Tversky and Kahneman value
and weighting functions. The optimal distribution consists of a single loss threshold together with a
distribution over the gains region. In each panel, we display the single loss threshold together with
the lower bound and upper 99th percentile of the distribution over the gains regime. Each panel
varies one parameter at a time, keeping the others fixed at base values. The vertical line marks
the location of the relevant base parameter in each panel. Base parameters used are ↵+ = 0.5,
↵  = 0.9,  + =    = 0.7, k = 1.25,   = 0.9, R = 1 and P0 = 1.
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nor the size of realised gains di↵ered significantly across the treatments with automatic
limits or no limits.
Standard expected utility settings can predict a stop-gain threshold at which an
investor should sell but tend to put any lower threshold at  1 (see Viefers and Strack
(2014)). Realisation utility (Barberis and Xiong (2012)) predicts a stop-gain threshold
which resets each time a sale is made. If models do predict a stop-loss, they tend to also
predict a stop-gain. This is the case in several prospect theory models without probability
weighting - for instance, Henderson (2012) and Ingersoll and Jin (2013).
In contrast, we have shown a PT investor with probability weighting finds a stop-loss
desirable but does not want to place a stop-gain. Instead, probability weighting encourages
him to gamble on obtaining extreme (overweighted) gains. This fundamental di↵erence in
behaviour with regard to losses and gains in our model mirrors very well what we see in the
financial markets.
1.3.2 PT trading and skewness
Prospect theory and skewness are heavily linked in the extant literature. Barberis and
Huang (2008) show that in a financial market where investors evaluate risk according to
prospect theory, probability weighting leads to the prediction that skewness in an asset’s
return distribution will be priced. Spalt (2013) argues using probability weighting that
firms can use stock options to benefit from catering to an employee demand for lottery-like
payo↵s. Ebert and Hilpert (2015) show a strong preference for skewness contributes to the
attractiveness of technical trading.
To demonstrate the role of probability weighting on skewness in our model, we
calculate a measure of skewness for the optimal distribution under our base model with
Tversky and Kahneman value and weighting functions. We use the robust, tail or quantile
based measure of skewness of Hinkley (1975) (see Ebert and Hilpert (2015), Green and
Hwang (2012) and Conrad et al. (2013))
 (0.99) =
F 1(0.99) + F 1(0.01)  2F 1(1/2)
F 1(0.99)  F 1(0.01)
where F is the cumulative distribution function. Note that skewness is an attempt to
summarise the shape of a distribution in a single statistic, which is often a di cult task.
 (0.99) depends only on the quantiles at 0.01, 0.5 and 0.99.
In Figure 1.4 we plot skewness, as measured by  (0.99), across di↵erent levels of the
probability weighting parameter  ±. The corresponding optimal distribution for the same
18
δ
+
=δ
-
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Γ
(0.
99
)
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(a)
Figure 1.4: Skewness measure for the optimal distribution in the model with Tversky and
Kahneman value and weighting functions. The skewness measure  (0.99) is plotted for
varying values of the probability weighting parameter  ±. The vertical dashed line indicates
the base parameter value of  ± = 0.7. Other base parameters are ↵+ = 0.5, ↵  = 0.9,
k = 1.25,   = 0.9, R = 1 and P0 = 1.
parameter choice was displayed earlier in Figure 1.2. We first observe that skewness can be
positive or negative, and can take values over the full range of +1 and -1, depending on the
level of probability weighting.
Without probability weighting, PT investors take small gains frequently, with some
occasional large losses (Henderson (2012), Ingersoll and Jin (2013)). This typically leads
to a left or negatively skewed distribution. In particular, F 1(0.01) is zero, whereas both
F 1(0.5) and F 1(0.99) are equal and both just above P0 (the agent follows a two-sided
threshold strategy). It follows  (0.99) =  1 when  ± = 1. With an S shaped utility and no
probability weighting, investors prefer left skewed return distributions.
Once probability weighting is included, the skewness measure is no longer -1. The
investor does not follow a two-sided threshold and he looks for a long-tailed distribution
on gains. This tail gets larger as  ± decreases, although for  ± close to one, the return
distribution remains negatively skewed. For  ± greater than about 0.75 the optimal prospect
includes an atom at zero and the skewness statistic is negative. However, at  ± ⇠ 0.75 the
optimal prospect undergoes a step change and the mass on losses moves from zero to a
strictly positive level. This leads to a jump in the skewness statistic, which now becomes
positive. As  ± decreases further, the right tail on the optimal prospect becomes larger and
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the skewness increases further from about 0.2 to 0.6. Now the investor is taking losses of
moderate size, regular small gains, and occasional large gains.
The second jump in the skewness statistic occurs when the total mass on losses
reaches 0.5. For values of  ± below about 0.65, F 1(0.01) = F 1(0.5) < P0 < F 1(0.99)
and  (0.99) = +1. The optimal prospect places more than half of the mass on losses and
the skewness measure simplifies in a way which does not depend on either the location of
this mass, nor on the location of the point F 1(0.99) describing the size of the right tail.
Nonetheless, as probability weighting increases, the size of this right tail increases, even if
this change cannot be captured in the skewness statistic.
To summarise, as the strength of probability weighting increases, the investor’s
return distribution changes from left or negatively skewed to right or positively skewed and
the right tail becomes fatter. Most of this change is captured in the skewness statistic.
1.3.3 Recent experimental evidence
The vast majority of trading models - including those based on expected utility and those
based purely on the S shaped utility function of prospect theory (Henderson (2012), Barberis
and Xiong (2012), Ingersoll and Jin (2013) and Magnani (2016)) - predict investors sell
stocks when the price breaches a threshold or pair of thresholds. For example, if an investor
bought a stock at $100, he should sell when the price rises to say $105, or falls to say, $90.
If investors behaved according to such models, we should see them sell the first time the
price breaches such threshold limits.
In fact, recent evidence of Viefers and Strack (2014) shows that this is very often
not the case and individuals do not behave according to threshold rules. They conduct an
experiment in a sophisticated asset selling task whereby subjects played sixty-five rounds
during which they could sell their stock. In each round they observe a path of the market
price which follows a random walk with positive drift. Viefers and Strack (2014) present
evidence that players do not play cut-o↵ or threshold strategies - they do not behave time-
consistently within rounds 75% of the time, and visit the same price level three times
on average before stopping at it. Their findings are supportive of our model whereby an
investor with PT and probability weighting has an optimal target distribution over gains,
because, as we will show in Section 1.5, our investor stops at a rate at each price level.
Our research also has implications for the design of future experimental studies. Magnani
(2016)’s recent experimental evidence to support the disposition e↵ect is predicated on
the behaviour of subjects being well approximated by threshold rules. Our theoretical
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findings, combined with Viefer and Strack’s experimental observations, point to threshold-
type behaviour providing an incomplete description of individuals’ behaviours.
1.4 Explaining the disposition e↵ect: the Odean’s ratio
The disposition e↵ect is arguably the most prominent trading anomaly in financial economics
- the stylised fact that investors are on average more likely to sell a winner (an asset where
the investor has a gain relative to purchase price) than a loser (where the investor has a
loss). The e↵ect has been documented for individual investors (Odean (1998)), institutional
investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)) as well as in the real estate market (Genesove
and Mayer (2001)) and options markets (Poteshman and Serbin (2003)). Studies have also
examined the impact of trading experience (Feng and Seasholes (2005), Seru et al. (2010))
and investor sophistication (Dhar and Zhu (2006), Calvet et al. (2009), Grinblatt et al.
(2012)) on the disposition e↵ect. Finally, experimental evidence from the lab (Weber and
Camerer (1998) and more recently, Magnani (2015) and Magnani (2016)) is also supportive.
In this and the next section we present two ways to measure the strength of the
disposition e↵ect within our theoretical model. The first is to construct a disposition measure
based on the Odean (1998) measure, which focuses on the propensity to sell at a gain versus a
loss without consideration of the size of those trades. More recently, researchers have studied
how the sale propensity depends upon the magnitude as well as the sign of returns. Our
second method presented in Section 1.5 is to develop a model-based implied sale intensity
which can be compared to empirical selling schedules as recently documented in Barber and
Odean (2013) and Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012).
To test whether investors are disposed to selling winners and holding losers, we
need to look at the frequency with which they sell winners and losers relative to their
opportunities to sell each. Odean (1998) compares the proportion of gains realised (PGR)
to the proportion of losses realised (PLR) by 10 000 individual investors with accounts at
a discount brokerage firm over a six year period. Each time a stock is sold, the prices of all
unsold stocks in the investors’ portfolio are checked and it is recorded if they are trading at
a gain, loss or neither on that day. The PGR (PLR) is the number of times a gain (loss)
is realised as a fraction of the total number of times a gain (loss) could have been realised.
Odean (1998) reports PGR=0.148 and PLR = 0.098, giving a disposition ratio of 1.51, or
equivalently, investors realise gains at a 50% higher rate than losses. Using data over a
di↵erent time period, Dhar and Zhu (2006) obtain a slightly higher ratio of 2.06.
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Since we are working in continuous time, to capture the opportunities the investor
had to sell at a gain (loss) we calculate the expected amount of time the price spent in
the gain (loss) regime before a sale. A model-based measure of the rate of selling at gains
(losses), denoted RG (respectively, RL) is found by dividing the probability of selling at a
gain (loss) by the expected amount of time the price spent above (below) the initial price:
RG =
P(P⌧ > P0)
E(
R ⌧
0 1(Pu>P0)du)
, RL =
P(P⌧ < P0)
E(
R ⌧
0 1(Pu<P0)du)
where ⌧ is an optimal sale time in the model. Then, following Henderson (2012) (see also
Magnani (2015)) we define the disposition ratio D by
D =
RG
RL
=
P(P⌧ > P0)
E(
R ⌧
0 1(Pu>P0)du)
E(
R ⌧
0 1(Pu<P0)du)
P(P⌧ < P0)
. (1.12)
This is the continuous time analog of Odean’s measure. We say the disposition e↵ect occurs
when the ratio D is in excess of one.
Although the optimal prospect is typically unique there are several stopping rules
or strategies which are optimal in the sense that they attain this optimal prospect. An
important feature of (1.12) is that D does not depend on the stopping rule ⌧ , except through
the resulting prospect (the probability law of P⌧ ).
Proposition 1.8. The disposition ratio D in (1.12) depends on the optimal prospect, but
not on the stopping rule used to generate that prospect. Further, if the reference level R is
equal to the initial price level P0,16 then D can be rewritten in the form
D =
R1
0 ⌫(dx)R1
0
1
⇠2(x) (u⌫(x)  x) dx
R 0
L
1
⇠2(x) (u⌫(x) + x) dxR 0
L ⌫(dx)
(1.13)
where ⌫ is the probability law of the scaled target prospect X⌧ = s(P⌧ ), u⌫(x) := EX⇠⌫ [|X  
x|] is the potential function of ⌫ and ⇠(x) :=  P (s 1(x))s0(s 1(x)).
Proof. By construction X satisfies the SDE dXt = ⇠(Xt)dBt with initial value X0 = 0.
Let LX = (LXt (x))t 0,s(aJ )xs(bJ ) be the local time of X at level x by time t using the
standard normalisation of, say, Revuz and Yor (1999). (No confusion should arise between
L = s(aJ) and the local time LXt (x) since the former never has any sub- or superscripts.)
By the occupation times formula (Revuz and Yor (1999) [Theorem VI.1.6]), for any Borel
function  , Z
 (a)LXt (a)da =
Z t
0
 (Xs)d[X]s. (1.14)
16The choice of the reference level is not crucial and we impose R = P0 purely for the purpose of
expressions simplification.
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Clearly, P(P⌧ > P0) = P(X⌧ > 0) =
R1
0 ⌫(dx). Similarly P(P⌧ < P0) =
R 0
L ⌫(dx).
On the other hand,
E
✓Z ⌧
0
1(Pu>P0)du
◆
= E
✓Z ⌧
0
1(Xu>0)du
◆
= E
✓Z ⌧
0
1(Xu>0)
⇠2(Xu)
d[X]u
◆
= E
✓Z
1(x>0)
⇠2(x)
LX⌧ (x)dx
◆
=
Z 1
0
E(LX⌧ (x))
⇠2(x)
dx
where we use (1.14) for the penultimate equality. But, by Tanaka’s formula E(LX⌧ (a)) =
E|X⌧   a|  |X0   a|. Hence, writing u⌫(x) :=
R |z   x|⌫(dz)
E
✓Z ⌧
0
1(Pu>P0)du
◆
=
Z 1
0
1
⇠2(x)
(E|X⌧   x|  |X0   x|) dx =
Z 1
0
1
⇠2(x)
(u⌫(x)  x) dx
which is independent of the stopping rule used to realise ⌫. Similarly we can establish
E
✓Z ⌧
0
1(Pu<P0)du
◆
=
Z 0
L
1
⇠2(x)
(u⌫(x) + x) dx.
The representation (1.13) follows. ⇤
If we assume the investor is a PT value maximiser, then his optimal scaled prospect
can be computed from the optimal quantile function (see (1.11)), and we can calculate
D without making any assumption about how the investor trades to achieve the optimal
distribution.
Figure 1.5 plots the (base-10 logarithm of the) disposition ratio D against the Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992) weighting parameter in panel (a), loss aversion in panel (b),
and the weighting parameters separately in panels (c) and (d). Other parameters are our
base values. The horizontal dashed line in each panel represents Odean’s PGR/PLR of
log10 1.51 ⇡ 0.18. Our main finding is that in contrast to PT models without probabil-
ity weighting, the model incorporating weighting can indeed deliver Odean’s estimate. In
panel (a), we see that for a probability weighting parameter  ± of about 0.675, we obtain
a disposition ratio of about 1.5. In panel (b), holding other parameters fixed and varying
loss aversion, we see that for a loss aversion of around 2.25, the disposition ratio is again
about 1.5. The lower two panels (c) and (d) look at varying the two probability weighting
parameters separately. In panel (d) we see that values close to Odean’s measure can be
generated by a range of    between about 0.5 and 0.65, when  + = 0.7. It is also worth
noting that Dhar and Zhu (2006)’s disposition measure of 2.06 (log10 2.06 ⇡ 0.313) can be
obtained with slightly less probability weighting and a lower level of loss aversion.
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Figure 1.5: Base-10 logarithm of the disposition ratio D given in (1.12). Each panel varies
one parameter, keeping others fixed at base values. Other base parameters used are  ± = 0.7,
↵+ = 0.5, ↵  = 0.9,   = 0.9, k = 1.25. The reference level is R = 1, and the current price is
P0 = 1. The horizontal dashed lines mark Odean’s disposition estimate of log10 1.51 ⇡ 0.18.
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We see that as the degree of probability weighting becomes small, the measure of
the disposition e↵ect gets very large. As  ± ! 1, we recover the case in the absence of
probability weighting studied in Henderson (2012) where the calibrated disposition measure
was much greater than that found in the empirical data. Thus, probability weighting does
indeed help PT explain realistic levels of the disposition e↵ect.
We also comment on the impact of the level of risk aversion and risk seeking on the
disposition ratio. Parameters around the base values deliver Odean’s ratio of about 1.5. If
the investor is more risk averse over gains, then he will shrink the range of price gains over
which he stops, so will take smaller gains more frequently whilst also taking fewer losses,
which increases the disposition ratio. In the extreme, as 1   ↵+ gets su ciently large, the
investor waits indefinitely over losses (see Figure 1.3) and the ratio is infinite. If the investor
is more risk seeking over losses, then the increased convexity in the loss region drives the
disposition ratio higher as the investor delays taking losses. In the extreme as 1   ↵  is
su ciently large, the investor waits indefinitely over losses (see the thresholds in Figure 1.3
(d)) and the disposition ratio becomes infinite.
It is worth highlighting that the model has delivered Odean’s estimate of the dis-
position e↵ect even for a single investor - at this point we have not needed to extend to a
mixture over heterogeneous investors.17 In contrast, in the setting of Ingersoll and Jin (2013)
without probability weighting but allowing for reinvestment, heterogeneity was necessary to
obtain a fit with Odean’s measure. They mix reference-dependent realisation utility traders
with random Poisson traders in a 50-50 ratio to obtain a good fit to the empirical data.
Here, in our model, we instead have the impact of probability weighting, which is working
to enable PT to deliver realistic levels of the disposition e↵ect.
1.5 Explaining the disposition e↵ect: implied selling in-
tensity
In this section, we extend our analysis to consider the relative magnitude of gains and losses.
The disposition e↵ect is commonly understood as the preference for selling assets that have
increased in value relative to assets that have decreased in value since purchase. Researchers
have recently studied how the rate of sale depends on the relative magnitude of the gain or
loss. A number of authors estimate proportional hazards models to derive the hazard rate
17Although such an extension is straightforward and would clearly also be able to achieve realistic levels
of the disposition ratio, it is not necessary for a good fit.
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for the sale of stock conditional on return since purchase, see Feng and Seasholes (2005), Seru
et al. (2010) and Barber and Odean (2013). Others, in particular, Ben-David and Hirshleifer
(2012) (see also Kaustia (2010)) document the probability of selling as a function of profits,
whilst allowing for di↵erent prior holding periods to be taken into account.
There is broad agreement amongst researchers that the estimated hazard rate as a
function of returns since purchase is higher on gains than on losses. This is an evidence in
favour of a disposition e↵ect amongst investors because the higher rate over gains means
that the average propensity to sell is higher for gains than losses. For all but very short
holding periods, researchers consistently find the hazard rate or selling schedule on losses is
fairly flat (see Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012), Barber and Odean (2013) and Seru et al.
(2010)).
There is less consensus over results concerning the overall shape of the hazard rate
or selling schedule in the literature with findings depending upon the length of the holding
period under consideration. For instance, over short holding periods, Ben-David and Hirsh-
leifer (2012) demonstrate a strong asymmetric V shaped pattern in their empirical selling
schedules. Some authors even find that when holding periods are aggregated, the selling
intensity function may exhibit an inverted V shape (Odean (1998), Meng and Weng (2016)).
In the remainder of this section, we will develop a model-based selling intensity for a
single and for many investors, and compare to the findings of the empirical literature. Since
our model gives an intensity over all holding periods, our focus is on achieving the empirical
features coming from the aggregated data.
1.5.1 Model-based implied selling intensity
The empirical measure of the selling rate at price level p can be defined as
 (p) =
number of sales at p
amount of time spent at p
.
The equivalent model-based quantity is
⇣(p) =
P(P⌧ 2 dp)
E
⇥R ⌧
0 du1(Pu2[p,p+dp))
⇤ (1.15)
provided this quantity is well defined. Similar to our model-based disposition ratio in (1.12),
it can be shown that ⇣(p) is the same for all stopping times ⌧ such that P⌧ has law µ.
Proposition 1.9. Suppose µ is the law of the target prospect P⌧ and ⌫ is the law of the
scaled prospect X⌧ = s(P⌧ ). Assume a reference point of R = P0. If µ has a density   then
⇣(p) =
 P (p)2s0(p)
u⌫(s(p))  |s(p)| (p). (1.16)
26
Proof. Recall the notation we use in the proof of Proposition 1.8. For any arbitrary Borel
function   we haveZ ⌧
0
 (Pu)d[P ]u =
Z ⌧
0
 (s 1(Xu))
 2P (s
 1(Xu))
⇠2(Xu)
d[X]u =
Z
LX⌧ (a) (s
 1(a))
da
[s0(s 1(a))]2
=
Z
LX⌧ (s(u))
 (u)
s0(u)
du.
In particular if we choose  (z) =
1(z2[p,p+dp))
 2P (z)
then we haveZ ⌧
0
1(Pu2[p,p+dp))du =
LX⌧ (s(p))
 2P (p)s
0(p)
dp.
The expected value of the above expression can be computed by Tanaka’s formula, and
(1.16) follows.
⇤
More generally, to allow for optimal prospects which contain atoms we set
 (dp) =
 P (p)2s0(p)
u⌫(s(p))  |s(p)|µ(dp). (1.17)
If µ is absolutely continuous then  (dp) = ⇣(p)dp. Conversely, if the optimal selling rule is a
pure threshold strategy, i.e. a strategy in which it is optimal to sell the asset the first time
the price process leaves an interval (whence the optimal prospect is a pair of point masses)
then we find u⌫(s(p)) = |s(p)| at the ends of the interval and the measure   consists of a
pair of point masses of infinite size. (This is intuitive: we must stop the price process at the
first time it leaves the relevant interval, and the only way we can ensure this is to stop at
an infinite rate.) We have seen an example of this when there is no probability weighting
in the model.
In fact, the optimal selling rule in our asset liquidation model contains a point mass
on losses, and a mixture distribution on gains consisting of a point mass and a continuous
distribution above that point. The corresponding stopping rate   has an atom of infinite
size at the location of the point mass on losses, an atom of finite size at the location of the
point mass on gains, and a continuous density above this point.
Given a non-negative function g = g(p) then we can consider selling at a rate g(Pt)
per unit time. This is equivalent to stopping at the random time ⌧g = inf{u : R u0 g(Pv)dv >
T} where T is an independent exponential random variable with unit parameter. Given a
target law, for example the law µ⇤ of the optimal prospect, we can ask if it is possible to
choose a level dependent (but not explicitly time-dependent) function g such that P⌧g has
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the desired target law. This can be done, and makes use of the measure   in (1.17), as
described in the following lemma where the proof is given in Appendix 1.E.
Lemma 1.10. Let ⇤P = (⇤Pt )t 0 be the increasing additive functional ⇤Pt =
R
`Pt (p) (dp),
where `P = (`Pt (p))p>0,t 0 is an appropriately scaled version of local time process of P .
If T is an independent, exponentially distributed, unit rate random variable and if
⌧ = inf{u : ⇤Pu > T}, then P⌧ ⇠ µ⇤.
This lemma gives a second interpretation of the quantity  (dp): if the investor sells
at a level-dependent rate per unit time given by  , then he will attain the optimal prospect.
Note that we are not arguing that our investors must follow this stopping rule, but rather
this kind of randomised strategy provides a convenient way to interpret the model-based
quantities given in (1.15) and (1.17).
1.5.2 Mixing over heterogeneous investors
We have so far discussed the case of a single investor implementing a stopping rule to
generate a target prospect. However, the typical empirical selling rate estimated from
market data is an amalgamation of liquidation strategies enacted contemporaneously by
multiple investors who may have di↵erent risk preferences. We consider the implied selling
intensity function when we average across individuals.
Let ⇥ denote the space of risk and probability weighting parameters. If the parame-
ters of the typical investor are distributed with prior law ⌘ on ⇥, then we find a model-based
selling rate at price level p of
⇣(p)dp =  (dp) =
µ(dp) P (p)2s0(p)
u⌫(s(p))  |s(p)| (1.18)
where µ(dp) =
R
⌘(d✓)µ✓(dp) and ⌫ is given by F⌫(x) = Fµ(s 1(x)).
To illustrate the idea, we suppose the price process P follows a geometric Brownian
motion and the expected return is such that P is a martingale. We are free to choose ⇥ the
space of parameters and ⌘, the distribution over this parameter space. For this example, we
suppose investors have a common pair of probability weighting functions (given by TK with
 ± = 0.7) and TK value functions (with reference level R = P0 = 1). We assume ↵+ = 0.5
and ↵  = 0.9 are fixed across investors but that the loss aversion parameter k varies. We
identify ⇥ with a subset of R+ corresponding to the value of the loss aversion parameter.
Once we have specified ⌘ we can calculate the implied selling density. Di↵erent choices
of ⌘ will lead to di↵erent model-based predictions for the selling density. We make use of
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the earlier empirical observation that the selling rate on losses is approximately constant
across di↵erent returns. We design ⌘ such that the model-based selling intensity at a loss
is constant, and then consider the implications for the model-based rate of selling at gains.
The construction of such a prior density is given in Appendix 1.F. Barber and Odean (2013)
find hazard ratios of around one for losses in their analysis of the LDB and Finnish datasets.
This motivates our choice of a unit rate of selling on losses, which corresponds to a daily
probability of a loss of 1/250 or 0.4%.
Figure 1.6 displays our model’s implied stopping rate ⇣(p) against price. The model
implied sales rate on gains, given in (1.18) is plotted. Our first goal is to demonstrate
that the disposition e↵ect holds. The implied sales rates are indeed consistent with the
disposition e↵ect as the rate for gains is higher than that for losses and thus implies a
higher propensity to sell at gains than losses. The second goal is to show the model implied
sales rate captures some of the features of the empirical data. Since our focus is on results
for longer holding periods or aggregate data, we compare with the estimated hazard ratios
of Barber and Odean (2013) and the graphs of the probability of selling shares at Day 60,
125, and 250 in Figure 1 of Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012).
In particular, the graphs in Figure 1 of Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) for Day 60
and 250 have very similar qualitative features to our Figure 1.6. Over losses, the probability
of sale is relatively flat. Over gains, the sales probability is slightly humped - first rising
and then falling with the magnitude of returns since purchase. This is also true (perhaps
to a lesser extent) in the graph of the hazard ratio for the Finnish dataset in Barber and
Odean (2013).
The rate of ⇣ between 3.5-5 in Figure 1.6 equates to a daily probability of selling
between 1.4% and 2%. The implied sales rate in our example is slightly higher than those
in Barber and Odean (2013) and Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) and thus our disposition
e↵ect is on the strong side.
The presence of probability weighting in our model has had a dramatic impact on
the PT model’s ability to produce realistic sale intensity schedules across di↵erent return
magnitudes. Without probability weighting, recall that the optimal distribution for an
individual is a two point distribution with weight on a single gain and a single loss threshold.
Mixing over investors can improve the fit, but, as Ingersoll and Jin (2013) find, in the absence
of probability weighting, PT investors need to be mixed with random Poisson traders to
yield a reasonable calibration.
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Figure 1.6: Implied stopping rate ⇣(p) against price for a set of heterogeneous investors.
Parameters are  ± = 0.7, ↵+ = 0.5, ↵  = 0.9,   = 0.5. Loss aversion k varies across
investors. The reference level is R = P0 = 1.
1.6 Conclusion
Despite the recent surge in interest in the implications of prospect theory in dynamic trading
models, very few papers treat the probability weighting element of prospect theory, in part
because of the additional technical challenges probability weighting brings. In this chapter
we argue the understanding of the implications of probability weighting in a dynamic setting
is crucial, as it significantly alters the form of the PT investor’s optimal strategy.
The behaviour of PT investors in the absence of probability weighting has been
studied by Ingersoll and Jin (2013), Henderson (2012) and Barberis and Xiong (2012).
They find that the optimal stopping rule in this setting is a stop-loss, stop-gain strategy.
In fact, although there is some support for stop-loss strategies in empirical and laboratory
data, stop-gain strategies are not widely supported. Moreover, the locations of the stop-loss
and stop-gain thresholds are such that a gain is much more likely than a loss, corresponding
to a target law with a negative skew and an extreme disposition e↵ect (well beyond that
found in empirical data). Further, it is not possible to obtain reasonable patterns for selling
rates at di↵erent price levels even when mixing over PT agents with characteristics based
on di↵erent parameter values.
We show that re-introducing probability weighting improves the predictive power of
models of PT agents in all these aspects. With probability weighting set to levels estimated
in the literature we find the PT investor has an optimal stopping rule which is stop-loss but
not stop-gain. Instead, the investor trades to achieve an optimal prospect which on gains
is a long-tailed distribution chosen to reflect the overweighting of extreme gains. Overall,
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his target prospect can have right skew, and a model-based disposition ratio which matches
the levels predicted by Odean (1998). Finally, by considering mixtures of PT agents we find
model-based level-dependent selling intensities which closely mirror the patterns of level-
dependent selling rates which have been documented in the literature. Both the model-
based rate and the empirical rate are approximately constant on the loss regime, and much
higher on gains, consistent with the disposition e↵ect.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Existing results on optimal stopping with proba-
bility weighting
Our goal in this and the next section is to prove Proposition 1.7 which characterises the
optimal prospect. The starting point of our results is Xu and Zhou (2013) who have the
important insight that the optimisation over stopping times can be reduced to a problem of
maximising over distributions. However, their results are largely confined to the one-sided
case of gains (or losses) only. We summarise the relevant results in this section.
Recall that the quantile function of a random variable Y , denoted GY (or G if
the random variable is clear), is the (left-continuous) inverse of the cumulative distribution
function.
Proposition 1.11 (Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 of Xu and Zhou (2013)). Suppose the scaled asset
price process X = (Xt)t>0 is always non-negative and X0 > 0. Then the probability-weighted
optimal stopping problem
sup
⌧
Z 1
0
w (P (v(X⌧ ) > x)) dx (1.19)
has a dual representation in terms of the quantile function G = GX of X⌧ in the form
sup
G2AX0
Z 1
0
v(G(x))w0(1  x)dx (1.20)
where
Az = {G| G : (0, 1)! [0,1) is a left-continuous quantile function,
Z 1
0
G(x)dx = z}.
In particular, if G⇤ is an optimiser of (1.20) with ⌫⇤ being the associated probability
law, then there exists a stopping time ⌧⇤ such that X⌧⇤ ⇠ ⌫⇤, and such ⌧⇤ is optimal for
(1.19).
The optimal prospects in this one-sided problem can be identified under some par-
ticular forms of v and w. The two results below are the most relevant to our current
problem.
Proposition 1.12 (Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 4.1 of Xu and Zhou (2013)). The optimiser
of (1.20) can be characterised under the two cases below:
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1. Suppose the target prospect can take values on [0,1), and that the mean is constrained
to be less than or equal to z. If v is concave and w is inverse-S shaped such that it is
concave on [0, q] and convex on [q, 1], then the optimiser G is of the form
G(x) = a1(0,1 q] +
✓
a _ (v0) 1
✓
 
w0(1  x)
◆◆
1(1 q,1) (1.21)
for some a > 0 and   > 0, where a and   are chosen such that they respect the
constraint
R 1
0 G(x)dx = z. The optimal prospect is an atom at a of size at least 1  q
combined with a continuous distribution on (a _ (v0) 1(  w0(q) ),1).
2. Suppose the target prospect is bounded such that it can only take values on [0,K] for
some 0 < K < 1, and its mean is constrained to be less than or equal to z. If
v is convex and w is a general probability weighting function, the optimiser G is a
step-function taking values on 0, K and some b 2 (0,K). The optimal prospect is a
three-point distribution with masses at 0, b and K.
Proof. In the first case with a concave v, one can write down the relaxed Lagrangian ob-
jective function and obtain a candidate optimiser as (v0) 1
⇣
 
w0(1 x)
⌘
for some Lagrangian
multiplier   from the first order condition. This candidate optimiser is not monotonic since
w is inverse-S shaped and thus it cannot be a quantile function. But it can be shown that
the optimal solution is in form of a suitably truncated version of this candidate optimiser.
See Xu and Zhou (2013) for details.
The second case involving a convex v is much more subtle since it is a constrained
convex maximisation problem on a somewhat complicated space. Xu and Zhou (2013)
provide a proof18 based on an approximating sequence with step functions. Here we give an
alternative proof using a more fundamental approach.
Suppose G is the optimiser to the problem in the second case and the image of G
contains more than three distinct elements. Then we can choose (c, b) 2 (0, 1)⇥ (0,K) with
b 2 [G(c), G(c+)] such there exists x1 2 (0, c) and x2 2 (c, 1) with 0 < G(x1) < b and
b < G(x2) < K.
Consider a convex function ⌘1(x) = ⌘1(x; ✏1) := x
✏1 and a concave function ⌘2(x) =
⌘2(x; ✏2) := 1  (1  x)✏2 with ✏1 > 1 and ✏2 > 1. Define a new quantile function via
G(x) = G(x; ✏1, ✏2) :=
8><>:b⌘1
⇣
G(x)
b
⌘
, 0 < x 6 c,
b+ (K   b)⌘2
⇣
G(x) b
K b
⌘
, c < x < 1.
18Although Xu and Zhou (2013) do not directly consider the problem with bounded payo↵, their Lemma
4.1 can be trivially extended to a set of quantile functions with bounded range on [0,K].
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With this definition we have G(x) 6 G(x) on (0, c] and G(x) > G(x) on (c, 1). Moreover,
there exists values of x such that these inequalities are strict.
Then,41(✏1) :=
R c
0 G(x)dx 
R c
0 G(x)dx > 0 and42(✏2) :=
R 1
c G(x)dx 
R 1
c G(x)dx >
0. Observe that 41 and 42 are strictly increasing in ✏1 and ✏2 respectively, and 41,42 # 0
when ✏1, ✏2 # 1. Thus we can choose ✏⇤1 > 1 and ✏⇤2 > 1 such that 41(✏⇤1) = 42(✏⇤2), or
equivalently
R 1
0 G(x; ✏
⇤
1, ✏
⇤
2)dx =
R 1
0 G(x)dx 6 z.
Now fix 0 <  ⇤ < min
⇣
1
✏⇤1
, 1✏⇤2
⌘
< 1. Consider another pair of functions given by
e⌘i(x) := x   ⇤⌘i(x; ✏⇤i )
1   ⇤
for i = 1, 2. It can be easily checked that e⌘i(0) = 0 and e⌘i(1) = 1, and e⌘1 (resp. e⌘2) is a
strictly increasing concave (resp. convex) function on [0, 1].
Define another quantile function via
eG(x; ✏⇤1, ✏⇤2) :=
8><>:be⌘1
⇣
G(x)
b
⌘
, 0 < x 6 c,
b+ (K   b)e⌘2 ⇣G(x) bK b ⌘ , c < x < 1.
Then from the construction of e⌘ it can be easily verified that R 10 eG(x; ✏⇤1, ✏⇤2)dx = R 10 G(x; ✏⇤1, ✏⇤2)dx 6
z and
G(x) =  ⇤G(x; ✏⇤1, ✏
⇤
2) + (1   ⇤) eG(x; ✏⇤1, ✏⇤2). (1.22)
Convexity of v now leads toZ 1
0
v(G(x))w0(1  x)dx 6 max
✓Z 1
0
v(G(x))w0(1  x)dx,
Z 1
0
v( eG(x))w0(1  x)dx◆ .
(1.23)
But both G and eG are feasible solutions to the optimisation problem. The strict convexity
of v and the optimality of G implies equality has to hold in (1.23) and in turn in (1.22)
which happens if and only if G(x) = G(x) = eG(x). This means
G(x) =
8><>:b⌘1
⇣
G(x)
b
⌘
, 0 < x 6 c,
b+ (K   b)⌘2
⇣
G(x) b
K b
⌘
, c < x < 1.
or equivalently 8><>:
G(x)
b = ⌘1
⇣
G(x)
b
⌘
, 0 < x 6 c,
G(x) b
K b = ⌘2
⇣
G(x) b
K b
⌘
, c < x < 1.
(1.24)
Given ✏⇤1 > 1 and ✏⇤2 > 1, (1.24) implies
G(x)
b must take values on 0 or 1 over (0, c],
and G(x) bK b must take values on 0 or 1 over (c, 1). Hence G(x) can only take values on 0 or
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b over (0, c], and b or K over (c, 1). This contradicts the assumption that the image of G
contains more than three distinct elements. Hence the optimal quantile function must be a
three-step function, and moreover it can only take values on 0, K and some interim level
b 2 (0,K).
⇤
The results in the second part of the Proposition 1.12 translate directly to a one-
sided problem involving losses. Thus, we can deduce from the results of Xu and Zhou (2013)
that in the loss regime the optimal prospect consists of up to three point masses.
Our main technical contribution is to solve for the optimal prospect for a wide
class of prospect theory specifications. The results we present are not valid for all set-
ups. Rather, we make some additional assumptions involving our elasticity condition which
are satisfied under our base case, and more widely under many standard formulations of
the problem. Under these additional assumptions we can prove that the optimal prospect
has extra structure beyond that which can be deduced from Proposition 1.12. This extra
structure allows us to solve for the optimal prospect in the general case with probability
weighting and both gains and losses.
First, on the gain regime we show that a and   are such that a   (v0) 1(  w0(q) ).
Hence the point a is simultaneously the location of a point mass in the optimal prospect
and the lower limit in the continuous part of the optimal prospect on gains. Second, on the
loss regime, we show that the optimal prospect is a single point mass (and not three point
masses) located at some point b 2 [L, 0). These results are shown in the next section.
1.B General construction of the optimal solution
In this section, we solve (1.7) assuming that the scaled value function v is concave on the
gain regime [0,1) and convex on the loss regime [L, 0]. The probability weighting functions
w± are inverse-S shaped, concave on [0, q±] and convex on [q±, 1]. The starting level of the
scaled price process X0 is a given fixed constant. Our base case fits into this setting.
Using the same ideas as in Proposition 1.11, (1.7) is equivalent to
sup
X
 Z 1
1 P(X>0)
v(GX(u))w
0
+(1  u)du+
Z P(X<0)
0
v(GX(u))w
0
 (u)du
!
, (1.25)
where the supremum is taken over random variables (or prospects) X with mean X0 and
support on [L,1). If X⇤ is an optimal prospect, then any stopping time ⌧⇤ constructed
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such that X⌧⇤ has the same law as X⇤ is optimal.
1.B.1 The problem for gains
Suppose we are given  + 2 (0, 1] and z+ > X+0 which are the probability mass allocated to
gains and the mean of gains. The gain problem is to find
D+( +, z+) = sup
G2A+ +,z+
Z 1
1  +
v(G(x))w0+(1  x)dx (1.26)
where
A+ ,z = {G| G : (0, 1)! [0,1) is a quantile function,
Z 1
1  
G(x)dx = z, G(x) = 0 on (0, 1   ]}.
The gain problem involves an optimisation for concave v and inverse-S shaped w+.
The first part of Proposition 1.12 can be applied to identify the form of the optimal quantile
function on (1  +, 1).19 From (1.21), with q+ being the point of inflexion of w+ we deduce
that the optimiser is of the form
G+(x) = G+(x; +, z+; a, ) = a1(1  +,(1 q+)_(1  +)]
+
✓
a _ (v0) 1
✓
 
w0+(1  x)
◆◆
1((1 q+)_(1  +),1) (1.27)
for some constants a > 0 and   > 0. (Note that G+ = 0 on (0, 1    +].) The optimal
values a⇤ and  ⇤ of a and   are obtained by maximising the objective function in (1.26)
over A+ +,z+ .
Lemma 1.13. Suppose v0 is continuous with v0(0+) =1 and limx"1 v0(x) = 0. Then for
the optimal prospect we have a⇤   (v0) 1
⇣
 ⇤
w0+(q+^ +)
⌘
.
Proof. We begin by showing that the optimiser (1.21) to the one-sided gain-problem (1.20)
with v concave has its parameter a   (v0) 1(  w0+(q+) ).
Let L(x;G, ) = v(G)w0+(1 x)  G. This is maximised over G by G = yL(x; ) :=
(v0) 1
⇣
 
w0+(1 x)
⌘
. If v0(0) = 1 and limx"1 v0(x) = 0, then yL(x; ) is well defined and
strictly positive for all 0 < x < 1. Now suppose G0 is an optimal solution to (1.20) which
has the form of (1.21) with parameters (a0, 0). Consider another quantile function G1
which is in form of (1.21) with parameters (a1, 1) where a1 := (v0) 1
⇣
 1
w0+(q+)
⌘
> a0 and
the value of  1 is implied by the constraint
R 1
0 G1(x)dx = z.
19By considering a transformation of eG(x) = G((1  +)(1  x)+ x), one can see (1.26) can be rewritten
in form of (1.20).
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On 0 < x 6 1   q+, G0(x) = a0 < a1 = G1(x) 6 yL(x; 1). As yL( · ; 1) is
the maximiser of L( · ;G, 1) we have L(x;G1, 1) > L(x;G0, 1). On 1   q+ < x < 1,
G1(x) = yL(x; 1) and then trivially L(x;G1, 1) > L(x;G0, 1). This shows L(x;G1, 1) >
L(x;G0, 1) for all 0 < x < 1 (with strict inequality holding for some x). It contradicts the
assumption that G0 is an optimal solution.
By extension, the optimiser (1.27) for the sub-problem of gains (1.26) must have its
parameter a   (v0) 1
⇣
 
w0+(q+^ +)
⌘
. ⇤
Two things follow. First, since a > 0 an optimal solution on gains must allocate
all the available probability mass on gains. This also implies the value of the gain problem
D+( +, z) is always strictly increasing in the available probability mass  +.
Second, a = (v0) 1
⇣
 
w0+( )
⌘
for some   q+ ^  + and then we can rewrite the
optimal solution in (1.27) as
G+(x) = G+(x; +, , ) = (v
0) 1
✓
 
w0+( ^ (1  x))
◆
1(1  +,1) (1.28)
where the mean on gains can be written as
z+ = z+( +, , ) =
Z 1
1  +
(v0) 1
✓
 
w0+((1  u) ^  )
◆
du =
Z  +
0
(v0) 1
✓
 
w0+(u ^  )
◆
du.
(1.29)
Then G+ is identically 0 on (0, 1  +), equal to a constant on (1  +, 1  ) and continuous
on (1    +, 1). The corresponding distribution has an atom at some a⇤ and a density on
(a⇤,1). The candidate optimiser takes the form in (1.28) parameterised by  +,   and
  q+ ^  + subjected to (1.29).
1.B.2 The problem for losses
Suppose now we are given    and z  such that    > 0 and X 0 6 z  6 K   where
K =  L and where    and z  represent the probability mass allocated to losses and the
mean of losses. The loss problem is to find
D (  , z ) = sup
G2A   ,z 
Z   
0
v(G(x))w0 (x)dx (1.30)
where
A  ,z = {G| G : (0, 1)! [L, 0] is a quantile function,
Z  
0
G(x)dx =  z, G(x) = 0 on ( , 1)}.
37
The loss problem is a maximisation problem involving a convex v and an inverse-S
shaped w  over quantile functions with fixed mean and a bounded range. Using the second
part of Proposition 1.12, the optimal quantile function on (0,  ) is in the form of a step-
function taking values on L, 0 and some b 2 (L, 0). Our main result is that under some
mild extra assumptions on v and w  the solution can be further simplified to a two-point
distribution which has a mass at L or a mass at an interior point, but not both, together
with an atom at 0. Later we will argue that for the problem with gains and losses there
cannot be a mass at zero.
Proposition 1.14. If E(x; v, L) is increasing in x 2 [L, 0] and E(p;w , c) is decreasing in
p 2 [0,min(q , c)] for any c 2 [0, 1], then the optimal solution to problem (1.30) is a two-
point distribution with probability mass allocated to 0 and a single further point in [L, 0).
The optimal quantile function is of the form
G (x;  , z ) =  z 
⌘
1(0,⌘]
for some ⌘ with   z L 6 ⌘ 6   .
Proof. Using the second part of Proposition 1.12 we know that on losses, the optimal
prospect consists of masses at up to three points, two of which must be at 0 and L. We
want to show that under Assumption 1.6, the optimal prospect contains a single mass on
the loss regime, with potentially a second mass at the origin. Suppose that the probability
that the prospect takes a positive value and the mean of gains element of the prospect are
given. Then the probability of the prospect taking a value on losses, and the mean loss z
may also be considered as given.
Consider prospects on losses in form20 of P = (L, pL;x, px; 0, p0) with L < x < 0.
We have the relationships pL + px + p0 =   and LpL + xpx =  z for fixed   2 (0, 1) and
z 2 (0, L]. To show that under the stated assumptions the optimal prospect on losses
is a two-point distribution, it is su cient to show the existence of some feasible two-point
prospects which are at least as good as P.
Recall that w  is an inverse-S shaped function which is concave on [0, q ] and convex
on [q , 1]. By the Elasticity Assumption, E(p;w , c) is decreasing in p 2 [0,min(c, q )] for
any c 2 [0, 1]. The prospect value of P is given by
V = w (pL)v(L)+(w (pL+px) w (pL))v(x) = w (pL)v(L)+(w (  p0) w (pL))v(x).
20Following Barberis (2012), we write a prospect P corresponding to a discrete random variable with n
atoms at x1 < x2 < ... < xn of sizes p1, p2, ..., pn as P = (x1, p1;x2, p2; ...;xn, pn).
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Since L  x  0 we must have L(   p0)   z else there is no feasible solution. Fix p0 and
z and consider varying x, pL and px. The feasible range of x is given by L 6 x 6   z  p0 .
From the mean constraint pLL+ pxx =  z and the fact that pL + px =    p0, we have
dpL
dx
=  dpx
dx
=
px
x  L.
Di↵erentiation of the prospect value function with respect to x gives
@V
@x
= (w (   p0)  w (pL))v0(x)  px
x  Lw
0
 (pL)(v(x)  v(L))
=
(w (   p0)  w (pL))(v(x)  v(L))
x  L
✓
(x  L)v0(x)
v(x)  v(L)  
pxw0 (pL)
w (   p0)  w (pL)
◆
=
(w (   p0)  w (pL))(v(x)  v(L))
x  L (E(x; v, L)  E(pL;w ,   p0)).
Case 1: px + pL =    p0 6 q .
Then pL  q  ^ (    p0) and E(pL;w ,    p0) is decreasing in pL and in turn decreasing
in x. Together with the fact that E(x; v, L) is increasing in x, @V@x is either positive for all
x 2 [L,  z  p0 ], negative for all x over the same range, or changes sign from negative to
positive as x increases. Hence, either V is monotonic, or V has a minima, and the maximal
prospect value is attained at either x =   z  p0 or x = L. The corresponding prospects are
(  z  p0 ,   p0; 0, p0) and (L, z|L| ; 0,   z|L| ). Since z  (   p0)|L| we have    z|L| > p0 > 0
and both prospects are feasible two-point solutions with at most one mass at a non-zero
location.
Case 2:    p0 > q  and pL  q .
Then again by the fact that E(pL;w ,  p0) is decreasing in pL and E(x; v, L) is increasing
in x, the maximal prospect value (as we let pL range between 0 and q ) is attained at either
pL = 0, whence x =   z  p0 , or pL = q , whence x =  
z+Lq 
  q  p0 .
The former corresponds to a feasible two-point prospect (  z  p0 ,   p0; 0, p0). The
latter corresponds to a prospect (L, q ;  z+Lq   q  p0 ,   p0   q ; 0, p0). We show in the next
case that is not an optimal prospect, since the prospect value can be further increased by
increasing pL above q .
Case 3:    p0 > q  and pL   q .
We compare the prospect (L, pL;x, px; 0, p0) with another feasible prospect which places all
its mass at L and 0 and show that the latter has at least as large a PT value as the former.
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We have
V = w (pL)v(L) + (w (   p0)  w (pL))v(x)
6 w (pL)v(L) + (w (   p0)  w (pL)) |x||L|v(L)
= v(L)
✓ |x|
|L|w (   p0) +
✓
1  |x||L|
◆
w (pL)
◆
6 v(L)w 
✓ |x|
|L| (   p0) +
✓
1  |x||L|
◆
pL
◆
= v(L)w 
✓
pL +
|x|
|L| (   p0   pL)
◆
where we have used the fact that v is convex on [L, 0] in the second line and the fact that
w  is convex on [q , 1] in the fourth line. But v(L)w
 
pL +
x
L (   p0   pL)
 
is the value of
a feasible two-point prospect
⇣
L, pL +
|x|
|L| (   p0   pL); 0, p0 + (1  |x||L| )(   p0   pL)
⌘
. ⇤
We saw in Proposition 1.4 that the assumptions of Proposition 1.14 are satisfied by a
large class of value functions and probability weighting functions including those commonly
considered in the literature.
1.B.3 The combined problem for gains and losses
With the solutions from the previous sub-problems for gains and losses, the combined-
problem is to find
sup
( ±,z±)2H
(D+( +, z+) +D (  , z ))
where H = {( ±, z±) :  ± > 0, + +    6 1, z+   z  = X0, z+ > X+0 , z  2 [X 0 , L  ], }.
The optimal prospect can be identified on solving this problem.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. If ( ⇤±, z⇤±) are the optimisers to the combined problem, then the
optimiser for (1.25) is given by combining the optimisers for the sub-problems of gains and
losses such that the optimal quantile function is given by
G⇤(x) = G (x; ⇤ , z
⇤
 )1(0, ⇤ ] +G+(x; 
⇤
+, 
⇤, ⇤)1(1  ⇤+,1).
where ( ⇤, ⇤) are the optimisers to the sub-problem for gains with z+ = z⇤+ and  + =  ⇤+.
Expressing z⇤  in terms of z⇤+, we can rewrite the constraint on z⇤± as X
+
0 6 z⇤+ 6 X0 L  .
Under the assumption that v0(0+) = 1, by the remarks at the end of the proof of
Lemma 1.13 we have  ⇤  = 1    ⇤+. Moreover, suppose that a candidate optimal solution
of the problem includes a mass at the origin in the loss-component. We could reclassify
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this mass as part of the gain-distribution. But then, the prospect value could be improved
by redistributing this mass to become strict gains. Hence the candidate solution cannot be
optimal, and there cannot be any mass at zero in the optimal prospect. In particular, the
form of the optimal quantile function is given by (1.11).
⇤
In summary, the optimal prospect does not allocate any probability mass to zero
(which corresponds to the reference level prior to scaling). Moreover, Assumption 1.6 pro-
vides a simple su cient (and decoupled) condition on the behaviours of v and w  leading
to the feature that there is only one single atom on loss.
1.C Proof of the well-posedness condition under the
base model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Let bw(p) = p + . Then obviously limp#0 bw(p)w+(p) = 1. Then for some
fixed ✏ > 0 there exists p⇤ > 0 such that bw(p) < (✏+ 1)w+(p) for 0 < p < p⇤.
Consider a two-point zero-mean prospect ( a, ba+b ; b, aa+b ) with b being large enough
such that aa+b < p
⇤. Then the prospect value is given by
V (a, b) = w+
✓
a
a+ b
◆
v(b) + w 
✓
b
a+ b
◆
v( a)
> 1
✏+ 1
bw✓ a
a+ b
◆
v(b) + v( a)
=
1
✏+ 1
✓
a
a+ b
◆ +
((b+R )
1
   R)↵+ + v( a)
!1
as b!1 if  + < ↵+  .
To prove the well-posedness property under  + >
↵+
  , it is su cient to show that
the gain-part value D+( +, µ) is finite for any  + and µ. Using the cumulative distribution
function formulation (see Lemma 3.1 of Xu and Zhou (2013)), we can rewrite the gain-part
value as
D+( +, z) = sup
F2B +,z
Z 1
0
w+(F (x))v
0(x)dx
where
B ,z = {F | F : [0,1)! [0, 1] is a decreasing function,
Z 1
0
F (x)dx = z, F (0) =  }.
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Since w+(p) 6 bw(p) = p + for all p, it is su cient to show that bD+( +, z) is finite
where bD+( +, z) := supF2B +,z R10 bw(F (x))v0(x)dx. Since bw is concave, the optimiser forbD can be obtained by solving a simple Lagrangian problem where the solution is
F
⇤
(x) = min
✓
 +, ( bw0) 1✓  
v0(x)
◆◆
= min
0@ +, ✓↵+ +
  
◆
1
(x+R )
  1
  ((x+R )
1
   R)1 ↵+
! 1
1  +
1A
and the optimal value is in form of
bD+( +, µ) = Z 1
0
w+(F
⇤
(x))v0(x)dx
= C +
Z 1
K
✓
 +
 
◆  +
1  +
 ✓
↵+
 
◆
1
(x+R )
  1
  ((x+R )
1
   R)1 ↵+
! 1
1  +
dx
for some constants C and K. This indefinite integral is convergent if  + >
↵+
  . ⇤
1.D On Elasticity measures of popular value and prob-
ability weighting functions
Proof of Proposition 1.3. The fact that E(x; ax+ b; c) = 1 is immediate from the definition.
Also
E(x; f, c)E(f(x); g, f(c)) =
(x  c)f 0(x)
f(x)  f(c)
(f(x)  f(c))g0(f(x))
g(f(x))  g(f(c)) =
(x  c)(g   f)0(x)
(g   f)(x)  (g   f)(c)
= E(x; (g   f), c).
⇤
For several popular classes of convex value functions v and inverse-S shaped proba-
bility weighting functions w, this result allows us to give simple proofs to show that E(x; v, c)
is increasing in x > c for any c, and E(p;w, c) is decreasing on p 2 [0,min(q, c)] for any
c 2 [0, 1] where q is the inflexion point of w. The remainder of this appendix is devoted to
giving such proofs.
1.D.1 Value functions
Power function
42
Suppose v has the form of v(x) = x↵ defined on [0,1) and ↵ > 0. Then
E(x; v, c) =
↵(x  c)x↵ 1
x↵   c↵
with c > 0. Di↵erentiation gives
E0(x; v, c) =
↵x↵ 2(cx↵   ↵xc↵ + (↵  1)c↵+1)
(x↵   c↵)2 .
Consider H(x) = cx↵   ↵xc↵ + (↵   1)c↵+1 and note that H(c) = 0. We have @H/@x =
H 0(x) = ↵c(x↵ 1   c↵ 1) and note that H 0(c) = 0. Then for ↵ > 1 we have H(x) is convex
in x and H   0. If ↵ < 1 then H is concave in x and H  0. It follows that E is monotonic
increasing in x if ↵ > 1 and monotonic decreasing in x if ↵ < 1.
Exponential function
For v(x) = e↵x on [0,1) and ↵ > 0,
E(x; v, c) =
↵(x  c)e↵x
e↵x   e↵c =
↵(x  c)e↵(x c)
e↵(x c)   1 .
Note that e↵(x c) > 1 + ↵(x  c). Then di↵erentiation gives
E0(x; v, c) =
↵e↵(x c)(e↵(x c)   ↵(x  c)  1)
(e↵(x c)   1)2 > 0
so that E(x; v, c) is monotonic increasing in x.
Reverse-power function
Consider v(x) = K↵   (K   x)↵ on x 2 [0,K] for some K > 0 and 0 < ↵ < 1.
Then v is a non-negative convex function with v(0) = 0. For x, c 2 [0,K], we have using
Proposition 1.3 twice,
E(x; v, c) = E(x; (K   x)↵, c) = E(K   x;x↵,K   c).
Since E(y;x↵, z) is decreasing in y we conclude that E(x; v, c) is increasing in x.
Scaled power function from TK value function
Consider v(x) =  k(h   (x + h )1/ )↵ for  h  < x < 0 with ↵,  > 0. Then, for
 h   c < 0,
E(x; v, c) = E(x; v(z) = (h  (z + h )1/ )↵, c)
= E(x+ h  ; v(z) = (h  z1/ )↵, c+ h )
= E((x+ h )1/  ; v(z) = (h  z)↵, (c+ h )1/ )E(x+ h  ; y1/  , c+ h )
= E((x+ h )1/  ; v(z) = h↵   (h  z)↵, (c+ h )1/ )E(x+ h  ; y1/  , c+ h ).
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Now suppose that 0 < ↵,  < 1. Then 0 < ↵ < 1 < 1/ . From the discussion of the
power and reverse-power functions, both of E(h   (x + h )1/  ; v(z) = z↵, h   (c + h )1/ )
and E(x+ h  ; y1/  , c+ h ) are increasing in x. Hence the product is increasing in x.
1.D.2 Probability weighting functions
Let w be an inverse-S shaped weighting function which is concave on [0, q] and convex
on [q, 1]. We want to show that for common families of weighting function E(x;w, c) is
decreasing in x for 0 6 x 6 min(c, q) for any 0 6 c 6 1.
Let G(x, c) = @@x lnE(x;w, c) =   1c x + w
00(x)
w0(x) +
w0(x)
w(c) w(x) . It is necessary and
su cient to show that G(x, c) 6 0 for all 0 6 x 6 min(c, q) and 0 6 c 6 1. Fix some x with
0 6 x 6 q. Then by a repeated application of l’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
c#x
G(x, c) = lim
c#x
✓
  1
c  x +
w00(x)
w0(x)
+
w0(x)
w(c)  w(x)
◆
=
w00(x)
2w0(x)
6 0
since w00(x) 6 0 for x 6 q. Then, if one could show that G(x, c) is decreasing in c 2 [x, 1],
then G(x, c) 6 G(x, x) 6 0, and the result will follow.
Hence, for our desired conclusion it is su cient to show that @@cG(x, c) =
1
(c x)2  
w0(x)w0(c)
(w(c) w(x))2 6 0 for x  c, or equivalently f(x, c) = f(x, c;w)   0 for x  c where
f(x, c) = w0(c)w0(x) 
✓
w(c)  w(x)
c  x
◆2
. (1.31)
In the remainder of this section, we use this approach to prove the results for the
Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Prelec (1998) weighting functions, and give some analysis
for the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) function.
The Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) weighting function
The Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) weighting function is given by w(x) =  x
d
 xd+(1 x)d
with 0 <  , d < 1.
Di↵erentiation gives
w0(x) =
d
 x2
✓
1
x
  1
◆d 1 
1 +
1
 

1
x
  1
 d! 2
and in turn, with z = 1x   1 and y = 1c   1
f(x, c) =
d2
 2x2c2
zd 1yd 1
✓
1 +
zd
 
◆ 2✓
1 +
yd
 
◆ 2
  1
(c  x)2
 
1
1 + z
d
 
  1
1 + y
d
 
!2
=
1
 2(c  x)2
✓
1 +
zd
 
◆ 2✓
1 +
yd
 
◆ 2 
d2
✓
1
x
  1
c
◆2
zd 1yd 1    zd   yd 2! .
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Since x  c we have y 6 z. The condition for f(x, y) > 0 is then
d2(z   y)2zd 1yd 1   (zd   yd)2 > 0. (1.32)
On writing z =  y with   > 1, (1.32) is equivalent to d(    1)  d2  12   ( d   1) > 0 and in
turn gd( )   0 where
gd( ) := d( 
1/2     1/2)  ( d/2     d/2) > 0. (1.33)
Write   = e2✓ for ✓   0. Then gd( ) = h(✓) where h(✓) = 2d sinh ✓   2 sinh(d✓). But
h(0) = 0 and h0(✓) = 2d[cosh ✓   cosh(d✓)]   0 since d < 1. Hence gd is increasing in   for
    1. Since gd(1) = 0 the result follows.
The Prelec (1998) weighting function
The Prelec (1998) probability weighting function is given by w(x) = exp( b(  lnx)a)
for 0 6 x 6 1 where 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b  1. It is su cient to show that f(x, c;w)   0
where f is given by (1.31). For the Prelec weighting function, we have
w0(x) =
ab
x
(  lnx)a 1 exp( b(  lnx)a).
Let y =   lnx > 0 and z =   ln c > 0, then y > z > 0 and f(x, c) = H(y, z) where
H(y, z) := w0(e z)w0(e y) 
✓
w(e z)  w(e y)
e z   e y
◆2
= (ab)2(yz)a 1ey+z b(y
a+za)  
✓
e bz
a   e bya
e z   e y
◆2
=
e b(y
a+za)
(e z   e y)2
✓
(ab)2(yz)a 1
⇣
e
1
2 (y z)   e  12 (y z)
⌘2
 
⇣
e
b
2 (y
a za)   e  b2 (ya za)
⌘2◆
=
4e b(y
a+za)
(e z   e y)2
✓
(ab)2(yz)a 1 sinh2
✓
1
2
(y   z)
◆
  sinh2
✓
b
2
(ya   za)
◆◆
.
Hence to show H(y, z) > 0, it is equivalent to show that
(ab)2(yz)a 1 sinh2
✓
1
2
(y   z)
◆
  sinh2
✓
b
2
(ya   za)
◆
> 0
or
sinh
 
1
2 (y   z)
 
sinh
 
b
2 (y
a   za)  > (yz)
1
2 (1 a)
ab
. (1.34)
Let   = zy such that 0 6   6 1. Then the condition in (1.34) becomes
sinh
 y
2 (1   )
 
sinh
⇣
bya
2 (1   a)
⌘ > y1 a  12 (1 a)
ab
. (1.35)
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It is known that under b 6 1, the inflexion point of w lies above the diagonal
line. Thus q is smaller than the fixed point of w which is given by exp( b 11 a ), i.e. q 6
exp( b 11 a ). Then  y = lnx 6 ln q 6  b 11 a and in turn y > bya. Also we have 1     >
1    a, then y2 (1    ) > by
a
2 (1    a). By convexity of the function sinh(·) on the positive
regime,
sinh
 y
2 (1   )
 
sinh
⇣
bya
2 (1   a)
⌘ > y2 (1   )
bya
2 (1   a)
=
y1 a(1   )
b(1   a) .
Hence to show (1.35) it is su cient to show
y1 a(1   )
b(1   a) >
y1 a 
1
2 (1 a)
ab
or equivalently
G( ) := a(1   )    12 (1 a)(1   a) > 0
on 0 6   6 1. But   1/2G( ) = a(  1/2   1/2)  (  a/2   a/2) = ga(1/ ) where ga is the
function given in (1.33) and shown to be positive there.
The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function
The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function is given in (1.3)
as: w(x) = x
 
(x +(1 x) )1/  . The decreasing elasticity property on the concave regime seems
di cult to verify analytically. In Figure 1.7 we plot the  G(x, c) =   @@x lnE(x;w, c) =
1
c x   w
00(x)
w0(x)   w
0(x)
w(c) w(x) for several values of   over 0 6 x 6 min(c, q) and 0 6 c 6 1 where
q is the inflexion point of w. All the plots show positive values which verify the decreasing
elasticity property of w on the required range.
1.E Proofs for the implied rate of selling
Our goal in this section is to prove Lemma 1.10 which can be established by the following
collection of results. To begin with, the key mathematical result which underpins our
analysis is:
Lemma 1.15 (Bertoin et al. (1992)). Let X be a di↵usion process in natural scale with X0 =
0 and satisfying dXt = ⇠(Xt)dBt. Suppose that ⌫ is a centred target law. Let ⇣ = ⇣⌫ be given
by ⇣(dx) = ⌫(dx)u⌫(x) |x| and let ⇤
X,⇣
t =
R
R ⇣(dx)L
X
t (x) where L
X = (LXt (x))t 0,s(aJ )xs(bJ ) is
the local time process of X defined in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1.8. Set
⌧ = ⌧X,⇣,⇤ = inf{u : ⇤X,⇣u   T} where T is a standard exponential random variable with
unit rate which is independent of X. Then X⌧ ⇠ ⌫.
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Figure 1.7: Plot of  G(x, c) =   @@x lnE(x;w, c) with w taken to be the Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function for several values of parameter  . To
conclude that E(x;w, c) is decreasing in x for 0  x  min{c, q} we need  G(x, c)   0 over
the relevant range.
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For our purposes it is convenient to work with a slightly di↵erent normalisation
of local time which satisfies an occupation time formula for calendar time, rather than
quadratic variation. Set `Xt (a) = L
X
t (a)/⇠(a)
2. Then, for a Borel function  ,Z t
0
 (Xu)⇠(Xu)
2du =
Z t
0
 (Xu)d[X]u =
Z
LXt (a) (a)da =
Z
`Xt (a) (a)⇠(a)
2da
and we have
R t
0  (Xu)du =
R
`Xt (a) (a)da. Set  
X,⌘
t =
R
⌘(dx)`Xt (x). Then ⇤
X,⌘
t =  
X,⇠2⌘
t
where ⇠2⌘ is the measure ⇠2(x)⌘(dx).
Proposition 1.16. Let   =  ⌫ be given by  (dx) =
⇠(x)2⌫(dx)
u⌫(x) |x| . Let ⌧ = ⌧
X, ,  = inf{u :R
 (da)`Xt (a)   T}. Then X⌧ ⇠ ⌫.
Proof. This directly follows from Lemma 1.15 and construction of  . ⇤
Let `P be the local time process of P with the normalisation that
R t
0  (Ps)ds =R
 (a)`Pt (a)da.
Proposition 1.17. Suppose P is given as the solution to the SDE dPt =  (Pt)dBt+(Pt)dt.
Let s be a scale function of P chosen such that s(P0) = 0. Let µ be a prospect such that
⌫ := µ   s has zero mean.
Let   =  µ be given by  (dp) =  (p)2s0(p)
µ(dp)
u⌫(s(p)) |s(p)| and let  
P, 
t =
R
R  (dp)`
P
t (p).
Set ⌧ = ⌧P, ,  = inf{u :  P, u   T} where T is a standard exponential random variable with
unit rate which is independent of P . Then P⌧ ⇠ µ.
Proof. Let X = s(P ). For a Borel function  we haveZ
 (s(p))`Xt (s(p))s
0(p)dp =
Z
 (x)`Xt (x)dx =
Z t
0
 (Xu)du
=
Z t
0
(   s)(Pu)du =
Z
(   s)(p)`Pt (p)dp.
In particular, `Xt (s(p))s
0(p) = `Pt (p).
From Itoˆ’s formula we have dXu = ⇠(Xu)dBu =  (Pu)s0(Pu)dBu and so ⇠(s(p)) =
s0(p) (p). Then
 P, u =
Z
µ(dp)
u⌫(s(p))  |s(p)| (p)
2s0(p)`Pu (p) =
Z
µ(dp)
u⌫(s(p))  |s(p)| (p)
2[s0(p)]2`Xu (s(p))
=
Z
µ(dp)
u⌫(s(p))  |s(p)|⇠(s(p))
2`Xu (s(p)) =
Z
⌫(dx)
u⌫(x)  |x|⇠(x)
2`Xu (x) =  
X, 
u
where   is as given in Proposition 1.16. Then ⌧ = ⌧P, ,  = ⌧X, ,  and s(P⌧ ) = X⌧ =
X⌧X, ,  ⇠ ⌫. We conclude that P⌧ ⇠ µ. ⇤
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1.F Distribution of agents’ types and aggregate implied
selling rate
In this section we discuss how to design the distribution of agents’ types to produce a flat
aggregate implied selling rate on losses as in Figure 1.6. We assume the agents in the
economy have homogeneous TK preference parameters except their loss aversion levels k
vary on [kmin,1). Here kmin :=
 
R `1
R
 ↵  ↵+
with R being the common reference level
and `1 the target loss threshold of the agent with k = 1. The price process is a martingale
exponential Brownian motion starting at the reference level such that   = 1 and P0 = R.
We insist ↵  > ↵+.
Lemma 1.18 (A scaling property). Let Fk be the CDF of the optimal prospect of the agent
with loss aversion level k. Then Fk(p) = F1(R+k
1
↵  ↵+ (p R)) for k > kmin. Moreover, all
agents allocate a common size ✓  of probability mass to losses, and the target loss threshold
of the agent with loss aversion level k is given by `k = R  k 
1
↵  ↵+ (R  `1).
Proof. Under the assumption of   = 1, the scaled value function of the agent with loss
aversion level k is simply given by
vk(x) =
8><>:x
↵+ , x > 0,
 k|x|↵  , x 6 0,
and his corresponding PT objective function is
Ek(X) =
Z 1
1 P(X>0)
vk(G(x))w
0
+(1  x)dx+
Z P(X<0)
0
vk(G(x))w
0
 (x)dx
with X belonging to a class of random variables with zero mean and lower bound  R, and
G is the quantile function of X. Then we have
Ek(k 
1
↵  ↵+X) =
Z 1
1 P(k 
1
↵  ↵+ X>0)
vk(k
  1↵  ↵+G(x))w0+(1  x)dx
+
Z P(k  1↵  ↵+ X<0)
0
vk(k
  1↵  ↵+G(x))w0 (x)dx
= k
  ↵+↵  ↵+
Z 1
1 P(X>0)
v1(G(x))w
0
+(1  x)dx
+ k
1  ↵ ↵  ↵+
Z P(X<0)
0
v1(G(x))w
0
 (x)dx
= k
  ↵+↵  ↵+ E1(X).
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Hence if X⇤1 is an optimiser to the problem supX E1(X), then X⇤k := k 
1
↵  ↵+X⇤1 is
the optimiser to the problem supX Ek(X) (the zero-mean property trivially preserves, and
the lower bound constraint is guaranteed to be satisfied as long as k > kmin). The result
immediately follows. ⇤
Assume the loss aversion levels of the agents are randomly distributed with a prior
density ⌘ supported on [kmin,1). The CDF of the aggregate target sale price is given by
Fµ(p) =
R1
kmin
Fk(p)⌘(k)dk where Fk is the CDF of X⇤k . Note that we have Fµ(R) = ✓ .
Let fµ be the density function of Fµ. We require a constant stopping rate   on the
loss regime p < R = P0, then using (1.18) we have fµ(p) =
2 
 2p2
R p
0 (p   u)fµ(u)du and in
turn Fµ is a solution to the ODE
p2F 00(p) + 2pF 0(p)  2 
 2
F (p) = 0.
Using the boundary conditions of Fµ(0) = 0 and Fµ(R) = ✓ , we conclude Fµ(p) =
✓ 
  p
R
 C  for p 6 R = P0, where C  :=  1+p1+8 / 22 .
Hence to produce this target CDF on losses, we require
✓ 
⇣ p
R
⌘C 
=
Z 1
kmin
Fk(p)⌘(k)dk = ✓ 
Z 1
kmin
1(p>`k)⌘(k)dk
= ✓ 
Z 1
kmin
1⇣
k6(R `1R p )
↵  ↵+
⌘⌘(k)dk
= ✓ 
Z (R `1R p )↵  ↵+
kmin
⌘(k)dk.
Di↵erentiating both side with respect to p gives
C 
R
⇣ p
R
⌘C  1
=
(↵    ↵+)(R  l1)↵  ↵+
(R  p)1+↵  ↵+ ⌘
 ✓
R  `1
R  p
◆↵  ↵+!
and this gives the required form of ⌘ as
⌘(k) =
C (R  `1)
R(↵    ↵+)
 
R  (R  `1)k 
1
↵  ↵+
R
!C  1
k
 
⇣
1+ 1↵  ↵+
⌘
defined for k > kmin =
 
R `1
R
 ↵  ↵+
.
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Chapter 2
Randomised strategies and
prospect theory in a dynamic
context
“From here on in, I’ve decided to make all trivial decisions with a
throw of the dice, thus freeing up my mind to do what it does best:
enlighten and amaze.”
— Sheldon Cooper, The Big Bang Theory (Season 5, Episode 4)
2.1 Introduction
In the asset liquidation model under prospect theory (PT) preferences introduced in Chapter
1, the agent solves for an optimal prospect at time zero and adopts a trading strategy
accordingly which attains this target prospect. Implicitly, it is assumed that the agent is a
precommitting one in the sense that he is able to follow the strategy devised at time zero
consistently throughout the rest of the game. This indeed is just one of the several possible
notions of optimality. The main subtlety of predicting an agent’s behaviours in a dynamic
PT model is that its probability weighting component may - and typically will - induce time
inconsistency.1
In presence of time inconsistency, how an individual acts in a state of the world
may di↵er from how he planned to act in that state. It becomes crucial to understand how
1Other types of economic problems featuring time inconsistency include dynamic mean-variance portfolio
optimisation and intertemporal choices with hyperbolic discounting.
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to deal with the time inconsistency - see Machina (1989) - is the agent naive (and thus
unaware of the inconsistency), or is he sophisticated and aware of the inconsistency? And if
he is sophisticated, can he find a way to commit to his initial plan, or must he acknowledge
the fact that his future self will re-optimise, and potentially change strategy? In his recent
discussion paper on the psychology of tail events, Barberis (2013) raises the challenge of
how to best address the time inconsistency induced by probability weighting.
In a model of casino gambling in a multi-period binomial tree setting, Barberis
(2012) observes and investigates the phenomenon of time inconsistency with PT agents.
Three types of agent are considered: an agent with a precommitment mechanism (for short,
a precommitting agent), a naive agent and a sophisticated agent.2 The optimal behaviours
of the three types of agent are solved by exhaustive numerical searches. Barberis (2012)
finds PT can explain observed patterns of gambling behaviour. Each type of agent will,
for certain values of PT preference parameters, gamble in a casino. The first contribution
of Barberis (2012) is to show that PT provides a viable model of gambling behaviour. His
second major contribution is to make a striking observation concerning the behaviour of the
naive agent - that sometimes the naive agent follows a strategy which is the exact opposite
of the one he planned to follow at the outset.3
However, the realistic predictions brought by the discrete, finite horizon model are
not robust to change in the modelling setup. Ebert and Strack (2015) consider a continuous
time, continuous space and infinite horizon analog of the Barberis (2012) model in which
wealth from gambling follows a Brownian motion. They show that for a wide range of PT
specifications (including essentially all versions which have received empirical support) the
agent with commitment would prefer a stopping rule based on the first exit time of the
2The precommitting agent decides his strategy today and has a mechanism for making his future self
follow this strategy; a naive agent is not aware of his time inconsistent preference structure, and he re-
evaluates all possible strategies and takes a new decision about whether to gamble further or to stop at each
point of time; the sophisticated agent is aware of his time inconsistency but is unable to commit his future
self to following any given strategy. See Section 2.3.1 for a more detailed description.
3Suppose parameters are such that the naive agent wants to gamble at time zero. On first entering the
casino, the naive agent typically plans to continue to gamble if his first bet is a success, but to stop if his first
bet is unsuccessful. This is a “loss-exit” strategy. But what happens in practice? If the first gamble results
in a win, then the agent re-evaluates his situation and may now find it optimal to stop. In particular, the
extreme outcome of a winning gamble in every time period up to the final horizon is now less extreme, and
thus the impact of probability weighting is less significant. Then the fact that the agent is risk averse (on
gains) means that he stops gambling. Conversely, if the first gamble results in a loss, the agent re-evaluates,
and again the probability weighting is less significant, resulting in the agent electing to continue gambling
(as PT preferences are risk seeking on losses).
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wealth process from a well-chosen interval to one of stopping immediately. From this fact
Ebert and Strack (2015) make a drastic inference: the naive PT agent never stops. This
extreme prediction of a naive agent’s behaviours arguably casts doubt over the applicability
of PT in a continuous dynamic model.
The extant prospect theory literature has focused on pure strategies, both in static
and dynamic settings. Results on mixed (or randomised) strategies are very limited. One
result is given in Wakker (1994) (see also Theorem 7.4.1 of Wakker (2010)), which considers
mixed strategies in the context of a static choice of prospect in a rank dependent utility
model, and relates the benefit of using mixed strategies to the concavity of the probability
weighting function. There is also mention of the desire of PT agents for randomisation in
the mathematical finance literature, for example, Carassus and Rasonyi (2015). In contrast,
randomisation has been discussed in the ambiguity literature since the seminal work of
Rai↵a (1961) and is standard in other branches of economics such as game theory. In this
chapter we consider the role of randomisation in the agents’ set of potential strategies and
re-examine the impact of probability weighting in a dynamic PT model, in both the discrete
setup of Barberis (2012) and the continuous setup of Ebert and Strack (2015).
The first contribution of this chapter is to highlight that a PT agent facing a dynamic
investment/stopping problem will typically benefit from following a randomised strategy.4
We demonstrate this result in the context of the casino gambling model of Barberis (2012).
In this setting the wider choice of available strategies causes the agent to gamble in a larger
regime of parameters.
Our second contribution is to reconsider the continuous time model of Ebert and
Strack (2015). They show how to choose an interval [a, b] containing the initial wealth x such
that stopping at the first exit time of the wealth process from this interval is strictly preferred
to stopping immediately. Their result is true under a mild condition described as probability
weighting being stronger than loss aversion, which they demonstrate holds for the most
popular weighting functions. We show that the randomised strategy of sometimes stopping
immediately and sometimes stopping on the first exit from [a, b] is a better prospect than
simply stopping on the first exit from the interval. Hence the analysis of Ebert and Strack
(2015) is no longer su cient to conclude that the naive agent never stops, once randomisation
is allowed. Our result requires a condition that can be interpreted as follows: probability
4A similar observation is made in He et al. (2016). The main focus of He et al. (2016) is on the agent
who can precommit in a discrete time, infinite horizon model. In contrast, our focus is on the implications
for the continuous time setting, and especially the impact of time inconsistency and the question of whether
naive agents always use a trivial strategy in this setting.
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weighting on losses for nearly certain events is stronger than probability weighting on gains
for rare events. We show this condition follows from the prevailing experimental finding
that w±(1/2) < 1/2 and demonstrate (for the same parameters as Ebert and Strack (2015))
that it holds for several popular weighting functions.
Ebert and Strack (2015) extend their arguments based on intervals to prove that
for naive agents restricted to pure strategies, the optimal strategy is to always continue and
gamble “until the bitter end”. In contrast, we show that a naive agent with a randomisation
device (the ability to generate a continuous random variable), and with the ability to commit
his current self to following strategies which depend on the realisation of this device, does
not necessarily follow a never-stopping strategy. However, our argument needs more than a
result based on intervals. One way to conclude that the optimal strategy for agents who can
randomise is to always continue is to determine the optimal prospect and to show that this
prospect does not carry any mass at the starting wealth level. We show that this is not true
in general, and that the never-stopping result no longer holds when agents can randomise.
To demonstrate this, in Section 2.5 we give a pair of examples for which we calculate the
optimal prospect of an agent and show that if the initial value of the Brownian motion is
at the reference level, then the optimal prospect includes an atom at the reference level.
A naive agent who can randomise may stop at the reference level. The analysis is further
extended in Section 2.6 to cover a more general modelling setup where we show that a naive
agent may stop if his net wealth is su ciently high. Thus the drastic conclusion of Ebert
and Strack (2015) that naive PT agents never stop is no longer the unique prediction if we
allow for a wider class of strategies. Naive PT agents who can follow randomised strategies
may voluntarily stop gambling.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we briefly describe the
structure of the optimal stopping problem under PT preferences and the idea of randomi-
sation. Section 2.3 presents the discrete model and we give numerical results confirming
that randomisation can lead to improvement in economic value to di↵erent types of agent.
The continuous counterpart is reviewed in Section 2.4. We first demonstrate that the pure
strategy in form of a first exit rule of Ebert and Strack (2015) can be improved by mixing the
strategy with sometimes stopping immediately. Then through solving two simple stylised
examples in Section 2.5 as well as a model under more general specifications in Section 2.6,
we show that the optimal behaviours of a naive agent may include voluntary cessation of
gambling. Finally we conclude in Section 2.7.
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2.2 Prospect theory and optimal stopping
2.2.1 Prospect theory preferences
We work under the same PT preferences framework as in Section 1.2.1 of Chapter 1 which
we briefly recap as follows. The agent’s utility or value function defined over gains and losses
is U such that U is continuous, U(0) = 0, U is concave and increasing on R+ and convex
and increasing on R  and U satisfies the (simple) loss aversion property U(y) +U( y) < 0
for all y.5 For the probability weighting functions, we assume that w± is concave on [0, Q±]
and convex on [Q±, 1] for some Q± 2 (0, 1) with w±(1/2) < 1/2. For an exogenously fixed
reference level R, the PT value of a random payo↵ Z is given by E(Z) as defined in (1.2).
2.2.2 Optimal stopping
We assume that the agent’s wealth from gambling or trading of assets follows a stochastic
process X. For this chapter, we consider X to be either a simple random walk (Section
2.3), a Brownian motion (Section 2.4 and 2.5), or some other general time-homogeneous
di↵usion (Section 2.6). The strategies available to the agent correspond to stopping times
⌧ representing when to sell an asset or stop gambling. Then the stopped value X = X⌧
represents the prospect of the agent. The goal of the agent is to find
sup
⌧2⇤
E(X⌧ )
where E is as given in (1.2). ⇤ is a suitable set of stopping times depending on the context
of the modelling framework.
2.2.3 Randomised strategies: a preliminary discussion
In classical optimal stopping problems in the expected utility framework, the agent faces a
choice between stopping and continuing at each instant of time. If there is no probability
weighting then there is no incentive to randomise: the expected payo↵ is linear in the
probabilities and if the value from stopping is V S and the value from continuing is V C ,
then the payo↵ V (✓) from a randomised strategy involving continuing with probability ✓
is V (✓) = ✓V C + (1   ✓)V S  max{V S , V C}. Hence there is an optimal strategy which is
pure, and the ability to randomise brings no benefit to the agent. This result extends to any
5We do not explicitly require simple loss aversion in Chapter 1 but this condition will be useful in this
chapter. For the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function of (1.1), it satisfies simple loss aversion if
↵+ = ↵  and k > 1.
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situation where there is no probability weighting.6 However, if probabilities are re-weighted
then typically V (✓) 6= ✓V C+(1 ✓)V S and the agent may benefit from mixed strategies. In
fact, although our focus is on PT preferences, similar arguments will apply in any dynamic
setting where probability weighting is included, for example, the rank dependent utility
models of Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1987).
Extensive experimental research documents widespread patterns of stochastic or
random choice whereby subjects faced with the same decision problem on multiple occasions
make di↵erent choices.7 Agranov and Ortoleva (2015) (also Dwenger et al. (2013)) design an
experiment to distinguish between di↵erent explanations for the source of stochastic choice
and document evidence in support of deliberate randomisation.8 This evidence fits with our
theoretical model where it can be optimal for PT agents to randomise.
2.3 The discrete model
2.3.1 Wealth dynamics and types of the agent
An agent is o↵ered a series of independent and identical fair gambles in which he could
win or lose a unit amount. At the beginning of each period, the agent decides whether to
enter the gamble (continue) or to leave (stop). Upon stopping or the end of the T th period,
whichever comes first, the whole game ends and the agent takes the current cumulative
profit or loss as his final payo↵. The evolution of the agent’s net wealth can be represented
by a path through a T -period recombining binomial tree, and the wealth process X follows
a simple random walk. At each time point t = 0, 1, ..., T , his net wealth can possibly take
t + 1 distinct values labeled by S(1, t) > S(2, t) > ... > S(t + 1, t). If the initial wealth of
the agent is zero then S(i, t) = t  2(i  1). In this setup, the available strategies ⇤ is a set
of stopping times taking values on {0, 1, ..., T   1}.
Barberis (2012) assumes that the agent’s decision at a particular node is a binary
choice of exit or continuation which only depends on the current position of that node. A
plan at node (i, t) is defined as a mapping C : (i, t)! {stop, continue}. When the agent is
6Kyle et al. (2006) and Henderson (2012) consider optimal stopping problems for PT agents without
probability weighting and determine the optimal stopping rules. Since there is no probability weighting in
these settings their proposed strategies are optimal, even if randomised strategies are allowed.
7This pattern of stochastic choice was first noted by Tversky (1969) and replicated in many studies, see
Agranov and Ortoleva (2015) and Dwenger et al. (2013) and references therein.
8Other theoretical models where randomisation is a deliberate choice include Machina (1985), Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. (2013), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) and Saito (2015).
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at node (i, t), a collection of plans at all reachable subsequent nodes a = {C(k, s) : t 6 s 6
T  1, i 6 k 6 s  t+ i} is a stopping strategy of the game associated with (i, t) as a starting
position. Let A(i, t) be the set of all possible stopping strategies available to the agent who
is at the node (i, t). Then under a given stopping strategy a 2 A(i, t) which leads to a
stopping time ⌧(a), one can compute the probability distribution of X(i,t)⌧(a) (the superscript
(i, t) is used to indicate that the wealth process starts at the node (i, t)). Assuming a zero
reference level, the PT value of this strategy is computed by E(X(i,t)⌧(a)). The exact behaviours
of the agent depends on his own type as described below.
The precommitting agent
At time zero, the precommitting agent solves the optimisation problem
sup
a2A(1,0)
E(X(1,0)⌧(a) ).
Define the corresponding optimiser as a⇤ = {C⇤(i, t) : 0 6 t 6 T   1, 1 6 i 6 t + 1}. The
precommitting agent acts according to the plan C⇤(i, t) in any subsequent node (i, t). In
this case, the optimal strategy is computed only once at time zero and it characterises the
subsequent behaviours of the agent completely.
The naive agent
Unlike the precommitting agent, the naive agent re-computes the optimal strategy at every
node and decides whether to continue or stop in the current node based on the new optimi-
sation result. The updated decision overrides the plans derived in any previous time step.
Mathematically, the agent who is currently at node (i, t) solves
sup
a2A(i,t)
E(X(i,t)⌧(a)).
Suppose the optimal solution associated with this particular starting node is given by a⇤(i,t) =
{C⇤(i,t)(k, s) : t 6 s 6 T   1, i 6 k 6 s  t+ i}. Then the agent’s action at this node is given
by C⇤(i,t)(i, t). This type of agent is time inconsistent as his planned action at a fixed node
(K,S) may change with his current position (i, t) (that is, C⇤(i,t)(K,S) depends on (i, t)).
The sophisticated agent
This type of agent is aware that he will re-evaluate the prospect value in future states
and follow the best strategy at that moment in time. Nonetheless, he does not have any
commitment device to force his future self to follow a strategy planned today. Instead,
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he acts in an optimal way today in anticipation of how he will behave in the future.
Consequently, this type of agent operates on the logic of backward induction.9 Starting
from the last period of the game, the agent solves for the optimal plan at the nodes of
(1, T   1), (2, T   1), ..., (T, T   1). Knowing his behaviours in the future time, he iterates
one time-step backward and decides whether it is optimal to continue or quit the game at
the preceding nodes. The process is repeated all the way back to time zero. Precisely, the
optimal decision C⇤ at each node is given by the algorithm
C⇤(i, T   1) = argmax
C(i,T 1)2{stop,continue}
E(X(i,T 1)⌧(C(i,T 1))), 1 6 i 6 T,
C⇤(i, t) = argmax
C(i,t)2{stop,continue}
E(X(i,t)⌧(C(i,t)[a⇤(i,t))), 1 6 i 6 t+ 1, t < T   1,
where a⇤(i, t) := {C⇤(k, s) : t < s 6 T   1, i 6 k 6 s  t+ i} represents the collection of the
optimal actions at all reachable nodes beyond (i, t).
2.3.2 Randomisation in the discrete model
Rather than limiting the plan at each node to a binary choice between stopping or continuing,
the agent could consider randomising the stopping decision such that the probability of
continuing at node (i, t) is given by ✓(i, t). A stopping strategy associated with a particular
starting node (i, t) is no longer a collection of binary mappings but instead a collection of
continuation probabilities {✓(k, s) 2 [0, 1] : t 6 s 6 T   1, i 6 k 6 s  t+ i}. In this setting,
the PT value of a stopping strategy can be obtained by (1.2) as before upon evaluating
the payo↵ distribution, and one can still distinguish the three types of agent as in Barberis
(2012) by amending the definitions in Section 2.3.1 to allow for a supremum over a suitable
space ⇥. Note that if we restrict the continuation probabilities to take values on {0, 1} only,
we recover the setup of Barberis (2012).
2.3.3 Numerical results in a two-period model
In this section we present results under the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) specification of
the value and weighting function (see (1.1) and (1.3)) with ↵± = ↵ and  ± =  . We consider
T = 2 a two-period model and a starting net wealth at the reference point which is assumed
to be zero.
9It is also possible to understand the optimal strategy of this type of agent in a game-theoretic manner.
The stopping problem can be interpreted as a sequential game with T players, each of them representing a
copy of the agent at each time point t = 0, 1, ..., T   1. The optimal strategy can then be characterised as a
sub-game perfect equilibrium.
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The agent who can pre-commit
Consider first Figure 2.1. The left panels show the strategies followed by the agent in the
case where he cannot randomise, for three di↵erent parameter combinations. An open circle
at a node indicates a node at which it is optimal to continue gambling; a closed or solid
circle indicates a node at which it is optimal to stop. We find three possible behaviours
- the loss-exit strategy of gambling at time zero and continuing after a win but stopping
after a loss [Panel (a)]; the gain-exit strategy of gambling at time zero and continuing after
a loss but stopping after a win [Panel (c)] and the trivial strategy of always stopping such
that the agent does not enter the game in the first place [Panel (e)]. Note that it is never
optimal to always continue. The right hand panels show what happens if, for the same
parameter sets, we consider an agent who can randomise. We find cases where the agent
who can randomise gambles at time zero when the agent who cannot does not gamble. The
probability of gambling can be significant in this case, for the parameters of Panels (e) and
(f) it is 0.47 as opposed to zero. However, compare Panels (a) and (b) ((c) and (d)), if
the deterministic agent follows a loss-exit (gain-exit) strategy then his counterpart with the
ability to randomise follows a strategy with similar characteristics.
Now consider the results of Figure 2.2 which describe the strategies in detail as
parameters change. Panel (a) shows the parameter combinations (in loss aversion k and
↵, we fix the probability weighting parameter  ) for which the agent gambles at time zero.
The agent without the ability to randomise follows a gain-exit strategy for low values of loss
aversion k and convexity/concavity ↵ (region bounded by the dash-dot line) and a loss-exit
strategy for low k and large ↵ (region bounded by the solid line) and chooses never to
gamble for large values of loss aversion k (the region above the solid and dash-dot lines).
Also plotted in Panel (a) by the dashed line is the boundary of the region where the agent
with the ability to randomise chooses a non-zero probability of gambling. (Again, the region
below the dashed line is the parameter region where he follows a non-trivial strategy). Note
that the parameter region where the agent who can randomise enters the gamble at time
zero is larger than the corresponding region for the deterministic agent. In this sense, the
ability to randomise leads to more gambling.
The lower left panel (c) shows the optimal probability that the agent gambles at
time zero for the agent who can randomise. The two right panels (b) and (d) show the
probability of gambling at time 1, after a win (Panel (b)) or after a loss (Panel (d)). In
cases where the agent who cannot randomise follows a gain-exit strategy then the agent who
can randomise follows a similar strategy - he gambles at time zero and again after a loss,
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but after a win he may gamble again, albeit with a small probability. In cases where the
agent who cannot randomise follows a loss-exit strategy then the agent who can randomise
also exits after a loss, but gambles at time zero with a probability typically less than one,
and sometimes as low as 0.4, and also gambles after a win with a probability less than one.
There are several features of PT which drive these results. First, the presence
of loss aversion means that symmetric bets, such as stopping at time 1 in all situations,
are unattractive. (Further, increasing loss aversion parameter k reduces the value of all
strategies making stopping at time zero more likely.) Second, the fact he is risk seeking
on losses and risk averse on gains means an agent has an incentive to follow a gain-exit
strategy. Since U(2)/U(1) = U( 2)/U( 1) = 2↵ this incentive is greatest when ↵ is small.
However the impact of probability weighting is to provide incentives in the opposite direction
- probability weighting gives greater prominence to extreme events, encouraging long tailed
distributions on gains and thin tailed distributions on losses, or equivalently, encouraging
loss-exit strategies. When ↵ is large and thus the impact of convexity is small, this factor
dominates.
What then is the impact of randomisation? In this model randomisation gives the
agent further flexibility in the design of his terminal wealth. This makes it more likely that
the agent gambles or enters the casino initially, see Panel (a) of Figure 2.2. For the agent
who is not allowed to make use of randomisation, the only values of w which are relevant
are w(1/4) and w(1/2). In particular, there are no events of very small probability and the
shape of w near zero is irrelevant. In contrast, the agent who can randomise can design
gambles of arbitrary probability.
The naive agent
Results for the naive agent are presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 in the same format. Recall
that we are assuming a version of na¨ıvite´ whereby the agent can commit his current self to
following an action which depends on a contemporaneous random outcome. At time zero,
the naive agent selects the identical strategy to the precommiting agent. That is, what he
plans to do is the same as the agent who can commit. (See the time zero node in all trees in
Figures 2.1 and 2.3 and the left hand panels of Figures 2.2 and 2.4.) The interesting feature
of the naive agent is the fact that because he is unable to commit, he has the possibility
of modifying his strategy at time 1. The naive agent re-evaluates his strategies at time 1,
and always chooses to gamble after a loss but stop after a win, ie. if he gambles at time
zero, he follows a gain-exit strategy. As Barberis (2012) observes, the striking feature is
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(a) Optimal pure strategy with ↵ =
0.95, k = 1.45 and   = 0.5.
0.52
0.95
0
(b) Optimal randomised strategy with
↵ = 0.95, k = 1.45 and   = 0.5.
(c) Optimal pure strategy with ↵ = 0.3,
k = 1.05 and   = 0.5.
1
0.14
1
(d) Optimal randomised strategy with
↵ = 0.3, k = 1.05 and   = 0.5.
(e) Optimal pure strategy with ↵ = 0.5,
k = 1.15 and   = 0.5.
0.47
0.45
0
(f) Optimal randomised strategy with
↵ = 0.5, k = 1.15 and   = 0.5.
Figure 2.1: The agent who can precommit. The left panels display strategies when the agent
cannot randomise where an open circle denotes a node at which it is optimal to continue and closed
or solid circles are nodes where it is optimal to stop. The right panels display the corresponding
strategy for the agent who can randomise where the number at each node gives the probability of
continuing at that node. The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) PT parameters are given in each
panel.
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(b) Probability of continuing at the
gain node for an agent with randomised
strategies.
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(c) Probability of entering the game at
time zero for an agent using randomised
strategies.
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(d) Probability of continuing at the
loss node for an agent with randomised
strategies.
Figure 2.2: The agent who can precommit. Panel (a) displays the parameter combinations for
which the agent gambles at time zero. The solid and dash-dot lines distinguish the three types
of strategy {do not enter/trivial; loss-exit, gain-exit} for the agent without randomisation. The
dashed line indicates the region below which the agent who can randomise enters the game at time
zero with some positive probability. Panels (c) displays the probability of entering the game at time
zero for the agent who can randomise. Panels (b) (and (d)) display the probability of continuing
at the gain (loss) node at time 1 for the agent who can randomise. Regions with no value in (b)
and (d) correspond to parameters where the agent did not enter the game at time zero. All panels
use T = 2 and   = 0.5.
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that when the probability weighting is the dominant e↵ect, the naive agent without access
to randomisation plans at time zero to follow a loss-exit strategy, but actually follows a
gain-exit strategy. For the agent with randomisation, the results are broadly similar. The
impact of randomisation is to modify the probability of entering the casino initially, but at
time 1, this agent still follows a gain-exit strategy.
The sophisticated agent
The results for the sophisticated agent are obtained by backward induction, see Figure 2.5.
In comparison with the results for the agent with the ability to commit, we find in the region
where the latter follows a gain-exit strategy the two agents behave similarly, but in the region
where the latter follows a loss-exit strategy, the sophisticated agent without the ability to
commit follows the trivial strategy. The agent knows at time zero that he plans to follow a
strategy of gain-exit at time 1 (if he does not follow the trivial strategy). Hence, in regions
where the agent with precommitment would choose to follow a loss-exit strategy (where loss
aversion and convexity/concavity are small and the probability weighting dominates) the
sophisticated agent knows that his future self will not follow this strategy and prefers not
to gamble at time zero.
2.4 The continuous model
2.4.1 The setup of Ebert and Strack (2015)
In the Ebert and Strack (2015) model, returns from gambling are modelled as a Brownian
motion Bx where the superscript x denotes the starting wealth level. The agent’s problem
is thus to find
V˜ (x) = sup
⌧2⇤
E(Bx⌧ ) (2.1)
where ⇤ is the set of uniformly integrable stopping times.10
The uniform integrability assumption deserves some discussion. Since Brownian
motion hits any level in finite time with probability one, over the infinite horizon an agent
without a lower bound on wealth can achieve a prospect (y, 1) (a unit mass at y) for any
y, especially any y > x where x is the starting value of the Brownian motion. We want
to exclude this type of doubling strategy. There are at least four approaches or rationales
10Recall that the set of uniformly integrable stopping times is the set of finite stopping times ⇢ such that
(Bxt^⇢)t>0 is a uniformly integrable family of random variables.
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(a) Optimal pure strategy with ↵ =
0.95, k = 1.45 and   = 0.5.
0.52
0
1
(b) Optimal randomised strategy with
↵ = 0.95, k = 1.45 and   = 0.5.
(c) Optimal pure strategy with ↵ = 0.3,
k = 1.05 and   = 0.5.
1
0
1
(d) Optimal randomised strategy with
↵ = 0.3, k = 1.05 and   = 0.5.
(e) Optimal pure strategy with ↵ = 0.5,
k = 1.15 and   = 0.5.
0.47
0
1
(f) Optimal randomised strategy with
↵ = 0.5, k = 1.15 and   = 0.5.
Figure 2.3: The naive agent. The left panels display strategies when the agent cannot randomise
where an open circle denotes a node at which it is optimal to continue and closed or solid circles
are nodes where it is optimal to stop. The right panels display the corresponding strategy for the
agent who can randomise where the number at each node gives the probability of continuing at that
node. The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) PT parameters are given in each panel.
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the agent gambles at time zero and form
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(b) Probability of continuing at the
gain node for an agent with randomised
strategies.
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(c) Probability of entering the game at
time zero for an agent using randomised
strategies.
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(d) Probability of continuing at the
loss node for an agent with randomised
strategies.
Figure 2.4: The naive agent. Panel (a) displays the parameter combinations for which the agent
gambles at time zero. The solid and dash-dot lines distinguish the two types of strategy {do
not enter/trivial; gain-exit} for the agent without randomisation. The dashed line indicates the
region below which the agent who can randomise enters the game at time zero with some positive
probability. Panels (c) displays the probability of entering the game at time zero for the agent who
can randomise. Panels (b) (and (d)) display the probability of continuing at the gain (loss) node
at time 1 for the agent who can randomise. Regions with no value in (b) and (d) correspond to
parameters where the agent did not enter the game at time zero. All panels use T = 2 and   = 0.5.
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Figure 2.5: The sophisticated agent. The figure displays the parameter combi-
nations for which the sophisticated agent gambles at time zero. The dash-dot line
distinguishes the two types of strategy {do not enter/trivial; gain-exit} for the
agent without randomisation. The dashed line indicates the region below which
the agent who can randomise enters the game at time zero with some positive
probability. In the region where the agent enters, the probabilities of continuing
at the gain (loss) nodes are zero (one) respectively. We use T = 2 and   = 0.5.
for doing so. First, we can suppose that the Brownian motion has a negative drift (so that
Brownian motion Bx hits levels y > x with probabilities strictly less than one), at the
expense of an extra level of complication in the analysis. Second, we can insist that if the
Brownian motion hits some value   then all gambling must cease, and the agent receives
the stopped value  . It follows that Bx is a supermartingale and all feasible prospects
(ie. the class of random variables in form of Bx⌧ ) have expected values less than or equal to
x. Then by first order stochastic dominance it is su cient to consider only prospects with
mean x. Having calculated the optimal prospect we can check that its range is bounded
below, and hence that the condition of enforced stopping at   is never applied, for large
enough . Third, we could insist that stopping times are bounded by some large T and
then let T increase to infinity. Finally, as we do, we could exclude doubling strategies by
positing a mathematical restriction on ⌧ , in particular by insisting that stopping times are
uniformly integrable, whence the mean of the stopped process is x.
(2.1) is the type of the probability-weighted optimal stopping problem that we anal-
yse in Chapter 1. The key step towards constructing a solution is based on the idea that
the search over stopping times can be replaced by a search over random variables (refer to
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the equivalence of (1.7) and (1.8) in Section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1). Define
V (x) = sup
X:E[X]=x
E(X).
Then we have V (x) = V˜ (x). Our goal here is to find V (x) = V˜ (x) and the set of optimisers
for V (prospects or random variables) and V˜ (stopping times).
Ebert and Strack (2015) show that for an extremely wide class of value and prob-
ability weighting functions, for any initial wealth x there is a first exit stopping rule (a
two-point prospect) which is preferred to stopping immediately (a prospect of a sure-wealth
x). From this they reach the result that in continuous time models, naive agents always
postpone their stopping decisions: a naive agent with PT preferences will gamble “until the
bitter end”. Taken at face value, this never stopping result leads to unrealistic predictions
and casts doubt on the usefulness of na¨ıvite´ plus PT preferences in a dynamic context.
Assume the reference level is zero, and that the initial value of the Brownian motion
is at the reference level. We first restate a result of Ebert and Strack (2015).
Proposition 2.1 (Ebert and Strack (2015)). Suppose that (in addition to the standard
assumptions listed in Section 2.2.1) the value function U satisfies 0 < U 0(0 ) = KU 0(0+) <
1 for some K > 1.11,12
Suppose for the probability weighting functions w± there exists a pˆ 2 (0, 1/2) such
that
w+(pˆ) >
Kpˆ
1 + (K   1)pˆ , w (1  pˆ) <
1  pˆ
1 + (K   1)pˆ . (2.2)
Then there exists ✏ˆ > 0 such that the agent with zero initial wealth prefers gambling until
his wealth reaches ✏ˆ(1  pˆ) or  ✏ˆpˆ to stopping immediately.
Proof. Let ✏ be a positive constant which later we will treat as a parameter. Let b✏ = ✏(1 pˆ)
and a✏ =  ✏pˆ. Suppose the agent has zero initial wealth. One strategy open to the agent is
to gamble until the first time his wealth reaches b✏ or a✏ and then to stop. By construction,
the probability that the process hits b✏ before a✏ is pˆ. Then the value Hpˆ(✏) of this strategy
is:
Hpˆ(✏) = w+(pˆ)U(b✏) + w (1  pˆ)U(a✏) = w+(pˆ)U(✏(1  pˆ)) + w (1  pˆ)U( ✏pˆ).
11Under this assumption the value function exhibits finite marginal loss aversion in the sense that
U 0(0+) < U 0(0 ) <1. Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) introduce this notion of loss aversion and show that
it has the advantage of being scale independent. We have added the adjective marginal to distinguish the
concept from simple loss aversion U(y) + U( y) < 0.
12Note that the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function (1.1) has infinite slope at the origin and
thus does not satisfy this assumption. We postpone the discussion on this type of value function to Section
2.6.
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Tversky-Kahneman Goldstein-Einhorn Prelec
Condition (2.2) K = 2.25 (0, 0.072) (0, 0.035) (0, 0.062)
K = 1.5 (0, 0.176) (0, 0.104) (0, 0.139)
Condition (2.3) (0, 0.5) (0, 0.5) (0.0018, 0.5)
Table 2.1: Ranges of probabilities for which the Ebert-Strack condition (2.2) and condition
(2.3) are satisfied for various weighting function specifications and input parameters. The
first two rows correspond to those in Table W.1 of Ebert and Strack (2015) and give prob-
abilities for which (2.2) is satisfied. The third row gives the range of probabilities for which
condition (2.3) is satisfied. The first (second; third) column corresponds to the Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) weighting function with  ± = 0.65 (Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) with
d± = 0.69,  ± = 0.77; Prelec (1998) with b± = 1.05, a± = 0.65).
Note that Hpˆ(0) = 0. Now, writing H 0pˆ for the derivative with respect to ✏,
H 0pˆ(0+) = (1  pˆ)w+(pˆ)U 0(0+)  pˆw (1  pˆ)U 0(0 )
> pˆ(1  pˆ)
⇢
K
1 + (K   1)pˆ  
K
1 + (K   1)pˆ
 
U 0(0+) = 0.
Hence there exists ✏ˆ > 0 for which Hpˆ(✏ˆ) > 0 and for this (pˆ, ✏ˆ) the agent prefers to continue
(run until wealth first hits b✏ˆ or a✏ˆ) over stopping immediately.
⇤
From this result (together with an extension to any arbitrary initial wealth level
x), Ebert and Strack (2015) infer that a naive agent who can only use pure stopping rules
always postpones stopping decisions and hence, never stops.
The assumptions on the weighting functions given in (2.2) are satisfied by the com-
monly used inverse-S shaped weighting functions of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Prelec
(1998), Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) (see (1.4) for the forms of the Prelec and Goldstein-
Einhorn weighting functions) and the neo-additive weighting function (Wakker (2010), p208)
for many parameter values, provided pˆ is small. The first two rows of Table 2.1 correspond
to those in Table W.1 of Ebert and Strack (2015) and give probabilites for which (2.2) is
satisfied. For example, for the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function, and a loss
aversion parameter of K = 2.25, (2.2) is satisfied provided the gain probability pˆ is chosen
to be less than 0.072.
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Ebert and Strack (2015) show that a su cient condition for there to exist a pˆ such
that (2.2) holds is both w0+(0+) > K and w0 (1 ) > K. This property says that extremely
unlikely gains are overweighted and extremely likely losses are underweighted, both by
more than the loss aversion parameter. That is, probability weighting is stronger than loss
aversion.
2.4.2 Randomisation in the continuous model
Now we move on to mixed strategies and our first main result in the continuous time setup.
As in the discrete model, the fact that a PT agent prefers one strategy over another does
not mean that he necessarily prefers the first strategy over any mixture of the two. We now
show that in the setup considered in the main body of Ebert and Strack (2015), the agent
who can randomise his strategy prefers such a mixture. Thus if the naive agent can mix
over strategies then he prefers sometimes stopping over never stopping. This prediction is
more realistic and is closer to observed behaviour.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that in addition to the assumptions of Proposition 2.1 we have
w0 ((1  pˆ)) > w0+(pˆ). (2.3)
Then there exists ✓ˆ 2 (0, 1) such that the agent with zero initial wealth prefers a randomised
strategy of stopping immediately with probability (1   ✓ˆ) and otherwise gambling until his
wealth reaches ✏ˆ(1 pˆ) or  ✏ˆpˆ to the pure strategy of gambling until his wealth reaches ✏ˆ(1 pˆ)
or  ✏ˆpˆ.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose now the agent
stops gambling immediately with probability 1   ✓ and otherwise gambles until his wealth
reaches b✏ˆ or a✏ˆ. Fixing pˆ, ✏ˆ, considering ✓ as a variable and writing Hpˆ,✏ˆ(✓) as the value of
the strategy,
Hpˆ,✏ˆ(✓) = w+(✓pˆ)U(b✏ˆ) + w (✓(1  pˆ))U(a✏ˆ) = w+(✓pˆ)U(✏ˆ(1  pˆ)) + w (✓(1  pˆ))U( ✏ˆpˆ).
Note that Hpˆ,✏ˆ(0) = 0 and Hpˆ,✏ˆ(1) > 0 by design.
Consider the derivative of H with respect to ✓. Then
@
@✓
Hpˆ,✏ˆ(✓) = pˆw
0
+(✓pˆ)U(✏ˆ(1  pˆ)) + (1  pˆ)w0 (✓(1  pˆ))U( ✏ˆpˆ)
= pˆ(1  pˆ)

w0+(✓pˆ)
U(✏ˆ(1  pˆ))
1  pˆ + w
0
 (✓(1  pˆ))
U( ✏ˆpˆ)
pˆ
 
.
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Since U is concave on y > 0, U(y) + U( y) < 0 and pˆ < 1/2, we have
U( ✏ˆpˆ)
pˆ
<  U(✏ˆpˆ)
pˆ
<  U(✏ˆ(1  pˆ))
1  pˆ .
Recall our hypothesis that w0 ((1  pˆ)) > w0+(pˆ). Then
@
@✓
Hpˆ,✏ˆ(✓)
    
✓=1
< pˆ
 
w0+(pˆ)  w0 (1  pˆ)
 
U(✏ˆ(1  pˆ)) < 0.
In particular, Hpˆ,✏(✓) is maximised at some interior point and the agent who can
randomise prefers a mixed strategy of sometimes stopping and sometimes waiting until
wealth first leaves the interval (a✏ˆ, b✏ˆ) to a pure strategy of waiting until wealth first leaves
the same interval.
⇤
Intuitively, condition (2.3) says we require the probability weighting function on
losses for nearly certain events to be stronger than probability weighting on gains for rare
events. Since typical weighting functions satisfy w±(1/2) < 1/2, w± is steeper over (1/2, 1)
than over (0, 1/2) and hence (2.3) may be expected to hold for a wide family of popular
weighting functions. Since
R 1/2
0 [w
0 ((1  p)) w0+(p)]dp = 1 w (1/2) w+(1/2) > 0 there
must exist a range of pˆ for which w0 ((1  pˆ)) > w0+(pˆ).
We now discuss specific functional forms in the literature. By considering limp#0
w0 (1 p)
w0+(p)
we see that for the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting functions, (2.3) is satisfied for
all su ciently small pˆ provided  +     . For the weighting function of Goldstein and Ein-
horn (1987), (2.3) is satisfied for all su ciently small pˆ, provided d+ > d  or d+ = d  and
 +     . In the third row of Table 2.1 we report the range of probabilities for which (2.3)
is satisfied. We take the same parameters as used by Ebert and Strack (2015) in their Table
W.1. We see that for their parameter choices, condition (2.3) holds for all probabilities
pˆ < 1/2 for the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) weighting
functions. In particular, the condition (2.3) is very mild and is easily satisfied for these
parameters. There is also a column in Table 2.1 for the Prelec (1998) weighting function.
Although (2.3) is not always satisfied by the Prelec (1998) weighting function, it is satisfied
for almost the whole range of probabilities for the parameters used by Ebert and Strack
(2015), excluding only very small values of pˆ less than 0.0018.
All the examples in Table 2.1 assume w+ = w . An example with w+ 6= w  is the
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function with parameters of  + = 0.61,    = 0.69
and loss aversion K = 2.25. Then Ebert and Strack’s condition (2.2) holds for pˆ < 0.0839
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and condition (2.3) holds over the range (0.0023, 0.5). In particular, both (2.2) and (2.3)
hold for 0.0023 < pˆ < 0.0839.
Proposition 2.2 shows that the first exit strategy of Ebert and Strack (2015) can be
improved upon by mixing with sometimes stopping immediately, and hence their argument
is not su cient to conclude that a naive agent never stops if he has access to randomised
strategies. Instead, we need to identify the optimal prospect: if this prospect has no mass
at the starting wealth level, then a naive agent with the ability to randomise would never
stop. Our goal in the next section is to show that in general this is not the case, by giving
examples in which the optimal prospects have masses at zero.
2.5 Two stylised examples
In this section, we give simple, tractable examples which demonstrate that the optimal
prospect can have a mass at the starting wealth level. As before, the wealth process prior to
stopping is a Brownian motion starting at the reference level which is assumed to be zero.
We consider two di↵erent specifications of the value function U and probability weighting
functions w±. Using (1.8) and a change of variable, our problem in both cases is to find
(the optimiser for)
V = sup
⇢Z 1
0
w+(F¯X(x))U
0(x)dx 
Z 0
 1
w (FX(x))U 0(x)dx
 
(2.4)
where the supremum is taken over random variables X with mean 0. FX is the CDF of X
and F¯X(x) := 1  FX(x).
2.5.1 Specifications
Specification I
In our first specification, the value function takes the piecewise linear form
U(x) =
8<: x ^ 1, x   0,Kx, x < 0,
whereK > 1. Then U exhibits loss aversion (both simple and finite marginal) and is concave
over gains13 and convex on losses.
13Some form of concavity is required on gains, else the optimisation problem for the PT agent with
probability weighting is ill-posed. The cap on the value function for wealth above one is a particularly
simple form, and may represent the not unrealistic assumption that the agent will be asked to leave the
casino once his cumulative winnings reach a critical value.
71
The probability weighting functions w± are general inverse-S shaped satisfying the
standard assumptions in Section 2.2.1. Define ⌘ = minp2[0,1]
w (p)
p and q  = argminp2[0,1]
w (p)
p .
Also set
q+ = argmax
p2[0,1]
{w+(p) K⌘p} . (2.5)
We further assume that
q+ + q  = argmax
p2[0,1]
⇢
w+(p) K min
u2[0,1]
✓
w (u)
u
◆
p
 
+ argmin
p2[0,1]
⇢
w (p)
p
 
< 1. (2.6)
If w+ = w  = w and the probability weighting function is that of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) then (2.6) is satisfied provided there is a reasonable level of loss aversion.
For example if   = 0.65, (2.6) is satisfied by K greater than about 1.2. See Appendix 2.A for
a pair of simple su cient conditions for (2.6). If K = 1 such that there is no loss aversion,
then (2.6) cannot hold.
Specification II
In the second case, the value function is logarithmic over gains and linear on losses
taking the form of
U(x) =
8<: ln(1 + x), x   0,Kx, x < 0. (2.7)
As before, we impose simple as well as finite marginal loss aversion by setting K > 1.
The weighting function on losses w  is general inverse-S shaped. We again define
⌘ = minp2[0,1]
w (p)
p and q  = argminp2[0,1]
w (p)
p . Meanwhile, the weighting function on
gains is piecewise linear given by
w+(p) =
8>>><>>>:
↵p, 0  p  q+,
↵q+ +  (p  q+), q+ < p < ↵ 1↵   + q+,
1  ↵(1  p), ↵ 1↵   + q+  p  1,
(2.8)
where ↵ > 1,   2 (0, 1) and q+ are constants with14 0 < q+ < 1  2(↵  ) < 12 . Piecewise linear
weighting functions of this form are proposed by Webb (2015) as a simple generalisation of
the probability weighting function used in the NEO-expected utility of Chateauneuf et al.
(2007). Relative to the NEO-expected utility probability weighting functions, a piecewise
linear function has the advantage of being continuous. Figure 2.6 gives a sketch of w+ and
w  under this specification.
14A condition q+  1  ↵   is required to ensure that ↵ 1↵   + q+  1. The additional factor of 12 ensures
that w+(
1
2 ) <
1
2 .
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pw+(p)
0
1
1q+
↵q+
↵ 1
↵   + q+
 (↵ 1)
↵   + ↵q+
p
w (p)
0
1
1q 
Figure 2.6: Sketch of w+ and w  used in Specification II of Section 2.5. w  is a general
inverse-S shaped weighting function whilst w+ is a piecewise linear function defined in (2.8).
Finally, we assume q+ + q  < 1 (as in (2.6) under Specification I) and
1  ↵q+
1  q+ < K⌘ < ↵. (2.9)
Note that under assumption (2.9) and using the piecewise linear structure of w+, we have
max
p2[0,1]
{w+(p) K⌘p} = max (0, 1 K⌘, q+(↵ K⌘)) = q+(↵ K⌘)
and the optimiser is q+. Hence q+ = argmaxp2[0,1] {w+(p) K⌘p}. Even though q+ should
be interpreted as a given model parameter under this specification, it is consistent with
definition (2.5) under Specification I.
2.5.2 The optimal prospects in the stylised examples
Proposition 2.3. If the initial wealth level is x = 0, then the optimal prospects P⇤ = P⇤0
under Specification I and II share the same form of a three-point distribution as
P⇤ =
✓
  ⌫
q 
, q ; 0, 1  q    q+; ⌫
q+
, q+
◆
(2.10)
where
q  = argmin
p2[0,1]
w (p)
p
, q+ = argmax
p2[0,1]
⇢
w+(p) K min
u2[0,1]
✓
w (u)
u
◆
p
 
.
Moreover, ⌫ = q+ under Specification I and ⌫ = q+
⇣
↵q 
Kw (q )   1
⌘
under Specification II.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.B. It follows that for an initial wealth starting at
the reference level of zero the optimal prospect includes a point mass at the reference level.
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If, in addition to the restrictions on parameters of w± in Section 2.5.1, we add an assumption
that there exists some p such that (2.2) and (2.3) hold for all pˆ < p.15 Then we have examples
which satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2.1, Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3. For
these examples, a naive agent with no access to randomisation and with zero initial wealth
will never stop (Proposition 2.1, Ebert and Strack (2015)). Such an agent can benefit from
randomisation to improve the first exit strategy of Ebert and Strack (2015) (Proposition
2.2). His optimal prospect includes an atom at zero (Proposition 2.3) and we discuss the
possible optimal behaviours of the naive agent in Section 2.5.4.
2.5.3 The optimal stopping rules in the stylised examples
The conclusion from the previous section is that there are circumstances in which the op-
timal prospect includes a mass at the origin. Typically (as in the example above) there is
uniqueness at the level of optimal prospects. But there are many stopping rules an agent
might use to attain a given prospect. In the probability literature, these are known as
solutions of the Skorokhod embedding problems.16
For now, assume that the agent is a precommitting one and he is looking for a
stopping strategy which can attain the target prospect P⇤0 . One way to do so is to use a
stopping rule in which the stopping time is the first time that the Brownian motion falls
below a well-chosen function of its running maximum. The Aze´ma and Yor (1979) solution
of the Skorokhod embedding problem takes this form.
A second way to achieve the prospect P⇤0 is to wait until Brownian motion hits
aˆ =  ⌫ q++q q  or bˆ = ⌫
q++q 
q+
, and then to stop the first time thereafter that the Brownian
motion is at   ⌫q  , 0 or ⌫q+ . For an agent with access to a randomisation device (in the form
of an independent random variable), other stopping rules can be used to attain optimality.
The simplest is to stop immediately with probability 1  q+   q  and to otherwise stop the
first time the Brownian motion reaches   ⌫q  or ⌫q+ .
A further way to achieve the prospect P⇤0 is to stop the first time the Brownian
motion hits   ⌫q  or ⌫q+ , and also to stop at zero at a constant rate   :=
1 q+ q 
2⌫ . Then,
15In both Specification I and II, it is possible to construct examples of w± which satisfy all these conditions
simultaneously. See Appendix 2.C.
16The only cases where there is a unique embedding (within the class of uniformly integrable embeddings)
are those where the optimal prospect is either a point mass at the reference level (when stopping immediately
is the only strategy) or a pair of point masses at locations aˇ < 0 < bˇ (when the only strategy is to stop
on first exit from the interval (aˇ, bˇ)). In general, for dynamic optimal stopping problems under probability
weighting we must expect non-uniqueness of the optimal strategy.
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in the absence of stopping at   ⌫q  or ⌫q+ , the probability that the process has not been
stopped by time t is e  L
0
t where (L0u)u 0 is the local time of Brownian motion at zero.
More specifically, this is the stopping rule introduced in Lemma 1.10 of Chapter 1 with the
choice of   such that  ({0}) =  ,  ({  ⌫q  }) =  ({ ⌫q+ }) = 1 and zero elsewhere. This
strategy is time-homogeneous and Markovian in the sense that the decision to stop only
depends on the current value of the wealth process. In fact it is the unique stopping rule
with these properties.17
2.5.4 Naive agents in the stylised examples
Proposition 2.3 describes the optimal prospect for the PT agent, and the discussion in
Section 2.5.3 describes some optimal strategies for an agent with zero initial wealth who
can commit to a strategy or stopping rule. What then is the strategy followed by the naive
agent? The strategy of the naive agent is the instantaneous, time zero, element of the
planned strategy of the agent who can commit to a stopping rule.
When the Brownian motion is at the origin, there is a family of optimal strategies
for the agent who can precommit, and no unique prediction for the behaviour of the naive
agent. Provided the optimal prospect includes an atom at zero (Proposition 2.3), any time-
zero behaviour at the reference level associated with the possible strategies in Section 2.5.3
(including stopping immediately, always continuing, or stopping at a rate) is consistent with
the behaviour of a naive agent.18
What might be considered a characteristic of a reasonable strategy for a naive agent?
One characteristic would be homogeneity in time, so that the same rule is used to stop or
otherwise continue each time the process returns to a given level. A second characteristic
would be that the decision to stop, now and in the future, depends on the prevailing level of
17In this example where the underlying wealth process is a Brownian motion, we say that a stopping
time ⌧ is time-homogeneous and Markovian if there exists a time-independent measure   such that P(⌧ >
t) = P(
R
R L
u
t  (du) < T ) where (L
u
t )t>0,u is the local time process of the Brownian motion and T is an
independent exponential random variable of rate one. Suppose   has a density such that  (dx) = ⇣(x)dx.
Using occupation times formula, we could deduce the hazard rate of this stopping strategy as
lim
 t#0
P(⌧ 2 (t, t+  t)|⌧ > t, (Bs)s6t)
 t
= ⇣(Bt).
In particular, the agent is stopping the process at a rate per unit time which only depends on the current
level of the Brownian motion but not its historical path nor time. If an agent wants to use this type of
time-homogeneous, Markovian stopping rule to attain a given target prospect, the required choice of   is
uniquely given by (1.17) in Chapter 1.
18If only pure strategies are deemed admissible, then the Ebert and Strack (2015) result implies that
instantaneous stopping is never optimal.
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the wealth process and not on any other factors.19 This suggests that a naive agent should
adopt a Markovian strategy. Within the class of time-homogeneous, Markovian stopping
rules there is a unique strategy which attains a given prospect. If we insist that the naive
agent chooses strategies from this class then there is a unique prediction for his behaviour.
Except in trivial cases, the use of a Markovian strategy requires randomisation.
Earlier in Section 2.5.3 we gave four stopping rules an agent with the ability to
precommit might use to attain the optimal prospect. The first strategy based on the Aze´ma-
Yor stopping time is Markovian in the pair (Bt, St = supstBs)t 0 but it is not Markovian
in the wealth process B alone. The second strategy is not time-homogeneous. Although
neither Markovian nor time-homogeneous, both these strategies are pure, and never involve
stopping immediately. A naive agent basing his strategy on these rules never stops, as
predicted by Ebert and Strack (2015).
The third proposed strategy for the agent with a commitment device is to stop
immediately with probability 1   q+   q , and otherwise to stop the first time the wealth
process leaves the interval (  ⌫q  , ⌫q+ ). This requires a randomisation device at t = 0. The
strategy is time-inhomogeneous since the agent plans to use a di↵erent strategy on any
future returns to zero. A naive agent following this strategy has a positive probability of
stopping every time the Brownian motion is at the reference level. Since Brownian motion
started at zero returns to zero infinitely often in any positive time interval, the naive agent
using this strategy stops the first time the Brownian motion hits zero with probability one.
For wealth processes started at the reference level, stopping is immediate with probability
one, the exact converse to the Ebert and Strack (2015) result of always waiting to the bitter
end.
The fourth strategy requires randomisation as well, but is Markovian and time-
homogeneous. The naive agent following this stopping rule stops at the origin at rate  .
The decision about whether to stop or continue depends only on the current value of wealth,
and does not depend on any other factors (including time). The discussion of this section
can be summarised by the following result.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose the naive agent uses a Markovian time-homogeneous strategy.
Then, for the examples in Section 2.5.1, the agent may stop at the reference level.
19A naive agent will reconsider any planned decisions. At time zero the agent does not plan to base his
strategy on any element of the wealth history except the current value: it is not natural for him to plan to
use a rule in which stopping at a future time depends on the behaviour of the wealth process between now
and that future time.
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2.6 Extension to a more general model
Our stylised examples in Section 2.5 have been designed to facilitate calculations. Nonethe-
less, they demonstrate that it is not the case that naive agents never stop: instead if agents
can randomise their strategy then they may stop voluntarily. For our analysis to be as
wide-ranging as Ebert and Strack (2015), we need to allow for more general value functions
and more general wealth processes. In particular, we want to consider value functions with
infinite marginal utility at the origin which are not covered by Proposition 2.1 and 2.2.
In this section, we consider the wealth process Xx = (Xxt )t>0 being an exponential
Brownian motion such that
Xxt = x exp
✓✓
µ   
2
2
◆
t+  Bt
◆
combined with the value and weighting function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as in
(1.1) and (1.3). We consider parameters combination such that the drift of the asset is
non-negative and the optimal stopping problem is well-posed. A su cient condition is given
by ↵+d+ < 1  2µ 2 6 1 (see Proposition 1.1 in Chapter 1). We study the behaviour of a naive
agent with di↵erent initial wealth levels x (while keeping his reference point R fixed). The
strategy of the naive agent at wealth level x is given by the time zero element of the optimal
solution of the problem
V (x) = sup
⌧
E(Xx⌧  R). (2.11)
Problem (2.11) has been solved completely in Chapter 1 and the optimal target
prospect P⇤(x) has a (scaled) quantile function in form of (1.11). It contains a point mass
on losses set at some level `(x) below min(x,R), a point mass at some level a(x) > R together
with a continuous distribution on a semi-infinite interval (a(x),1). From Proposition 1.7,
we know that the optimal prospect does not allocate any probability mass to the reference
level. Hence a naive agent will never stop at the reference level even if he has access to
randomised strategies.
However, there exists initial wealth levels x such that x lies inside the support of
the optimal prospect P⇤(x). In Figure 2.7 we plot the location `(x) of the point mass on
losses and the lower limit a(x) of the support of the distribution on gains as functions of the
initial wealth x. For small initial wealths x < x⇤ = 1.015, the optimal prospect consists of a
point mass on losses at `(x) where `(x) < min{x,R}, and a distribution on gains supported
on [a(x),1) where a(x) > max{x,R}. But for larger initial wealths x > x⇤, the form of
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the optimal prospect changes. There is no mass assigned to losses, and moreover a(x) < x.
Then the initial wealth lies within the support of the optimal prospect.
x
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Figure 2.7: The plot of the levels of losses and the lower bounds of gains against di↵erent
initial wealth levels x. The model takes a martingale exponential Brownian motion and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value and weighting functions. For x0 > x⇤ = 1.015, the
optimal prospect does not place any probability mass on losses, and the lower bound on the
support of the optimal prospect lies below the initial wealth level x. Parameters used are
↵+ = 0.5, ↵  = 0.9, k = 1.25,  ± = 0.7 and R = 1.
The implications for the naive agent in this example are as follows. If at time t the
current wealth Xt is such that Xt < x⇤ then it is not optimal to stop. If the current wealth
lies above x⇤ then it lies within the interval to which the optimal prospect assigns mass, and
a naive agent with access to randomised strategies may stop there. Although for a given
initial wealth there is no unique optimal stopping rule for the agent with a precommitment
device, there is an unique optimal stopping rule within the class of time-homogeneous,
Markovian strategies.
At an initial wealth level of x, suppose the precommitting agent plans to attain the
optimal prospect P⇤(x) by stopping at y at rate  (y;x) per unit time for some function
 . If the naive PT agent adopts strategies from this family, in particular, if he uses the
instantaneously-optimal (time-homogeneous, Markovian) strategy of an agent with a pre-
commitment device, then the naive agent stops at x at rate  (x;x). The resultant stopping
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rate  (x;x) adopted by the naive agent is non-zero for all x above x⇤. In this case the
realised prospect of the naive agent consists of a density on (x⇤,1), together with a point
mass at 0 (its size is equal to the probability that X never reaches x⇤). In other words, a
naive agent who can randomise may stop anywhere above x⇤.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter derives new results on prospect theory in a dynamic context. Our first con-
tribution is to observe that, unlike in the expected utility paradigm, PT agents can benefit
from following randomised strategies. We investigate the impact of randomised strategies in
recombining binomial tree models in the spirit of Barberis (2012) and show that the ability
to follow randomised strategies can lead to improvements in PT value.
Our second contribution is to revisit the continuous time model of Ebert and Strack
(2015) under an assumption that agents have access to randomised strategies. Ebert and
Strack (2015) argue that for any reasonable specification of PT preferences, a naive agent
prefers to stop on the first exit from some interval to stopping immediately. We show in a
general setting that there is a mixed strategy which is preferred to this first exit strategy,
and our mixed strategy may involve stopping at the reference level. Moreover, we provide
examples where the optimal prospect for an agent includes mass (in form of an atom or a
density) at the initial wealth level. If the naive agent is able to follow randomised strategies,
then the agent may realise this optimal prospect with a strategy which involves sometimes
stopping. Ebert and Strack (2015) show that under pure strategies, PT preferences and
na¨ıvite´ lead to the “unrealistic” conclusion of never stopping. The authors discuss options
to evade their never stopping result including dispensing with the probability weighting
element of PT or the notion of na¨ıvite´. Our results show that a third possibility is to retain
probability weighting and na¨ıvite´ but to allow the agent to use randomised strategies. If
the setup is expanded to allow for randomised strategies then the predictions of a dynamic
prospect theory model are closer to reality in the sense that they include voluntary cessation
of gambling for a naive agent.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Simple su cient conditions for (2.6).
A pair of conditions which together are su cient for (2.6) is
argmax
p2[0,1]
{w+(p)  p}+ arg min
p2[0,1]
⇢
w (p)
p
 
< 1 (2.12)
and
K >
✓
min
p2[0,1]
w (p)
p
◆ 1
. (2.13)
Proposition 2.5. Suppose w± = w where w is a di↵erentiable, inverse-S shaped probability
weighting function which is concave on [0, Q] and convex on [Q, 1]. Let A(p) = w(p)+w(1 
p). If A is strictly decreasing on [0, 1/2), then Q  1/2 and (2.12) holds.
Proof. Let q+ = argmaxp2[0,1](w(p)  p) and q  = argminp2[0,1]
⇣
w(p)
p
⌘
. Since A is strictly
decreasing on [0, 1/2) it follows that w0(p)   w0(1   p) < 0 there. Suppose Q > 12 . Then
1 Q < 1/2 and w0(1 Q) < w0(Q). But from the shape of w, w0 is minimised at Q, which
yields a contradiction. Hence Q 6 12 .
Define w(p) := 1   w(1   p) which is an inverse-S shaped probability weighting
function made by rotating w. Since q  is a contact point of the largest convex function
dominated by w, by symmetry 1  q  is a contact point of the concave majorant to w.
Let q⇤ 2 [0, 1   Q] be the solution to the equation w0(q⇤) = 1. As w0(p) 6
w0(1   p) = w0(p) on [0, Q] and w0(q+) = 1 = w0(q⇤), we have w0(q⇤) = w0(q+) 6 w0(q+).
Since q+ 6 Q 6 1   Q and w0 is decreasing on [0, 1   Q], this gives q+ 6 q⇤. Also
w0(1   q ) < 1 = w0(q⇤) and in turn q⇤ < 1   q . It follows that q+ 6 q⇤ < 1   q  or
equivalently q+ + q  < 1. Hence (2.12) holds. ⇤
Corollary 2.6. If w± = w then for the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Goldstein and
Einhorn (1987) weighting functions (2.12) holds. Then if K is su ciently large such that
(2.13) holds, (2.6) holds also.
Proof. The proof of this result makes use of the fact that these weighting functions are
inverse-S shaped, and therefore all that needs to be checked is that A is strictly decreasing
on [0, 1/2), which is a simple exercise in calculus. ⇤
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2.B Solutions in the examples of Section 2.5
Define
D(µ) = supR1
0 F¯X(x)dx=µ=
R 0
 1 FX(x)dx
⇢Z 1
0
w+(F¯X(x))U
0(x)dx 
Z 0
 1
w (FX(x))U 0(x)dx
 
= supR1
0 F¯X(x)dx=µ=
R 0
 1 FX(x)dx
⇢Z 1
0
w+(F¯X(x))U
0(x)dx K
Z 0
 1
w (FX(x))dx
 
since U(x) = Kx on x < 0 for both specifications. Then V = supµD(µ). The expression
for D(µ) can be rewritten as
D(µ) = sup
(h+,h )2A21(µ)
⇢Z 1
0
w+(h+(x))U
0(x)dx K
Z 1
0
w (h (x))dx
 
where the set A21(µ) is given by
A2 (µ) =
⇢
(h+, h ) : [0,1)2 ! [0,1)2, h± decreasing and right continuous, h±(0)  1,Z 1
0
h±(x)dx = µ, h+(0) + h (0)   
 
.
Then D(µ)  D˜(µ) where
D˜(µ) = sup
(h+,h )2A22(µ)
⇢Z 1
0
w+(h+(x))U
0(x)dx K
Z 1
0
w (h (x))dx
 
.
In calculating D(µ) we require the total mass of the target law X to be less than or equal
to one (with the understanding that X can be made into a random variable with unit total
mass by including an atom at zero). In calculating D˜(µ) we make no such requirement. The
advantage of considering D˜(µ) is that the problems over gains and losses decouple:
D˜(µ) = sup
h2A11(µ)
⇢Z 1
0
w+(h(x))U
0(x)dx
 
 K inf
h2A11(µ)
⇢Z 1
0
w (h(x))dx
 
where
A1 (µ) = {h : [0,1)! [0,1), h decreasing and right continuous, h(0)   ,
Z 1
0
h(x)dx = µ}.
Set
G˜(w;µ) = sup
h2A11(µ)
Z 1
0
w(h(x))U 0(x)dx, L˜(w;µ) = inf
h2A11(µ)
Z 1
0
w(h(x))dx.
Then
D˜(µ) = G˜(w+;µ) KL˜(w ;µ).
Our plan is to solve for G˜(w+;µ) and L˜(w ;µ) (and to find respective optimisers h
µ
+, h
µ
 )
and hence to find the µ (µˆ say) which maximises D˜(µ). There are two possibilities. If
81
hµˆ+(0)+h
µˆ
 (0) > 1 then the optimiser for D˜ = supµ D˜(µ) is not feasible for D (and then the
optimiser for D depends on a complicated interplay between h+(0) and h (0)); alternatively
if hµˆ+(0) + h
µˆ
 (0)  1 then the optimiser for D˜ = supµ D˜(µ) is feasible for D and hence is
an optimiser for D. The corresponding optimal target law has P(X > x) = hµˆ+(x) for x > 0
and P(X < x) = hµˆ ( x) for x < 0. If hµˆ+(0) + hµˆ (0) < 1 then the optimal target law
includes an atom of size 1  (hµˆ+(0) + hµˆ (0)) at zero.
We first look at the problem for losses which is common to both specifications.
Recall ⌘ = min
⇣
w (p)
p
⌘
and q  = argmin
⇣
w (p)
p
⌘
. Then w (h)   ⌘h with equality at zero
and q . For h 2 A11(µ) we haveZ 1
0
w (h(x))dx  
Z 1
0
⌘h(x)dx = ⌘µ.
Set h⇤(x) = q I(x< µq  ). Then h
⇤ is admissible and
R1
0 w (h
⇤(x))dx = µq w (q ) = ⌘µ.
Then h⇤ is optimal and L˜(w ;µ) = ⌘µ.
We complete the solution construction for each specification in the following two
subsections.
2.B.1 Specification I
In this case we have G˜(w+;µ) = suph2A11(µ)
R 1
0 w+(h(x))dx. Recall that w+ is a general
inverse-S shaped probability weighting function. Let Q+ be the inflexion point of w+.
Solution of the problem for gains
Extend the definition of w+ to [0,1) by setting w+(p) = 1 for p > 1. LetW be the smallest
concave majorant of w+. ThenW = w+ on [0,'] andW is linear on [', 1] for some ' < Q+.
Let W˜ ( ) = supp2(0,1){W (p)   p} be the convex dual of W .
For   > 0, W (p)  W˜ ( ) +  p andZ 1
0
w+(h(x))dx 
Z 1
0
W (h(x))dx 
Z 1
0
{W˜ ( ) +  h(x)}dx  W˜ ( ) +  µ
where we use
R 1
0 h(x)dx 
R1
0 h(x)dx = µ. Since   is arbitrary, and W is concave, so that
inf {W˜ ( ) +  µ} =W (µ), we have
R 1
0 w+(h(x))dx W (µ).
Now, we exhibit an admissible h such that
R 1
0 w+(h(x))dx = W (µ). This h is then
optimal and G˜(w+;µ) = W (µ). First consider the degenerate case when µ   1. Take
h(x) = I(x<µ); then
R 1
0 w+(h(x))dx = 1 = W (µ). Now consider the case where µ  '.
Take h(x) = µI(x<1); then
R 1
0 w+(h(x))dx = w+(µ) = W (µ). Finally consider the case
' < µ < 1. Take h(x) = I(x<µ '1 ' )
+ 'I(µ '1 'x<1). Then
R 1
0 h(x)dx =
µ '
1 ' + '
1 µ
1 ' = µ.
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Moreover, since h takes values 1 and ', and since W = w+ at these points, and W is linear
on [', 1], Z 1
0
w+(h(x))dx = w+(1)
µ  '
1  ' + w+(')
1  µ
1  ' =W (µ).
Solution of the problem for gains and losses
By definition
D˜ = sup
µ
{G˜(w+;µ) KL˜(w ;µ)} = sup
µ
{W (µ) K⌘µ} = W˜ (K⌘).
Under (2.6) and more especially the fact that q+ := argmaxp2[0,1]{w+(p)   K⌘p} < 1 we
have that the optimal µ given by ⌫ = q+ satisfying 0  ⌫ < '. For this ⌫, the solution of
the problem for gains is a mass of size q+ at 1, and the solution of the problem for losses
is a mass of size q  at  q+/q . Moreover, under (2.6) we have q+ + q  < 1. Then D˜ = D
and the optimiser for the problem is the prospect P⇤ = ( q+/q , q ; 0, 1   q+   q ; 1, q+)
which agrees with (2.10).
2.B.2 Specification II
In this case we have G˜(w+;µ) = suph2A11(µ)
R1
0
1
1+xw+(h(x))dx. Recall that w+ is piecewise
linear.
Solution of the problem for gains
Let W be the smallest concave majorant of w+. We solve the maximisation problem for the
concave probability weighting function W . This gives an upper bound for the problem with
probability weighting function w+. Then we show that this bound can be attained.
Set   = 1 ↵q+1 q+ . Then   2 (0, 1) and
W (p) =
8<: ↵p, 0  p  q+,↵q+ +  (p  q+), q+ < p  1.
We want to find G˜(W,µ) = suph2A11(µ) GˆW (µ, h) where
GˆW (µ, h) =
Z 1
0
1
1 + x
 
↵h(x)I{h(x)q+} + (↵q+ +  (h(x)  q+))I{h(x)>q+}
 
dx.
Suppose first that µ 
⇣
↵
    1
⌘
q+. Set
I(x) = max
g2[0,1]
⇢
1
1 + x
 
↵gI{gq+} + (↵q+ +  (g   q+))I{g>q+}
   ↵q+g
µ+ q+
 
. (2.14)
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Then, for h 2 A11(µ),
GˆW (µ, h)  ↵q+µ
µ+ q+
+
Z 1
0
I(x)dx.
From the piecewise linear structure of the objective function the maximum in (2.14) can
only occur at g 2 {0, q+, 1} and
I(x) = max
⇢
0,
↵q+
1 + x
  ↵q
2
+
µ+ q+
,
1
1 + x
  ↵q+
µ+ q+
 
.
Then since✓
↵q+
1 + x
  ↵q
2
+
µ+ q+
◆
 
✓
1
1 + x
  ↵q+
µ+ q+
◆
=
↵q+
µ+ q+
(1  q+)  1  ↵q+
1 + x
   (1  q+)  (1  ↵q+) = 0
we have
I(x) =
8><>:0, x  
µ
q+
,
↵q+
⇣
1
1+x   q+µ+q+
⌘
, x < µq+ .
Then for any h 2 A11(µ)
GˆW (µ, h)  q+↵µ
µ+ q+
+
Z µ/q+
0

↵q+
1 + x
  ↵q
2
+
µ+ q+
 
dx = ↵q+ ln
✓
1 +
µ
q+
◆
. (2.15)
Further, if h(x) = q+I{x<µ/q+} then h 2 A11(µ) and there is equality in (2.15). Hence
G˜(W,µ) = ↵q+ ln
⇣
1 + µq+
⌘
.
Finally, for the non-negative random variableX⇤ = X⇤(µ) with FX⇤(x) = q+I{x<µ/q+}
for x 2 (0,1) we find
↵q+ ln
✓
1 +
µ
q+
◆
=
Z 1
0
1
1 + x
w+(FX⇤(x))dx  G˜(w+, µ)  G˜(W,µ) = ↵q+ ln
✓
1 +
µ
q+
◆
and hence G˜(w+, µ) = ↵q+ ln
⇣
1 + µq+
⌘
.
Now suppose µ >
⇣
↵
    1
⌘
q+. Set
J (x) = max
g2[0,1]
⇢
1
1 + x
 
↵gI{gq+} + (↵q+ +  (g   q+))I{g>q+}
   g
1 + µ
 
(2.16)
= max
⇢
0,
↵q+
1 + x
  q+
1 + µ
,
1
1 + x
  1
1 + µ
 
.
We find
J (x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
1+x   11+µ , 0  x   (1 + µ)  1,
q+
⇣
↵
1+x   11+µ
⌘
,  (1 + µ)  1 < x  ↵(1 + µ)  1,
0, ↵(1 + µ)  1 < x,
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and the optimiser in (2.16) is g = h⇤(x) where
h⇤(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1, 0  x   (1 + µ)  1,
q+,  (1 + µ)  1 < x  ↵(1 + µ)  1,
0, ↵(1 + µ)  1 < x.
Then for h 2 A11(µ) we have
GˆW (µ, h)  µ
1 + µ
+
Z 1
0
J (x)dx = ↵q+ ln
✓
↵
 
◆
+ ln  (1 + µ).
As before, if we define X⇤ via FX⇤(x) = h⇤(x) 2 A11(µ) then
↵q+ ln
✓
↵
 
◆
+ ln  (1 + µ) =
Z 1
0
1
1 + x
w+(FX⇤(x))
 G˜(w+, µ)  G˜(W,µ)  ↵q+ ln
✓
↵
 
◆
+ ln  (1 + µ).
Hence G˜(w+, µ) = ↵q+ ln
⇣
↵
 
⌘
+ ln  (1 + µ).
In summary,
G˜(w+, µ) =
8><>:↵q+ ln
⇣
1 + µq+
⌘
, 0 < µ  q+
⇣
↵
    1
⌘
,
↵q+ ln
⇣
↵
 
⌘
+ ln  (1 + µ), µ > q+
⇣
↵
    1
⌘
.
Note that G˜(w+, ·) is continuously di↵erentiable (and concave) in its second argument. Let
G be the inverse to the derivative of G˜. Then G(y) = (G˜0) 1(y) = ( 1y   1)I{y< } + q+(↵y  
1)I{y  }.
Solution of the problem for gains and losses
By definition D˜ = supµ{G˜(w+;µ)   KL˜(w ;µ)}. We find that the supremum over µ
is attained at ⌫ = G(Kw (q )q  ) = q+
⇣
↵q 
Kw (q )   1
⌘
. Condition (2.9) is equivalent to
Kw (q )
q  2 ( ,↵) which ensures ⌫ > 0. For µ = ⌫ <
⇣
↵
    1
⌘
q+, the solution of the
problem for gains is a mass of size q+ at
⌫
q+
, and the solution of the problem for losses is
a mass of size q  at   ⌫q  . Moreover, by hypothesis q+ + q  < 1. Then D˜ = D and the
optimiser for the problem is the prospect P⇤ = (  ⌫q  , q ; 0, 1  q+   q ; ⌫q+ , q+).
2.C Constructions of w± satisfying all the conditions in
Propositions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
In this section, we demonstrate it is possible to construct probability weighting functions
w± which simultaneously satisfy all the conditions in (2.2) and (2.3) and those listed in
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Section 2.5.1 for each specification.
Under Specification I, the w± can be any general inverse-S shaped functions. It
follows from the discussion in Section 2.4.2 and Appendix 2.A that, for example, the Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) weighting functions with   =  + =    can satisfy all the required
conditions if K is su ciently large.
Now we consider Specification II. Suppose w  is continuously di↵erentiable and such
that ⇤ :=
q
w0 (1 )w (q )q  > 1. (The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Goldstein and
Einhorn (1987) weighting functions satisfy this condition for all parameter combinations, as
does the piecewise linear weighting function if ↵    1). Fix   2 (1,⇤) and suppose K > 1
is such that K 2 ( q w (q ) ,
w0 (1 )
 2 ). Then, since w
0 (1 ) > K 2, there exists q > 0 such
that w0 (1   q) >  K for q  q and then w (1   q) < 1    Kq < 1  Kq for q  q. Now
choose a piecewise linear w+ with ↵ 2 (K, K),   2 (0, 1) and q+ < min{ 1  2(↵  ) , q, 1  q }.
Then for pˆ 2 (0, q+), w+(pˆ) = ↵pˆ > Kpˆ > Kpˆ1+(K 1)pˆ and w (1  pˆ) < 1 Kpˆ < 1 pˆ1+(K 1)pˆ .
Thus (2.2) holds. Further, w0 (1   pˆ) >  K > ↵ = w0+(pˆ) so that (2.3) holds. Finally we
have q+ < 1   q  and 1 ↵q+1 q+ < 1 <
Kw (q )
q  < K < ↵ such that the assumptions under
Specification II hold.
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Chapter 3
A multi-asset investment and
consumption problem with
transaction costs
“What is so terrible about transaction costs? On what basis are they
considered the ultimate evil, so that their minimization must override
all other considerations of choice, freedom, and justice?”
— Murray Rothbard, The Myth of Neutral Taxation
3.1 Introduction
The study of optimal investment and consumption problem over an infinite time horizon
dated back to the seminal work of Merton (1969), in which a CRRA agent can trade in a
frictionless market consisting of one risk-free bond and one risky asset with price process
following a geometric Brownian motion. Merton provides an explicit solution to the problem:
the agent should invest a constant fraction of his wealth into the risky asset and maintain a
fixed consumption rate per unit wealth. Despite the mathematical elegance of the solution,
it is impractical to implement such an investment strategy involving continuous rebalancing
in view of transaction costs in the real world.
Ever since then researchers have been looking to incorporate market frictions in
the Merton model. Magill and Constantinides (1976) provide intuitions of the form of the
optimal strategy in presence of proportional transaction costs. The agent should trade
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in a minimal fashion to keep the fraction of wealth allocated to the risky asset within a
fixed interval which is referred to as the no-transaction region. This conjectured strategy is
characterised mathematically by Davis and Norman (1990) in form of a local time trading
rule, and its optimality is proved by a standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) verification
argument under some technical assumptions. Shreve and Soner (1994) utilise the notion
of viscosity solution to overcome some of the technical restrictions in Davis and Norman
(1990) and re-establish many of their results. More recently, a dual formulation based on
the concept of shadow price has emerged, starting with Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe (2010) in
the context of logarithm utility and later extended to power utility by Choi et al. (2013)
and Herczegh and Prokaj (2015). Choi et al. (2013) derive the conditions on the model
parameters leading to a well-posed problem. Using a primal HJB approach, Hobson et al.
(2016) re-prove these well-posedness conditions and along the way provide a number of new
analytical results on the comparatives statics of the problem.
The existing literature on this subject has been focusing on a market with one
risky asset only, and thus it is a natural direction to generalise the results to a model with
multiple risky assets. However, the extension is di cult and the limited progress made
so far in a higher dimensional setting is mostly confined to technical characterisations of
the value function/trading strategy, numerical studies or asymptotic analysis. Akian et al.
(1995) show that the value function is the unique viscosity solution to a HJB variational
inequality. In a model with two assets, Chen and Dai (2013) characterise the shape of the
no-transaction region. Explicit solutions in a multi-asset problem with transaction costs are
rare in general. An exception is the special case studied by Liu (2004) where the risky assets
are uncorrelated and the agent has a CARA utility function. Otherwise, one has to resort
to numerical methods such as a policy improvement algorithm proposed by Muthuraman
and Kumar (2006), or a Markov chain approximation scheme of Collings and Haussmann
(1999) which they prove the convergence. Some asymptotic results are available in the cases
with small transaction costs. See Possama¨ı et al. (2015) for example.
In this chapter we consider the problem with a risk-free bond and two risky assets.
Transactions in the first risky asset are costless, but transactions in the second risky asset,
which we term the illiquid asset, incur proportional costs. (More generally, we may have
several risky assets on which no transaction costs are payable. By a mutual fund theorem,
this general case can be reduced to the case with a single liquid, risky asset.)
The methodology adopted in this chapter is a primal HJB approach based on Hob-
son et al. (2016) which considers the classical case with one risky asset only. We postulate
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that the value function depends on four variables: the total amount of liquid wealth, the
price level of the illiquid asset, number of units of the illiquid asset held and time. Although
the second asset in our model leads to a much more complicated HJB equation, the transfor-
mation scheme used in Hobson et al. (2016) can indeed be employed in our current setting
and we obtain a reduced problem with a similar structure. The main di culty lies with
the extra parameters entering the problem which make the analysis of the well-posedness
conditions and comparative statics a much more challenging task. But through a detailed
study on the underlying di↵erential equations, we are able to extend the ideas from the
one-dimensional case in Hobson et al. (2016) to the more general setting considered in this
chapter. This in turn allows us to make significant progress towards understanding the
analytical behaviours of the solution in a multi-asset setup.
Our first achievement is to show that the problem of finding the free boundaries
associated with the HJB variational inequality and the value function can be reduced to the
study of a boundary crossing problem for a family of solutions to a class of first order ordinary
di↵erential equations parametrised by the initial values. This allows us to characterise
precisely the parameter combinations for which the problem is well-posed (Theorem 3.4),
and in those cases to give an expression for the value function (Theorem 3.5). These results
extend Choi et al. (2013) and Hobson et al. (2016) to the case of multiple risky assets.
Our second achievement is to make definitive statements about the comparative
statics for the problem. We focus on the boundaries of the no-transaction wedge and the
certainty equivalent value of the holdings in the illiquid asset. Amongst other results, we
prove (see Theorem 3.9 and Corollary 3.10 for precise statements) that as the drift on the
illiquid asset improves, the agent aims to keep a larger fraction of his total wealth in the
illiquid asset, in the sense that the critical ratios at which sales and purchases take place
are increasing in the drift. Conversely, as the agent becomes more impatient, the agent
keeps a smaller fraction of wealth in the illiquid asset. Further, we prove (Theorem 3.11
and Corollary 3.12) that as the drift on the illiquid asset improves, or as the agent becomes
less impatient, the certainty equivalent value of the holdings in the illiquid asset increases.
See Section 3.6 for a more detailed discussion.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we formulate the
problem. In Section 3.3 we derive the HJB equation and give heuristics showing how it can
be converted to a free boundary value problem involving a first order di↵erential equation.
Then we can state our main results in Section 3.4 on the existence of a solution. In Section 3.5
we discuss the various cases which arise. In Section 3.6 we discuss the comparative statics
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of the problem, before Section 3.7 concludes. Materials on the solution of the free boundary
value problem, the verification argument for the HJB equation, and other lemmas on the
analysis of solutions of the di↵erential equations are relegated to an appendix.
3.2 The problem
The economy consists of one money market instrument paying constant interest rate r > 0
and two risky assets, one of which is liquidly traded while the other one is illiquid. There are
no transaction costs associated with trading in the liquid asset. Meanwhile, trading in the
illiquid asset incurs a proportional transaction cost   2 [0,1) on purchases and   2 [0, 1)
on sales where not both   and   are zero. Let (S, Y ) = (St, Yt)t>0 be the price processes of
the liquid and illiquid assets respectively. The price dynamics are given by
(St, Yt) =
✓
S0 exp
✓
(µ   
2
2
)t+  Bt
◆
, Y0 exp
✓
(↵  ⌘
2
2
)t+ ⌘Wt
◆◆
where (B,W ) is a pair of Brownian motions with correlation coe cient ⇢ 2 ( 1, 1). Write
  := (µ   r)/  and ⌫ := (↵   r)/⌘ for the Sharpe ratio of the liquid and illiquid asset
respectively.
Let ⇥t be the number of units of the illiquid asset held by an agent at time t.
Then ⇥t = ⇥0 +  t    t where   = ( t)t>0 and  = ( t)t>0 are both increasing, non-
negative processes representing the cumulative units of purchases and sales respectively of
the illiquid asset. Let C = (Ct)t>0 be the non-negative consumption rate process of the
agent and ⇧ = (⇧t)t>0 be the cash value of holdings in the risky liquid asset. We assume
⇥, C and ⇧ are progressively measurable and right-continuous. If X = (Xt)t>0 is the total
value of the liquid instruments (cash and the liquid risky asset) then, assuming transaction
costs are paid in cash,
dXt = r(Xt  ⇧t)dt+ ⇧t
St
dSt   Ctdt  Yt(1 +  )d t + Yt(1   )d t
= [(µ  r)⇧t + rXt   Ct] dt  Yt(1 +  )d t + Yt(1   )d t +  ⇧tdBt.
We say that a portfolio (X,⇥) is solvent at time t if its instantaneous liquidation
value is non-negative, that is
Xt + ⇥
+
t Yt(1   ) ⇥ t Yt(1 +  ) > 0.
A consumption/investment strategy (C,⇧,⇥) is said to be admissible if the resulting port-
folio is solvent at the current time and at all the future time points. Write A(t, x, y, ✓) for
the set of admissible strategies with initial time-t value (Xt  = x, Yt = y,⇥t  = ✓).
90
We assume the agent has a CRRA utility function with risk aversion parameter
R 2 (0,1) \ {1}. His objective is to find an optimal strategy which maximises the expected
lifetime discounted utility from consumption. The problem is thus to find
V (x, y, ✓) = sup
(C,⇧,⇥)2A(0,x,y,✓)
E
✓Z 1
0
e  s
C1 Rs
1 Rds
◆
(3.1)
where   is the agent’s subjective discount rate.
We will call Xt +⇥tYt the paper wealth of the agent. In our parametrisation a key
quantity will be Pt :=
⇥tYt
Xt+⇥tYt
, the proportion of paper wealth invested in the illiquid asset.
3.3 The HJB equation and a free boundary value prob-
lem
3.3.1 Deriving the HJB equation
Let
V(x, y, ✓, t) = sup
(C,⇧,⇥)2A(t,x,y,✓)
E
✓Z 1
t
e  s
C1 Rs
1 Rds
◆
be the forward-starting value function from time t. Inspired by the analysis in the classical
case involving a single risky asset only, we postulate that the value function has the form
V(x, y, ✓, t) = e  tV (x, y, ✓) = ⌥e
  t(x+ y✓)1 R
1 R G
✓
y✓
x+ y✓
◆
(3.2)
for some strictly positive function G to be determined and ⌥ a convenient scaling constant
which will help simplify the HJB equation. We take ⌥ =
⇣
b1
Rb4
⌘ R
where b1 and b4 are
constants to be defined below in Section 3.3.2 in terms of the financial parameters associated
with the underlying problem. For the present we assume that G is smooth and use heuristic
arguments to derive a characterisation of the candidate value function. Later we will out-
line a verification argument that this candidate value function coincides with the solution
of the corresponding optimal investment/consumption problem, and therefore deduce the
necessary smoothness properties of V and G.
Building on the intuition developed by Magill and Constantinides (1976) and Davis
and Norman (1990) we expect that the optimal strategy of the agent is to trade the illiquid
asset only when Pt falls outside a certain interval [p⇤, p⇤] to be identified. Due to the
solvency restriction, we must have   1  6 Pt 6 1  and [p⇤, p⇤] ✓ [  1  , 1  ]. Whenever Pt < p⇤,
the agent purchases the illiquid asset to bring Pt back to p⇤. Hence for an initial position
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(x, ✓) such that p = y✓x+y✓ < p⇤, the number of units of illiquid asset to be purchased is given
by   = xp⇤ (1 p⇤)y✓y(1+ p⇤) such that
y(✓+ )
x+y(✓+ ) y(1+ )  = p⇤. The value function does not change
on this transaction, and hence we deduce that for   1  6 p < p⇤,
(x+ y✓)1 RG(p) = [x+ y(✓ +  )  y(1 +  ) ]1 RG(p⇤)
and in turn
G(p) =
✓
1 +  p
1 +  p⇤
◆1 R
G(p⇤) = A⇤(1 +  p)1 R (3.3)
where A⇤ := G(p⇤)(1 +  p⇤)R 1. Similar consideration leads to the conclusion that
G(p) =
✓
1   p
1   p⇤
◆1 R
G(p⇤) = A⇤(1   p)1 R (3.4)
for p⇤ < p 6 1  where A⇤ := (1   p⇤)R 1G(p⇤).
Consider M = (Mt)t>0 defined via
Mt :=
Z t
0
e  s
C1 Rs
1 Rds+ e
  tV (Xt, Yt,⇥t).
We expect M to be a supermartingale in general, and a martingale under the optimal
strategy. Suppose V is C2⇥2⇥1. Then applying Ito’s lemma we find
e tdMt
=
C1 Rt
1 Rdt+ VxdXt +
1
2
Vxxd[X]t + VydYt +
1
2
Vyyd[Y ]t + V✓d⇥t + Vxyd[X,Y ]t    V dt
=
 
C1 Rt
1 R   VxCt +
 2
2
Vxx⇧
2
t + ((µ  r)Vx +  ⌘⇢VxyYt)⇧t + rVxXt + ↵VyYt +
⌘2
2
VyyY
2
t    V
!
dt
+ (V✓   (1 +  )VxYt)d t + (VxYt(1   )  V✓)d t +  Vx⇧tdBt + ⌘VyYtdWt.
Further assume V is strictly increasing and concave in x. Then on maximising the drift
term with respect to Ct and ⇧t and setting the resulting maxima to zero, we obtain the
HJB equation over the no-transaction region:
R
1 RV
1 1/R
x + rxVx + ↵yVy +
⌘2
2
y2Vyy   ( Vx + ⌘⇢yVxy)
2
2Vxx
   V = 0. (3.5)
3.3.2 Reduction to a first order free boundary value problem
Define the auxiliary parameters b1, b2, b3 and b4 as
b1 =
2
h
    r(1 R)   2(1 R)2R
i
⌘2(1  ⇢2) , b2 =
 2   2R⌘⇢  + ⌘2R2
⌘2R2(1  ⇢2) , b3 =
2(⌫    ⇢)
⌘(1  ⇢2) ,
b4 =
2
⌘2(1  ⇢2) .
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It will turn out that the optimal investment and consumption problem depends on the
original parameters only through these auxiliary parameters and the risk aversion level R.
Here b1 plays the role of a ‘normalised discount factor’, which adjusts the discount
factor to allow for numeraire growth e↵ects and for investment opportunities in the liquid
risky asset. b4 is related to the level of the ‘idiosyncratic volatility’ of the illiquid asset.
The parameter b3 is the ‘e↵ective Sharpe ratio, per unit of idiosyncratic volatility’ of the
illiquid asset. The parameter b2 is the hardest to interpret: essentially it is a nonlinearity
factor which arises from the multi-dimensional structure of the problem. Note that b2 =
1 + 11 ⇢2
⇣
 
⌘R   ⇢
⌘2
> 1.
In the sequel we will work with the following assumption.
Standing Assumption 3.1. Throughout the chapter we assume b1 > 0, b2 > 1 and b3 > 0.
The rationale for imposing b1 > 0 is that b1 > 0 is necessary to ensure well-posedness
of the Merton problem in the absence of the illiquid asset. (If R < 1 and b1 6 0, the value
function is infinite for the Merton problem. Conversely, if R > 1 and b1 6 0, then for
every admissible strategy the expected discounted utility of consumption equals  1). In
contrast, the assumption b3 > 0 is not necessary. However, the advantage of working with
a positive e↵ective Sharpe ratio of the illiquid asset (b3 > 0) is that the no-transaction
wedge is contained in the first two quadrants of the (x, y✓) plane. The assumption b3 > 0
reduces the number of cases to be considered in our analysis, and facilitates the clarity of
the exposition, but the methods and results developed in this chapter can be extended easily
to the case of an illiquid asset with non-positive e↵ective Sharpe ratio.
The case b2 = 1 is rather special and we exclude it from our analysis. One scenario
in which we naturally find b2 = 1 is if   = 0 = ⇢. In this case there is neither a hedging
motive, nor an investment motive for holding the liquid risky asset. Essentially then, the
investor can ignore the presence of the liquid risky asset, reducing the dimensionality of the
problem. This problem is the subject of Hobson et al. (2016). If b2 = 1 then the solution n
we define in the next paragraph may pass through singular points. See Choi et al. (2013)
or Hobson et al. (2016) for a discussion of some of the issues.
We adopt the same transformation as Hobson et al. (2016) to reduce the order of the
HJB equation. Recall the relationship between V and G in (3.2) and the definition p = y✓x+y✓ .
Away from p = 1, set h(p) = sgn(1  p)|1  p|R 1G(p), w(h) = p(1  p)dhdp , W (h) = w(h)(1 R)h ,
let N =W 1 be the inverse function toW and set n(q) = |N(q)| 1/R|1 q|1 1/R. Then, we
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show in Appendix 3.A that (3.5) can be transformed into a first order di↵erential equation
n0(q) = O(q, n(q)) (3.6)
where
O(q, n) =
(1 R)n
R(1  q)  
2(1 R)2qn/R
2(1 R)(1  q) [(1 R)q +R]  '(q, n)  sgn(1 R)p'(q, n)2 + E(q)2
(3.7)
with
'(q, n) := b1(n  1) + (1 R)(b3   2R)q + (2  b2)R(1 R),
E(q)2 := 4R2(1 R)2(b2   1)(1  q)2.
Define the quadratic
m(q) :=
R(1 R)
b1
q2   b3(1 R)
b1
q + 1 (3.8)
and the algebraic function
`(q) := m(q) +
1 R
b1
q(1  q) + (b2   1)R(1 R)
b1
q
(1 R)q +R. (3.9)
Note that m has a turning point (a minima if R < 1 and a maxima if R > 1) at qM :=
b3
2R
and set mM := m(qM ) = 1  b
2
3(1 R)
4b1R
.
The following are the key properties of the function O. They are special cases of a
more complete set of properties given in Lemma 3.6 below.
Lemma 3.2. 1. O(q, n) can be extended to q = 1 by continuity on (1 R)n < (1 R)`(1);
2. On (0,1)⇥ (0,1), O(q, n) = 0 if and only if n = m(q);
3. For given R and q the sign of O(q, n) depends only on the signs of n   m(q) and
`(q)  n.
Now we apply the same transformations which took (3.5) to (3.6) to the value
function on the purchase and sale regime. For   1  6 p < p⇤, G(p) = A⇤ (1 +  p)1 R as
given by (3.3). Then
w(h) = p(1  p)dh
dp
= p(1  p)(1 R)h

 
1 +  p
+
1
1  p
 
= (1 R)h

p(1 +  )
1 +  p
 
and |1  W (h)| = |1 p|1+ p =
⇣
A⇤
|h|
⌘1/(1 R)
. It follows that n(q) = (A⇤) 1/R. This expression
holds for   1  6 p < p⇤ on which q = W (h) = (1+ )p1+ p . The equivalent range in q is thus
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given by q < q⇤ :=
(1+ )p⇤
1+ p⇤ . Similarly on the sale region we have n(q) = (A
⇤) 1/R for
q > q⇤ := (1  )p
⇤
1  p⇤ .
The C2⇥2⇥1⇥1 smoothness of the original value function V now translates into C1
smoothness of the transformed value function n. Hence we are looking for a continuously
di↵erentiable function n and boundary points (q⇤, q⇤) solving (3.6) on q 2 (q⇤, q⇤) with
n(q) = (A⇤) 1/R for q  q⇤ and n(q) = (A⇤) 1/R for q   q⇤. First order smoothness of n
at the boundary points forces n0(q⇤) = n0(q⇤) = 0. By Lemma 3.2, n0(q) = O(q, n(q)) = 0 if
and only if n(q) = m(q). Hence the free boundary points must be given by the q-coordinates
where n intersects the quadratic m. The free boundary value problem now becomes solving
n0(q) = O(q, n(q)) on q 2 (q⇤, q⇤) subject to n(q⇤) = m(q⇤) and n(q⇤) = m(q⇤).
As an example, suppose R < 1 and mM > 0. Fix u 2 (0, qM ). As we will show
later in Section 3.5, the solution to (3.6) with initial value (u,m(u)) is decreasing. We are
interested in when this solution crosses m again, and we call this point ⇣(u). Then we have
a family of solutions (nu(q))uq⇣(u) to (3.6) with n(u) = m(u) and n(⇣(u)) = m(⇣(u)).
The solution we want is the one which is consistent with the given transaction costs. Our
approach is based on the same idea as in Hobson et al. (2016). Let ⇠ =  + 1   > 0 be the
round-trip transaction cost. Suppose for now 1 /2 [p⇤, p⇤] and in turn 1 /2 [q⇤, q⇤]. Exploiting
the relationships that q⇤ =
(1+ )p⇤
1+ p⇤ and q
⇤ = (1  )p
⇤
1  p⇤ , we have
ln(1 + ⇠) = ln(1 +  )  ln(1   ) =
Z p⇤
p⇤
dp
p(1  p)  
Z q⇤
q⇤
dq
q(1  q) .
Then, using the definitions of w, N and O,
ln(1 + ⇠) =
Z h⇤
h⇤
dh
w(h)
 
Z q⇤
q⇤
dq
q(1  q)
=
Z q⇤
q⇤
N 0(q)dq
(1 R)qN(q)  
Z q⇤
q⇤
dq
q(1  q)
=
Z q⇤
q⇤
R
q(1 R)
✓
N 0(q)
RN(q)
  1 R
R(1  q)
◆
dq
=
Z q⇤
q⇤
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, n(q))
n(q)
◆
dq (3.10)
where in the last line we use the fact that O(q,n(q))n(q) =
n0(q)
n(q) =
1 R
R(1 q)   1R N
0(q)
N(q) . Hence the
required solution from the free boundary value problem is the one such that
ln(1 + ⇠) =
Z q⇤
q⇤
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, n(q))
n(q)
◆
dq (3.11)
holds.
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In case where 1 2 [p⇤, p⇤] or equivalently 1 2 [q⇤, q⇤], the integrals
R p⇤
p⇤
dp
p(1 p) andR q⇤
q⇤
dq
q(1 q) are not well defined. But it can be shown that (3.11) still holds using a limiting
argument, see Appendix 3.H.
To summarise, we would like to solve the following:
(The free boundary value problem) find a positive function n(·) and a pair of
boundary points (q⇤, q⇤) solving
n0(q) = O(q, n(q)), q 2 [q⇤, q⇤]
n(q⇤) = m(q⇤), n(q⇤) = m(q⇤) (3.12)
subject to (3.11).
In Section 3.5, we distinguish several di↵erent cases and discuss how to construct the
solution (n(·), q⇤, q⇤) in each of these cases. The importance of the quadratic m is clear from
(3.12). Meanwhile, the function ` acts as a bound on the feasible solution to n0 = O(q, n),
at least on 0 < q 6 1. Suppose, for example, that R < 1. Then for q 2 [q⇤, q⇤], m(q) 6 n(q)
by construction, and we also have n(q) < `(q) on q⇤ 6 q 6 1. Furthermore, the value of `(1)
is key in determining when the problem is ill-posed.
3.4 Main results
In Section 3.3 we converted the original HJB equation into the free boundary value problem
(3.12). Now we argue that, given a solution (n(·), q⇤, q⇤) to (3.12) we can reverse the
transformations and construct a candidate value function.
Suppose there exists a solution (n(·), q⇤, q⇤) to (3.12) with n being strictly positive.
Define p⇤ = q⇤1+ (1 q⇤) and p
⇤ = q
⇤
1  (1 q⇤) . Let N(q) = sgn(1   q)n(q) R|1   q|R 1,
W = N 1 and w(h) = (1   R)hW (h). We would like to construct the candidate value
function from G(p) = sgn(1   p)|1   p|1 Rh(p) where h solves dhdp = w(h)p(1 p) . The main
subtlety is that w(h)p(1 p) is not well defined at p = 1. Nonetheless, the definition of G at p = 1
can be understood in a limiting sense. To this end, we distinguish two di↵erent cases based
on whether (q⇤  1) and (q⇤  1) have the same sign or not, or equivalently whether the no-
transaction wedge, plotted in (x, y✓) space, includes the vertical axis x = 0 (corresponding
to p = 1).
Proposition 3.3. (i) For 1 /2 [p⇤, p⇤], define h(p) viaZ h(p)
N(q⇤)
du
w(u)
=
Z p
p⇤
du
u(1  u) (3.13)
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on p⇤ 6 p 6 p⇤. Then (3.13) is equivalent toZ N(q⇤)
h(p)
du
w(u)
=
Z p⇤
p
du
u(1  u) (3.14)
and (3.14) is an alternative definition of h(p).
Let
GC(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
n(q⇤) R (1 +  p)
1 R , p 2 [  1  , p⇤),
sgn(1  p)|1  p|1 Rh(p), p 2 [p⇤, p⇤],
n(q⇤) R (1   p)1 R , p 2 (p⇤, 1  ].
Then GC is a C2 function on (  1  , 1  ). Moreover (x+y✓)
1 R
1 R G
C( y✓x+y✓ ) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in x.
(ii) For 1 2 [p⇤, p⇤], define h(p) via8><>:
R h(p)
N(q⇤)
du
w(u) =
R p
p⇤
du
u(1 u) , p⇤ 6 p < 1,R N(q⇤)
h(p)
du
w(u) =
R p⇤
p
du
u(1 u) , 1 < p 6 p⇤.
Let
GC(p) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
n(q⇤) R (1 +  p)
1 R , p 2 [  1  , p⇤),
sgn(1  p)|1  p|1 Rh(p), p 2 [p⇤, p⇤] \ {1},
n(1) Re (1 R)a, p = 1,
n(q⇤) R (1   p)1 R , p 2 (p⇤, 1  ],
with a :=   R 1q⇤ ⇣ Rq(1 R) O(q,n(q))n(q) ⌘ dq ln(1+ ). Then |a| 6 ln(1+⇠), and GC is a C2 function
on (  1  , 1  ). Moreover (x+y✓)
1 R
1 R G
C( y✓x+y✓ ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in x.
The first pair of main results of this chapter are summarised in the following two
theorems. For a given set of risk aversion parameter R, discount factor   and market
parameters r, µ,  , ↵, ⌘, ⇢, we say the problem is well-posed if the value function is finite
on the interior of the solvency region for all values of the transaction costs   and  . We say
the problem is ill-posed if the value function is infinite for all   > 0 and   2 (0, 1). We say
the problem is conditionally well-posed if the value function is well-posed for large values of
the round-trip transaction cost, but ill-posed for small values.
Theorem 3.4. The investment/consumption problem is:
1. well-posed in either of the following cases:
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(a) R > 1;
(b) R < 1 and mM   0;
2. ill-posed if R < 1, mM < 0 and `(1) 6 0;
3. conditionally well-posed if R < 1, mM < 0 and `(1) > 0. In this case the problem is
well-posed if and only if ⇠ > ⇠ where ⇠ is defined in (3.18) below.
Note that, if R < 1 and mM = 0 and   = 0 =   (a case we have excluded) then the
problem is ill-posed.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose the parameters are such that the problem is well-posed. Set
V C(x, y, ✓) =
✓
b1
Rb4
◆ R (x+ y✓)1 R
1 R G
C
✓
y✓
x+ y✓
◆
where GC is as defined as in the relevant case of Proposition 3.3. Then V C = V where V
is the value function of the investment/consumption problem defined in (3.1).
3.5 Solutions to the free boundary value problem
In this section we study the solutions to the free boundary problem (3.12) under several
di↵erent combinations of parameters.
Let S ✓ {(q, n) : q > 0, n > 0} = (0,1) ⇥ [0,1) be the set S = {q = 1} [
{q = RR 1} [ {n = 0} [ {q < 1, (1   R)n   (1   R)`(q)}. On (0,1) ⇥ [0,1) \ S define
F (q, n) = O(q, n)/n. Extend the definition of F to (0,1)⇥ [0,1) where possible by taking
appropriate limits. We begin this section with a list of useful results regarding the functions
m and ` and operators O and F .
Lemma 3.6. 1. (a) For R < 1, `(q) > m(q) on q 2 (0, 1]. Moreover, on (0,1), m
crosses ` exactly once from below at some point above 1;
(b) For R > 1, m(q) > `(q) on q 2 (0, 1]. Moreover, on (0,1), m either does not
cross ` at all, or touches ` exactly once in the open interval (1, R/(R   1)), or
crosses ` twice on (1, R/(R  1)). Also, `(q) > m(q) on (R/(R  1),1);
2. For R > 1, F (q, n) is well defined at q = R/(R  1);
3. For n > 0 and (1 R)n < (1 R)`(1), F (1, n) is well-defined and
F (1, n) := lim
q!1F (q, n) =  
(1 R)(n m(1))
`(1)  n . (3.15)
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Also, for 0 < q  1 and R < 1 we have limn"`(q) F (q, n) =  1 (and limn#`(q) F (q, n) =
+1 if R > 1). For q > 1 and R < 1 (and 1 < q < RR 1 for R > 1) we have
F (q, `(q)) := lim
n!`(q)
F (q, n) =   1 R
R(1  q)
⇢
q[(1 R)q +R]
[(1 R)q +R]2 + (b2   1)R2   1
 
.
(3.16)
4. F (q, n) = 0 if and only if n = m(q). Moreover,
(a) for R < 1:
i. On 0 < q < 1, F (q, n) < 0 for m(q) < n < `(q) and F (q, n) > 0 for n < m(q)
or n > `(q);
ii. At q = 1, F (1, n) < 0 for m(1) < n < `(1) and F (1, n) > 0 for n < m(1).
F (1, n) is not well-defined for n > `(1);
iii. On q > 1, F (q, n) < 0 for n > m(q) and F (q, n) > 0 for n < m(q);
(b) for R > 1:
i. On 0 < q < 1, F (q, n) > 0 for `(q) < n < m(q) and F (q, n) < 0 for n < `(q)
or n > m(q);
ii. At q = 1, F (1, n) > 0 for `(1) < n < m(1) and F (1, n) < 0 for n > m(1).
F (1, n) is not well-defined for n 6 `(1);
iii. On 1 < q 6 R/(R   1), F (q, n) < 0 for n > m(q) and F (q, n) > 0 for
n < m(q);
iv. On q > R/(R   1), F (q, n) < 0 for m(q) < n < `(q) and F (q, n) > 0 for
n > `(q) or n < m(q).
Recall (qM ,mM ) is the extrema of the quadratic m (a minima when R < 1 and a
maxima when R > 1) with qM =
b3
2R > 0. The key analytical properties of the problem only
depend on the signs of the three parameters (1   R,mM , `(1)). We classify four di↵erent
cases using the decision tree in Figure 3.1.
We parameterise the family of solutions to (3.12) by the left boundary point. Fix
u 2 (0, qM ) and denote (nu(q))q>u the solution to the initial value problem
n0(q) = O(q, n(q)), n(u) = m(u).
Note that O(q, n) and @O@n (q, n) are well defined away from the set S (with appropriate
extension by taking limits whenever applicable). Then standard theories assure the existence
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R < 1
mM > 0
Case 1 (W)
mM < 0
`(1) 6 0
Case 2 (I)
`(1) > 0
Case 3 (CW)
R > 1
Case 4 (W)
Figure 3.1: Classification of di↵erent cases based on the signs of the parameters. The
abbreviations in parentheses indicate the solution features of the cases, where “W” refers
to unconditional well-posedness for all levels of transaction cost, “I” refers to unconditional
ill-posedness for all levels of transaction cost and “CW” refers to conditional well-posedness,
i.e. well-posedness for su ciently high levels of transaction cost only.
and uniqueness of the solution to the above initial value problem. Let ⇣(u) = inf{q > u :
(1 R)nu(q) < (1 R)m(q)} denote where nu first crosses m to the right of u. Define
⌃(u) = exp
 Z ⇣(u)
u
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, nu(q))
nu(q)
◆
dq
!
  1. (3.17)
Lemma 3.7. Suppose mM > 0. Then ⌃ is a strictly decreasing, continuous mapping
⌃ : (0, qM ]! [0,1) with ⌃(0+) = +1 and ⌃(qM ) = 0.
Now suppose mM  0. Let p   p+ be the roots of m(q) = 0. Set ⇠ := limu"p  ⌃(u).
Then ⌃ is a strictly decreasing, continuous mapping ⌃ : (0, p ]! [⇠,1) with ⌃(0+) = +1
and ⌃(p ) = ⇠. Moreover, limu"p  nu(·) = 0, limu"p  ⇣(u) = p+, and
⇠ = exp
 
 
Z p+
p 
R
q(1 R)F (q, 0)dq
!
  1. (3.18)
3.5.1 Case 1: R < 1 and mM   0
For any initial value u 2 (0, qM ), m0(u) < 0 = O(u,m(u)) = O(u, nu(u)) = n0u(u). Thus
nu(q) must initially be larger than m(q) for q being close to u. By part 4 of Lemma 3.6,
O(q, n) is negative on {(q, n) : 0 < q 6 1,m(q) < n < `(q)} [ {(q, n) : q > 1, n > m(q)}.
Also, nu(q) cannot cross `(q) from below on 0 < q 6 1 since limn"`(q)O(q, n) =  1.
By considering the sign of O(q, n), we conclude nu must be decreasing until it crosses m.
This guarantees the finiteness of ⇣(u), and the triple (nu(·), u, ⇣(u)) represents one possible
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solution to problem (3.12). Notice that the family of solutions (nu(·))0<u<qM cannot cross,
and thus nu(q) is decreasing in u. The solutions corresponding to initial values u = 0 and
u = qM can be understood as the appropriate limit of a sequence of solutions.
Although O(q, n) has singularities at q = 1 and n = `(q), part 3 of Lemma 3.6
shows that a well-defined limit O(q, n) exists on {(q, n) : q = 1, n < `(1)} and {(q, n) : q >
1, n = `(q)}. Hence there exists a continuous modification of O(q, n) and a solution nu can
actually pass through these singularity curves. See Figure 3.2(a) for some examples.
From the analysis leading to (3.11), the correct choice of u should satisfy ⇠ = ⌃(u).
From Lemma 3.7, for every given level of round-trip transaction cost ⇠, there exists a unique
choice of the left boundary point given by u⇤ = ⌃ 1(⇠) and then the desired solution to
the free boundary value problem is given by (nu⇤(·), u⇤, ⇣(u⇤)). Figure 3.2(b) gives the
plots of ⌃ 1(⇠) and ⇣(⌃ 1(⇠)) representing the boundaries (q⇤, q⇤) under di↵erent levels of
transaction costs.
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m(q) & l(q)
(a) Examples of solutions nu(q) with
di↵erent initial values (u,m(u)).
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(b) Plots of q⇤ = ⌃ 1(⇠) and q⇤ = ⇣(q⇤).
Figure 3.2: Case 1 where parameters chosen are R = 0.5, b1 = 0.25, b2 = 1.75 and b3 = 0.85.
3.5.2 Case 2: R < 1, mM < 0, `(1)  0
Let `0 be the root of `(q) = 0 on q 2 (0, 1). Since the solution to n0(q) = O(q, n(q)) must
be bounded below by zero1 and above by `(q) for q 2 (0, `0), for any initial value (u,m(u))
1Suppose a solution n starting at (u,m(u)) hits zero at some q = q0 with `(q0) > 0. Then both n
and n0 = n0(q) := 0 are solutions to the initial value problem n0(q) = O(q, n(q)) with n(q0) = 0, but this
contradicts the uniqueness of the solution given that @O@n (q, n) is well defined along the trajectories of n(q)
and n0(q) over q 2 [u, q0].
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for which m(u) > 0, the corresponding solution nu(·) must hit (`0, 0). Hence there does
not exist any strictly positive solution which crosses m again to the right of u. See Figure
3.3. In this case, there is no solution to the free boundary value problem and indeed the
underlying problem is ill-posed for all levels of transaction costs and thus the value function
cannot be defined.
q
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
n1(q)
n2(q)
n3(q)
m(q) & l(q)
Figure 3.3: Case 2 where parameters chosen are R = 0.5, b1 = 0.25, b2 = 1.75 and b3 = 1.5.
3.5.3 Case 3: R < 1, mM < 0, `(1) > 0
Let p± with 0 < p  < qM < p+ be the two roots of m(q) = 0. The parameterisation of the
solution is the same as in Case 1 except the left boundary point should now be restricted
to u 2 (0, p ) to ensure a positive initial value. The function ⌃ defined in (3.17) is still a
strictly decreasing map with ⌃(0+) = +1 except its domain is now restricted to (0, p ].
Unlike Case 1, we now only consider ⌃ 1(⇠) on the range ⇠ 2 (⇠,1). For such a
given high level of round-trip transaction cost, the required left boundary point is given
by u⇤ = ⌃ 1(⇠) and u⇤ = ⇣(u⇤), see Figure 3.4. In this case, the problem is conditionally
well-posed only for a su ciently high level of transaction costs.
3.5.4 Case 4: R > 1.
In this case the quadratic m has a positive maxima at (qM ,mM ) and m(q) > `(q) on
q 2 (0, 1). By checking the sign of O(q, n) using part 4 of Lemma 3.6, one can verify
that the solution nu of the initial value problem is always increasing for any choice of left
boundary point u 2 (0, qM ). In this case the family of solutions is increasing in u. The
solution nu(q) crosses m(q) from below at ⇣(u) = inf(q > u : nu(q) > m(q)). The correct
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(a) Examples of solutions nu(q) with
di↵erent initial values (u,m(u)).
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(b) Plots of q⇤ = ⌃ 1(⇠) and q⇤ = ⇣(q⇤).
Figure 3.4: Case 3 where parameters chosen are R = 0.5, b1 = 0.25, b2 = 1.75 and b3 = 1.2.
choice of u is again the one solving ⇠ = ⌃(u) using the same definition in (3.17). As in
Case 1, the function ⌃ is onto from (0, qM ] to [0,1) and hence u⇤ = ⌃ 1(⇠) always exists
uniquely for any ⇠. See Figure 3.5. Indeed for R > 1, the agent’s utility function is always
bounded above by zero and hence the value function always exists and is finite.
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(a) Examples of solutions nu(q) with
di↵erent initial values (u,m(u)).
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(b) Plots of q⇤ = ⌃ 1(⇠) and q⇤ = ⇣(q⇤).
Figure 3.5: Case 4 where parameters chosen are R = 1.25, b1 = 1.5, b2 = 1.25 and b3 = 2.
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3.6 Comparative statics
In this section, we investigate how the no-transaction wedge [p⇤, p⇤], the value function V
and the certainty equivalent value of the illiquid asset change with the market parameters
and level of transaction costs.
3.6.1 Monotonicity with respect to market parameters
Proposition 3.8. Suppose (n(·), q⇤, q⇤) is the solution to the free boundary value problem.
Then:
1. q⇤ and q⇤ are decreasing in b1;
2. For R < 1, q⇤ and q⇤ are increasing in b3.
Recall that p⇤ = q⇤1+ (1 q⇤) and p
⇤ = q
⇤
1  (1 q⇤) . Then, Proposition 3.8 gives imme-
diately:
Theorem 3.9. 1. p⇤ and p⇤ are decreasing in b1;
2. For R < 1, p⇤ and p⇤ are increasing in b3.
Theorem 3.9 describes the comparative statics in terms of the auxiliary parameters.2
In general, it is di cult to make categorical statements about the comparative statics with
respect to the original market parameters since many of the market parameters enter the
definitions of more than one of the auxiliary parameters. However, we have the following
results concerning the dependence of p⇤ and p⇤ on the discount rate, and on the drift of the
illiquid asset.
Corollary 3.10. p⇤ and p⇤ are decreasing in  . If R < 1 then p⇤ and p⇤ are increasing in
↵.
Now we consider the “cash value” of the holdings in the illiquid asset. We compare
the agent with holdings in the illiquid asset to an otherwise identical agent (same risk
aversion and discount parameter, and trading in the financial market with bond and risky
asset with price S) who has a zero initial endowment in the illiquid asset and is precluded
from taking any positions in this asset.
2Since the free boundary value problem does not depend on b4, q⇤ and q⇤ are trivially independent of
b4. We have strong numerical evidence that p⇤ is decreasing in b2 and p⇤ is increasing in b2, and when
R > 1 p⇤ and p⇤ are both increasing in b3, but we have not been able to prove the results.
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Consider the market without the illiquid asset. For an agent operating in this
market a consumption/investment strategy is admissible for initial wealth x > 0 (we write
(C = (Ct)t 0,⇧ = (⇧t)t 0) 2 AW (x)) if C and ⇧ are progressively measurable, and if the
resulting wealth process X = (Xt)t 0 is non-negative for all t. Here X solves
dXt = r(Xt  ⇧t)dt+ ⇧t
St
dSt   Ctdt
subject to X0 = x. Let W =W (x) be the value function for a CRRA investor:
W (x) = sup
(C,⇧)2AW (x)
E
"Z 1
0
e  t
C1 Rt
1 Rdt
#
.
The problem of finding W is a classical Merton consumption/investment problem without
transaction costs. We find
W (x) =

1
R
✓
    r(1 R)   
2(1 R)
2R
◆  R
x1 R
1 R =
✓
b1
b4R
◆ R x1 R
1 R.
Define C = C(y✓;x) to be the certainty equivalent value of the holding of the illiquid
asset, i.e. the cash amount which the agent with liquid wealth x and ✓ units of the illiquid
asset with current price y, trading in the market with transaction costs, would exchange
for his holdings of the illiquid asset, if after this exchange he is not allowed to trade in the
illiquid asset. (We assume there are no transaction costs on this exchange, but they can be
easily added if required.) Then C = C(y✓;x) solves
W (x+ C) = V (x, y, ✓)
which becomes
C = C(y✓;x) = (x+ y✓)G(p)1/(1 R)   x.
Theorem 3.11. 1. (1 R)G is decreasing in b1;
2. (1 R)G is increasing in b3.
Corollary 3.12. C is decreasing in   and increasing in ↵.
Both these monotonicities are intuitively natural. For the monotonicity in ↵, since
the agent only ever holds long3 positions in the illiquid asset, we expect him to benefit from
an increase in drift and hence price of the illiquid asset. If we consider monotonicity in  
then for R < 1, increasing   reduces the magnitude of the discounted utility of consumption,
3Note, if he starts with a solvent initial portfolio, but with a negative holding in the illiquid asset, then
the agent makes an instantaneous transaction at time zero to make his holding positive.
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and reduces the value function. However, this is not the same as decreasing the certainty
equivalent value of the holding of risky asset. Indeed, when R > 1, increasing   reduces the
magnitude of the discounted utility of consumption, but since the terms are negative, this
increases the value function. Nonetheless, C is decreasing in  .
3.6.2 Monotonicity with respect to transaction costs
From the discussion in Section 3.5, we have seen that transformed boundaries only depends
on the round-trip transaction cost ⇠. In particular, q⇤ and q⇤ are respectively strictly
decreasing and increasing in ⇠. However, the purchase/sale boundaries in the original scale
still depend on the individual costs of purchase and sale. Write
p⇤( ,  ) =
q⇤(⇠)
1 +  (1  q⇤(⇠)) , p
⇤( ,  ) =
q⇤(⇠)
1   (1  q⇤(⇠))
and recall that ⇠ =  + 1   . Then
dp⇤
d 
=
@p⇤
@q⇤
@q⇤
@⇠
@⇠
@ 
=
1 +  
(1   )2
1 +  
[1 +  (1  q⇤)]2
@q⇤
@⇠
< 0
so that the critical ratio of wealth in the illiquid asset to paper wealth at which the agent
purchases more illiquid asset is decreasing in the transaction cost on sales. However, per-
haps surprisingly, the dependence of the critical ratio p⇤ at which purchases occur on the
transaction cost on purchases is not unambiguous in sign:
dp⇤
d 
=
@p⇤
@ 
+
@p⇤
@q⇤
@q⇤
@⇠
@⇠
@ 
=   q⇤(1  q⇤)
[1 +  (1  q⇤)]2 +
1
1   
1 +  
[1 +  (1  q⇤)]2
@q⇤
@⇠
is not necessarily negative, for we may have q⇤ > 1. This issues is discussed further in Hobson
et al. (2016) where examples are given in which the boundaries to the no-transaction region
are not monotonic in the transaction cost parameters.
3.7 Conclusion
The solution of Merton (1969) of the infinite horizon, consumption and investment problem
is elegant and insightful but assumes a perfect market with no frictions. Building on this
work, there is a large literature, starting with Magill and Constantinides (1976) and Davis
and Norman (1990) investigating the form of the solution in the presence of transaction
costs. When there is a single asset Choi et al. (2013) (via shadow prices) and Hobson et al.
(2016) (via an analysis of the HJB equation) are able to characterise precisely when the
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problem is well-posed. However, Davis and Norman (1990), Choi et al. (2013) and Hobson
et al. (2016) all assume the financial market includes just a single risky asset.
In this chapter we have extended the results to two risky assets, and give a complete
characterisation of the solution, but in the special case where transaction costs are payable
on only one of the risky assets. The presence of the second risky asset, which may be used
for hedging and investment purposes, makes the problem significantly more complicated
than the single risky asset case, but we can extend the methods of Hobson et al. (2016) to
give a complete solution. Indeed, up to evaluating an integral of a known algebraic function,
we can determine exactly when the problem is well-posed and up to solving a free boundary
value problem for a first order di↵erential equation we can determine the boundaries of the
no-transaction wedge.
At the heart of our analysis is this free boundary value problem. Although the utility
maximisation problem depends on many parameters describing the agent (his risk aversion
and discount rate), the market (the interest rate and the drifts, volatilities and correlations
of the traded assets) and the frictions (the transaction costs on sales and purchases) the
ODE depends on the risk aversion parameter and just three further parameters, and the
solution we want can be specified further in terms of the round-trip transaction cost.
Building on the work of Choi et al. (2013), Hobson et al. (2016) give a solution to
the problem in the case of a single risky asset. The major issue in Choi et al. (2013) and
Hobson et al. (2016) is to understand the solution of an ODE as it passes through a singular
point. In this chapter the problem is richer, and the ODE is more complicated, but in other
ways the analysis is much simpler because although the key ODE has singularities, these
can be removed.
In the chapter we have assumed a single illiquid asset and just one further risky
asset, but the analysis extends immediately to the case of a single illiquid asset and several
risky assets on which no transaction costs are payable, at the expense of a more complicated
notation. This observation is a form of mutual fund theorem— the agent chooses to invest in
the additional liquid financial assets in fixed proportions and these assets may be combined
into a representative market asset. Details of the argument in a related context may be
found in Evans et al. (2008). Nonetheless, the extension to a model with many risky assets
with transaction costs payable on all of them remains a challenging open problem.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Transformation of the HJB equation
Looking at the HJB Equation (3.5), and using intuition gained from similar problems, we
expect that V = V (x, y, ✓) can be written as V (x, y, ✓) = x1 RJ(y✓x ) for J a function of a
single variable z representing the ratio of wealth in the illiquid asset to wealth in the liquid
assets. The equation for J = J(z) contains expressions of the form zJ 0(z) and z2J 00(z) and
so can be made into a homogeneous equation by the substitution (z, J(z)) 7! (eu,K(u)).
The second-order equation for K can then be reduced to a first order equation by setting
w(K) = dKdu and making K the subject of the equation, see Evans et al. (2008) or Hobson
et al. (2016) for details of a similar order-reduction in a related problem. However, there are
cases where x = 0 lies inside the no-transaction region and at this point z is undefined, and
the above approach does not work. Hence, we need to use a di↵erent parametrisation. We
use a parametrisation based on Pt =
Yt⇥t
Xt+Yt⇥t
representing the proportion of paper wealth
which is held in the illiquid asset. The delicate point at x = ±0 (or z = ±1) becomes
a delicate point at p = 1, but as we show by a careful analysis any singularities can be
removed.
Using the form of value function in (3.2) to compute all the relevant partial deriva-
tives, (3.5) can be rewritten as
0 =
b1
b4

G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R
 1 1/R
   G(p) + r(1  p) [(1 R)G(p)  pG0(p)]
+ ↵ [(1 R)pG(p) + p(1  p)G0(p)]
+
⌘2
2
⇥
p2(1  p)2G00(p)  2Rp2(1  p)G0(p) R(1 R)p2G(p)⇤
 
 
  [(1 R)G(p)  pG0(p)] + ⌘⇢ ⇥ R(1 R)pG(p) +Rp(2p  1)G0(p)  p2(1  p)G00(p)⇤ 2
2 [p2G00(p) + 2RpG0(p) R(1 R)G(p)] .
(3.19)
Let4 h(p) = sgn(1  p)|1  p|R 1G(p) and w(h) = p(1  p)dhdp . Then
w(h)
p(1  p) =
dh
dp
= sgn(1  p)|1  p|R 1

G0(p) + (1 R)G(p)
1  p
 
(3.20)
4The assumption b3 > 0 means that the agent would like to hold positive quantities of the illiquid asset,
and that the no-transaction wedge is contained in the half-space p > 0. To allow for b3 < 0 it is necessary
to consider p < 0. This case can be incorporated into the analysis by incorporating an extra factor of sgn(p)
into the definition of h, so that h(p) = sgn(p(1  p))|1  p|R 1G(p). This then leads to extra cases, but no
new mathematics, and the problem can still be reduced to solving n0 = O(q, n) where O is given by (3.7),
but now for q < 0.
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and in turn
G0(p) =
w(h)
|p||1  p|R   (1 R)
G(p)
1  p . (3.21)
This gives
G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R = G(p) 
p
1 R

w(h)
|p||1  p|R   (1 R)
G(p)
1  p
 
= |1  p| Rh
✓
1  w(h)
(1 R)h
◆
. (3.22)
We expect that Vx > 0 and hence that this expression is positive. It follows that sgn(1 p) =
sgn(h) = sgn(1 W (h)). Then✓
G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R
◆1  1R
= sgn(1  p)|1  p|1 Rh|h|  1R
    1  w(h)(1 R)h
    1  1R , (3.23)
(1  p) [(1 R)G(p)  pG0(p)] = sgn(1  p)|1  p|1 R [(1 R)h  w(h)] ,
(1 R)G(p)  pG0(p) = sgn(1  p)|1  p|
1 R
1  p (1 R)h
✓
1  w(h)
(1 R)h
◆
and
(1 R)pG(p) + p(1  p)G0(p) = sgn(1  p)|1  p|1 Rw(h).
Taking a further derivative
w(h)w0(h) = p(1  p)dh
dp
d
dh
w(h) = p(1  p) d
dp
w(h)
= p(1  p) d
dp
 
sgn(1  p)|1  p|R 1 [p(1  p)G0(p) + (1 R)pG(p)] 
= sgn(1  p)|1  p|R 1
⇥ ⇥p2(1  p)2G00(p) + p(1  p)(1  2Rp)G0(p) + (1 R)p(1 Rp)G(p)⇤
and hence the second order terms in (3.19) can be rewritten as:
p2(1  p)2G00(p)  2Rp2(1  p)G0(p) R(1 R)p2G(p)
= sgn(1  p)|1  p|1 Rw(h)(w0(h)  1),
 R(1 R)pG(p) +Rp(2p  1)G0(p)  p2(1  p)G00(p)
=   sgn(1  p)|1  p|
1 R
1  p (w
0(h)w(h)  (1 R)w(h)) ,
and
p2G00(p) + 2RpG0(p) R(1 R)G(p) = sgn(1  p)|1  p|1+R [w(h)w
0(h) + (2R  1)w(h) R(1 R)h] .
(3.24)
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Substituting back into (3.19), and dividing through by sgn(1 p)|1 p|1 R we obtain
0 =
b1
b4
h|h| 1/R
    1  w(h)(1 R)h
    1 1/R    h
+ r [(1 R)h  w(h)] + ↵w(h) + ⌘
2
2
w(h)(w0(h)  1)
 
n
 (1 R)h
⇣
1  w(h)(1 R)h
⌘
  ⌘⇢ [w0(h)w(h)  (1 R)w(h)]
o2
2 [w(h)w0(h) + (2R  1)w(h) R(1 R)h] . (3.25)
Recall the definitionsW (h) = w(h)(1 R)h , N =W
 1 and n(q) = |N(q)| 1/R|1 q|1 1/R.
Then w(N(q)) = (1 R)N(q)W (N(q)) = (1 R)qN(q). Put h = N(q) in (3.25) and divide
by h. Then we have
0 =
b1
b4
n(q)    + r(1 R)(1  q) + ↵(1 R)q + ⌘
2
2
(1 R) [qw0(N(q))  q]
  1 R
2
{ (1  q)  ⌘⇢ [qw0(N(q))  (1 R)q]}2
qw0(N(q)) + (2R  1)q  R . (3.26)
Recall the definitions of the auxiliary constants (bi)i=1,2,3,4 given at the very start
of Section 3.3.2. Rearranging (3.26) and multiplying by b4
0 = (1 R)q2(w0(N(q)))2
+ [b1n(q)  [b1 + b2R(1 R)] + (b3 + 2R  2)(1 R)q] qw0(N(q))
+
⇥
(2R  1)(b3   1) +R2(1  b2)
⇤
(1 R)q2
+ [(1  2R)b1 +R(1 R)b2  R(1 R)b3] q
+b1R+ b1 [(2R  1)q  R]n(q)
=: A(qw0(N(q)))2 +B(qw0(N(q))) + C. (3.27)
This can be viewed as a quadratic equation in qw0(N(q)). Note that the coe cients A, B,
C depend on the market parameters only through the auxiliary parameters b1, b2, b3.
We want the root corresponding to Vxx < 0. This is equivalent to
1
1 Rp
2G00(p) +
2R
1 RpG
0(p) RG(p) < 0. (3.28)
Using (3.24) and the fact that sgn(1  p) = sgn(h), and multiplying (3.28) by |1  p|R+1/|h|
we find we want the solution for which
1
(1 R)
1
h
{w(h)w0(h)+(2R 1)w(h) R(1 R)h} = {qw0(N(q))+(2R 1)q R} < 0. (3.29)
Consider (3.26) and write u = qw0(N(q)). Then for fixed q (3.26) is of the form
(1   R)a1u   a2 = (1   R) (a3u+a4)
2
(u a5) where (ai)1i5 are constants with a1 > a
2
3 and a5 =
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R   (2R   1)q. It is easily seen that this equation has two solutions, one on each side of
u = a5, and that from (3.29) the one we want is the smaller root. Thus
qw0(N(q)) =
 B   sgn(A)pB2   4AC
2A
where A, B, C are the constants in (3.27). Note that sgn(A) = sgn(1 R). Then, we have
n0(q)
n(q)
=
1 R
R(1  q)  
1
R
N 0(q)
N(q)
=
1 R
R(1  q)  
1 R
R
q
qw0(N(q))  (1 R)q2
=
1 R
R(1  q)  
1 R
R
2Aq
 B   sgn(A)pB2   4AC   2A(1 R)q2 .
After some algebra, we arrive at
n0(q) =
(1 R)n(q)
R(1  q)  
2(1 R)2qn(q)/R
2(1 R)(1  q) [(1 R)q +R]  '(q, n(q))  sgn(1 R)p'(q, n(q))2 + E(q)2 .
3.B Continuity and smoothness of the candidate value
function
Proof of Case (i) of Proposition 3.3. We haveZ N(q⇤)
N(q⇤)
du
w(u)
 
Z p⇤
p⇤
du
u(1  u) =
Z q⇤
q⇤
✓
N 0(u)
(1 R)uN(u)  
1
u(1  u)
◆
du
+
Z q⇤
q⇤
du
u(1  u)  
Z p⇤
p⇤
du
u(1  u)
=
Z q⇤
q⇤
✓
  R
u(1 R)
O(u, n(u))
n(u)
◆
du  ln(1 + ⇠)
= 0
using (3.11) and this establishes the equivalence of (3.13) and (3.14).
Suppose we have a solution (n(·), q⇤, q⇤) to (3.12) with n being strictly positive.
Let N(q) = sgn(1   q)n(q) R|1   q|R 1, W = N 1 and w(h) = (1   R)hW (h). We set
GC(p) = sgn(1   p)|1   p|1 Rh(p) where h solves dhdp = w(h)p(1 p) . For notational convenience
(and to allow us to write derivatives as superscripts) write G as shorthand for GC .
First we check that G is C2. Outside the no-transaction interval this is immediate
from the definition, and follows on (p⇤, p⇤) from the fact that n and n0 are continuous. This
property is inherited by the pair (w,w0) and then on integration by the trio (h, h0, h00) and
finally (G,G0, G00).
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It remains to check the continuity of G, G0 and G00 at p⇤ and p⇤. We prove the
continuity at p⇤; the proofs at p⇤ are similar. Using 1 q
⇤
1 p⇤ =
1
1+ p⇤ for the penultimate
equivalence, we have
G(p⇤+) = sgn(1  p⇤)|1  p⇤|1 Rh(p⇤)
= sgn(1  p⇤)|1  p⇤|1 R sgn(1  q⇤)n(q⇤) R|1  q⇤|R 1
= n(q⇤) R(1 +  p⇤)1 R = G(p⇤ ).
Then continuity of G0 at p⇤ follows from (3.22) where
G(p⇤+)  p⇤G
0(p⇤+)
1 R = |1  p⇤|
 Rh⇤(1 W (h⇤)) = G(p⇤+)
1  p⇤ (1  q⇤)
=
G(p⇤)
1 +  p⇤
= G(p⇤ )  p⇤G
0(p⇤ )
1 R .
Finally, from (3.24),
p2⇤G
00(p⇤+) + 2Rp⇤G0(p⇤+) R(1 R)G(p⇤+)
=
G(p⇤+)
(1  p⇤)2h⇤ [w(h⇤)w
0(h⇤) + (2R  1)w(h⇤) R(1 R)h⇤]
=
G(p⇤)
(1  p⇤)2 [(1 R)W (h⇤)w
0(h⇤) + (2R  1)(1 R)W (h⇤) R(1 R)]
=
G(p⇤)
(1  p⇤)2

(1 R)2q⇤
✓
q⇤ +
N(q⇤)
N 0(q⇤)
◆
+ (2R  1)(1 R)q⇤  R(1 R)
 
=
(1 R)G(p⇤)
(1  p⇤)2

(1 R)q⇤
✓
q⇤ +
1  q⇤
1 R
◆
+ (2R  1)q⇤  R
 
=  R(1 R)G(p⇤)
✓
1  q⇤
1  p⇤
◆2
=  R(1 R) G(p⇤)
(1 +  p⇤)2
= p2⇤G
00(p⇤ ) + 2Rp⇤G0(p⇤ ) R(1 R)G(p⇤ ),
where we have used the fact that
0 =
n0(q⇤)
n(q⇤)
=
1 R
R(1  q⇤)  
1
R
N 0(q⇤)
N(q⇤)
.
Then we conclude that G00 is continuous at p = p⇤.
Now we argue that (x+y✓)
1 R
1 R G(
y✓
x+y✓ ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
x. Outside [p⇤, p⇤] this is immediate form the definition. On [p⇤, p⇤] the increasing property
will follow if G(p)  pG0(p)1 R > 0. But this is trivial since
G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R = |1  p|
 Rh(1 W (h)) = |1  p| RN(q)(1  q)
= |1  p| R|1  q|Rn(q) R > 0.
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Meanwhile, (x+y✓)
1 R
1 R G(
y✓
x+y✓ ) is concave on [p⇤, p
⇤] is equivalent to (3.28), or, by the analysis
leading to (3.29) to qw0(N(q))+ (2R  1)q R < 0. But this follows from our choice of root
in (3.27).
⇤
Proof of Case (ii) of Proposition 3.3. Note that the integrand of
R q⇤
q⇤
⇣
R
q(1 R)
O(q,n(q))
n(q)
⌘
dq
is everywhere negative and therefore
R 1
q⇤
⇣
  Rq(1 R) O(q,n(q))n(q)
⌘
dq exists in [0, ln(1+⇠)]. Hence
  ln(1 + ⇠) 6 a 6 ln(1 + ⇠).
For p 6= 1, the C2 smoothness of G = GC follows as in the first case of Proposition
3.3. We will focus on the case of p = 1.
Suppose first that p⇤ < 1 < p⇤. Continuity of G and G0 at p = 1 can be established
if we can show that both
lim
p!1
1
G(p)
✓
G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R
◆1 1/R
= n(1) (3.30)
and
lim
p!1
pG0(p)
(1 R)G(p) = 1  e
a. (3.31)
Substituting (3.31) into (3.30) we recover the given value of G(1).
Using (3.23) and the equivalence of p! 1 and q ! 1 we have
1
G(p)
✓
G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R
◆1  1R
= |h|  1R |1 W (h)|1  1R = |N(q)|  1R |1  q|1  1R = n(q)! n(1)
and (3.30) holds.
For (3.31) we have,
1 W (h(p))
1  p =
(1 R)h(p)  p(1  p)h0(p)
(1 R)(1  p)h(p) = 1 
pG0(p)
(1 R)G(p) .
Suppose p < 1. Then using the definition of h(p),
0 =
Z h(p)
N(q⇤)
du
w(u)
 
Z p
p⇤
du
u(1  u)
=
Z W (h(p))
q⇤
N 0(q)dq
(1 R)qN(q)  
Z p
p⇤
du
u(1  u)
=
Z W (h(p))
q⇤
✓
N 0(q)
(1 R)qN(q)  
1
q(1  q)
◆
dq +
Z W (h(p))
q⇤
dq
q(1  q)  
Z p
p⇤
du
u(1  u)
=
Z W (h(p))
q⇤
✓
  R
u(1 R)
O(u, n(u))
n(u)
◆
du 
Z q⇤
p⇤
du
u(1  u)  
Z p
W (h(p))
dq
q(1  q)
=
Z W (h(p))
q⇤
✓
  R
u(1 R)
O(u, n(u))
n(u)
◆
du  ln(1 +  )  ln
✓
p
W (h(p))
1 W (h(p))
1  p
◆
.
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Letting p " 1 and using the fact that limp!1W (h(p)) = 1, we obtain
lim
p"1
1 W (h(p))
1  p = e
a. (3.32)
A similar calculation for p > 1 gives limp#1
W (h(p)) 1
p 1 = e
a as well. Hence (3.31) holds. As
a byproduct, we can establish
lim
p!1G
0(p) = (1 R)(1  ea)G(1) = (1 R)(1  ea)n(1) Re (1 R)a.
Consider now continuity of G00 at p = 1. We show limp!1G00(p) exists. Consider:
[(1 R)G(p)  pG0(p)]2
G(p)[p2G00(p) + 2RpG0(p) R(1 R)G(p)] =
(1 R)2h(1 W (h))2
w(h)w0(h) + (2R  1)w(h) R(1 R)h
=
(1 R)(1  q)2
(1 R)qN(q)/N 0(q)  (1  q)[R+ (1 R)q]
=
(1 R) [1 R R(1  q)n0(q)/n(q)]
R[R+ (1 R)q]n0(q)/n(q) R(1 R) .
Then,
lim
p!1
[(1 R)G(p)  pG0(p)]2
G(p)[p2G00(p) + 2RpG0(p) R(1 R)G(p)] = limq!1
(1 R) [1 R R(1  q)n0(q)/n(q)]
R{[R+ (1 R)q]n0(q)/n(q)  (1 R)}
=
(1 R)2
R[n0(1)/n(1)  (1 R)] . (3.33)
Note that n0(1)/n(1) (1 R) 6= 0 since sgn(n0(1)) =   sgn(1 R). The limit is thus always
well defined and can be used to obtain an expression for limp!1G00(p).
Since (x+y✓)
1 R
1 R G(
y✓
x+y✓ ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave in x for both p < 1
and p > 1, these properties extend to p = 1 under the second order smoothness of G. Note
that the monotonicity and concavity at p = 1 must be strict due to (3.31) and (3.33).
Finally we consider the case where p⇤ = 1 or p⇤ = 1. Suppose we are in the former
scenario. Then to show the continuity of G at p⇤ = 1 it is su cient to show that
n(q⇤) R (1 +  )
1 R = n(1) Re (1 R)a.
But q⇤ = 1 when p⇤ = 1 and thus a =   ln(1 +  ). The above expression then holds
immediately. Values of G0(1) and G00(1) can again be inferred from (3.31) and (3.33). A
similar result follows in the case p⇤ = 1.
⇤
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3.C The candidate value function and the HJB varia-
tional inequality
In this section we verify that the candidate value function given in Proposition 3.3 solves
the HJB variational inequality
min
✓
  sup
c>0,⇡
Lc,⇡V C , MV C , NV C
◆
= 0 (3.34)
where L, M and N are the operators
Lc,⇡f := c
1 R
1 R   cfx +
 2
2
fxx⇡
2 + ((µ  r)fx +  ⌘⇢fxyy)⇡
+ rfxx+ ↵fyy +
⌘2
2
fyyy
2    f,
Mf := f✓   (1 +  )yfx,
N f := (1   )yfx   f✓.
Note that for f = f(x, y, ✓) which is strictly increasing and concave in x we have
L⇤f := sup
c>0,⇡
Lc,⇡f = R
1 Rf
1 1/R
x + rxfx + ↵yfy +
⌘2
2
y2fyy   ( fx + ⌘⇢yfxy)
2
2fxx
   f
and thus it is equivalent to show that min
  L⇤V C , MV C , NV C  = 0. From construc-
tion of V C , it is trivial that L⇤V C = 0, MV C = 0 and NV C = 0 on the no-transaction
region, purchase-region and sale-region respectively. Hence it remains to show that8>>>><>>>>:
L⇤V C 6 0, NV C 6 0,  1/  6 p < p⇤,
MV C 6 0, NV C 6 0, p⇤ 6 p 6 p⇤,
L⇤V C 6 0, MV C 6 0, p⇤ < p 6 1/ .
On the purchase region p 2 [ 1/ , p⇤), direct substitution reveals that
NV C =  
✓
b1
Rb4
◆ R
n(q⇤) R( +  )y(x+ y✓) R(1 +  p) R 6 0,
and
L⇤V C = R(x+ y✓)
1 R
1 R
✓
b1
Rb4
◆1 R
(1 +  p)1 Rn(q⇤) R
✓
m(q⇤) m
✓
(1 +  )p
1 +  p
◆◆
6 0
where we have used the facts that n(q⇤) = m(q⇤),
(1+ )p
1+ p <
(1+ )p⇤
1+ p⇤ = q⇤ and the quadratic
m(q) is decreasing (respectively increasing) over q < q⇤ < qM when R < 1 (respectively
R > 1). Similar calculations can be performed on the sale region p 2 (p⇤, 1/ ] to show that
MV C 6 0 and L⇤V C 6 0.
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Now we show thatMV C 6 0 on the no-transaction region p 2 [p⇤, p⇤]. The inequal-
ity NV C 6 0 can be proved in an identical fashion. Again writing G as shorthand for GC ,
we have
MV C = V C✓   (1 +  )yV Cx =
pV C
✓

(1 +  p)
G0(p)
G(p)
   (1 R)
 
.
Since sgn(V C) = sgn(1 R), it is necessary and su cient to show
sgn(1 R)

(1 +  p)
G0(p)
G(p)
   (1 R)
 
6 0.
But G(p) = sgn(1  p)h(p)|1  p|1 R for p 6= 1, and then
G0(p)
G(p)
=
h0(p)
h(p)
  1 R
1  p =
w(h)
h(p)p(1  p)  
1 R
1  p =
1 R
1  p
✓
W (h)
p
  1
◆
and the required inequality becomes
1 W (h)
1  p >
1
1 +  p
. (3.35)
We are going to prove (3.35) for p 2 [p⇤, p⇤] \ {1}. Then MV C 6 0 will hold at p = 1 as
well by smoothness of V C .
Suppose p⇤ < p⇤ < 1. Starting from the identityZ N(q)
N(q⇤)
dh
w(h)
=
Z p
p⇤
du
u(1  u)
and following the substitutions leading to (3.10), we findZ q
q⇤
✓
  R
u(1 R)
O(u, n(u))
n(u)
◆
du =  
Z q
q⇤
dv
v(1  v) +
Z p
p⇤
du
u(1  u) .
Since the expression on the left hand side is increasing in q, we deduce
1
p(1  p)
dp
dq
> 1
q(1  q) .
Define  (q) := q1+ (1 q) . Then   is a solution to the ODE  
0(q) = %(q, (q)) where
%(q, y) = y(1 y)q(1 q) . Note that  (q⇤) =
q⇤
1+ (1 q⇤) = p⇤ = p(q⇤). For p⇤ 6 p 6 p
⇤ < 1 or
equivalently q⇤ 6 q 6 q⇤ < 1, we have p0(q) > %(q, p(q)), and we conclude p(q) >  (q) for
q 2 [q⇤, q⇤]. Then
p = p(q) > q
1 +  (1  q) =
W (h)
1 +  (1 W (h))
which establishes (3.35).
If instead 1 < p⇤ < p⇤, we can arrive at the same result by showing p(q) 6  (q) for
1 < q⇤ 6 q 6 q⇤ starting with
R N(q⇤)
N(q)
dh
w(h) =
R p⇤
p
du
u(1 u) and then apply the same argument
as in the previous case.
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It remains to consider the case of p⇤ 6 1 6 p⇤. The only issue is that the comparison
of derivatives of p(q) and  (q) may not be trivial at q = 1 because of the singularity in %(q, y).
But by direct computation, we find  0(1) = 1 +  . On the other hand, consider an inverse
expression q = q(p) we have
q0(1 ) = lim
p"1
1  q(p)
1  p = limp"1
1 W (h(p))
1  p = e
a
due to (3.32) and similarly we have q0(1+) = ea. Then q0(1) and in turn p0(1) = 1/q0(1) is
well-defined, and moreover since a >   ln(1 +  ) we have
p0(1) = e a < 1 +   =  0(1).
Together with the fact that p(1) = 1 =  (1), we must have that  (q) is an upcrossing of p(q)
at q = 1. From this we conclude p(q) >  (q) on q 2 [q⇤, 1) and  (q) > p(q) on q 2 (1, q⇤].
(3.35) then follows.
3.D Proof of the main results
Proof of Theorems 3.4 and 3.5. We prove the two theorems together. Suppose we are in
the well-posed cases. From the analysis in Section 3.5, there exists a solution (n(·), q⇤, q⇤)
to the free boundary value problem with n being strictly positive. By the C2 smoothness
of GC , V C is C2⇥2⇥1. Moreover, in Appendices 3.B and 3.C we show that V C is a strictly
increasing and concave function in x solving the HJB variational inequality (3.34).
Let Mt :=
R t
0 e
  s C1 Rs
1 R ds+ e
  tV C(Xt, Yt,⇥t). Applying Ito’s lemma, we obtain
Mt =M0 +
Z t
0
e  sLCs,⇧sV Cds+
Z t
0
e  sMV Cd s +
Z t
0
e  sNV Cd s
+
Z t
0
e  s V Cx ⇧sdBs +
Z t
0
e  s⌘V Cy YsdWs
6M0 +
Z t
0
e  s V Cx ⇧sdBs +
Z t
0
e  s⌘V Cy YsdWs.
Suppose R < 1. Then Mt > 0, and the sum of the stochastic integrals is a local
martingale bounded below by  M0 and in turn it is a supermartingale. Thus E(Mt) 6
M0 = V C(x, y, ✓) which gives
E
✓Z t
0
e  s
C1 Rs
1 Rds
◆
6 V C(x, y, ✓)  E  e  tV C(Xt, Yt,⇥t)  6 V C(x, y, ✓).
On sending t ! 1, we obtain E
⇣R1
0 e
  s C1 Rs
1 R ds
⌘
6 V C by monotone convergence and
thus V 6 V C since C is arbitrary.
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If R > 1, then the above argument does not go through directly since the local
martingale will not be bounded below. But using the argument of Davis and Norman (1990),
we can consider a perturbed candidate value function which is bounded on the no-transaction
region and define a version of the value process M which will be a supermartingale. The
result can be obtained by considering the limit of the perturbed candidate value function.
To show V C 6 V , it is su cient to demonstrate the existence of a strategy which
attains the value V C . Suppose the initial value (x, y✓) is such that y✓x+y✓ = p 2 [p⇤, p⇤].
Define feedback controls C⇤ = (C⇤t )t>0 and ⇧⇤ = (⇧⇤t )t>0 with C⇤t = C⇤(Xt, Yt,⇥t) and
⇧⇤t = ⇧⇤(Xt, Yt,⇥t) where
C⇤(x, y, ✓) := [V Cx (x, y, ✓)]
  1R , ⇧⇤(x, y, ✓) :=   (µ  r)V
C
x (x, y, ✓t) +  ⌘⇢yV
C
xy(x, y, ✓t)
 2V Cxx(x, y, ✓t)
,
and ⇥⇤ = (⇥⇤t )t>0 a finite variation, local time strategy in form of ⇥⇤t = ✓+ ⇤t   ⇤t which
keeps Pt within (p⇤, p⇤). Let X⇤ be the liquid wealth process evolving under these controls.
Now since (X⇤, Y ⇥⇤) is always confined in the no-transaction wedge, this strategy is clearly
admissible.
Let M⇤ be the process M = (Mt)t>0 evolving under this controlled system. Then
M⇤t =M
⇤
0 +
Z t
0
e  sLC⇤s ,⇧⇤sV Cds+
Z t
0
e  sMV Cd ⇤s +
Z t
0
e  sNV Cd ⇤s
+
Z t
0
e  s V Cx ⇧
⇤
sdBs +
Z t
0
e  s⌘V Cy YsdWs
=:M⇤0 +N
1
t +N
2
t +N
3
t +N
4
t +N
5
t .
By construction of C⇤ and ⇧⇤, N1t = 0. Moreover,  ⇤ is carried by the set {Pt = p⇤}
over which MV Cs = 0. Hence N2t = 0, and similarly N3t = 0. We show in Appendix 3.E
that the local-martingale stochastic integrals N4 and N5 are martingales. Then on taking
expectation we have
E
✓Z t
0
e  s
(C⇤s )1 R
1 R ds
◆
+ E(e  tV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t )) = E(M⇤t ) =M⇤0 = V C . (3.36)
We also show in Appendix 3.E that limt!1 E(e  tV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t )) = 0. Then letting t!1
in (3.36) gives
V C = E
✓Z 1
0
e  s
(C⇤s )1 R
1 R ds
◆
6 sup
(C,⇧,⇥)2A(0,x,y,✓)
E
✓Z 1
0
e  s
C1 Rs
1 Rds
◆
= V.
Now suppose the initial value (x, y✓) is such that p < p⇤. Then consider a strategy of
purchasing   = xp⇤ (1 p⇤)y✓y(1+ p⇤) number of shares at time zero such that the post-transaction
proportional holding in the illiquid asset is y(✓+ )x+y(✓+ ) y(1+ )  = p⇤, and then follow the
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investment/consumption strategy (C⇤,⇧⇤,⇥⇤) as in the case of p 2 [p⇤, p⇤] thereafter. By
construction of V C , V C(x, y, ✓) = V C(x  y(1 +  ) , y, ✓ +  ). Using (3.36) we have
E
✓Z t
0
e  s
(C⇤s )1 R
1 R ds
◆
+ E(e  tV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t )) = V C(x  y(1 +  ) , y, ✓ +  ) = V C(x, y, ✓)
and from this we can conclude V C 6 V . Similar argument applies for initial value p > p⇤.
Now we consider the set of parameters which leads to unconditional ill-posedness.
It is su cient to show that the problem without the liquid asset (which is the classical
transaction cost problem involving one single risky asset only) is ill-posed. Note that `(1) 6 0
is equivalent to b3 > b11 R + b2R and this inequality can be restated as ↵ > 12⌘2R +  1 R .
But this is exactly the ill-posedness condition in the one risky asset case. See Hobson et al.
(2016) or Choi et al. (2013).
Finally we consider the conditionally well-posed case. From the discussion in Section
3.5, it is clear that as long as ⇠ > ⇠ there still exists (n(·), q⇤, q⇤) a solution to the free
boundary value problem and thus one could show V C = V following the same argument in
the proof for the unconditionally well-posed cases. Moreover, from Lemma 3.7 we can see
that n(·) # 0 as ⇠ # ⇠, in turn V C ! 1 from its construction. But V > V C and thus we
conclude V !1 as ⇠ # ⇠. This shows the ill-posedness of the problem at ⇠ = ⇠, and using
the monotonicity of V in ⇠ this conclusion extends to any ⇠ 6 ⇠.
⇤
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3.E The martingale property of the value process under
the optimal control
Firstly we want to show that the  ⇧
⇤V Cx
V C and
⌘yV Cy
V C are bounded on the no-transaction region.
Writing GC as shorthand for G,
 ⇧⇤V Cx
V C
=  V
C
x
V C
 V Cx + ⌘⇢yV
C
xy
V Cxx
=   (1 R)G(p)  pG
0(p)
G(p)
⇥  [(1 R)G(p)  pG
0(p)] + ⌘⇢[ R(1 R)pG(p) +Rp(2p  1)G0(p)  p2(1  p)G00(p)]
p2G00(p) + 2RpG0(p) R(1 R)G(p)
=  (1 R)
✓
1  w(h)
(1 R)h
◆  (1 R)h⇣1  w(h)(1 R)h⌘  ⌘⇢[w0(h)w(h)  (1 R)w(h)]
w0(h)w(h) + (2R  1)w(h) R(1 R)h
=  (1 R)(1  q)
 (1  q)  ⌘⇢
h
(1 R)q
⇣
q + N(q)N 0(q)
⌘
  (1 R)q
i
(1 R)q N(q)N 0(q)   (1  q)[R+ (1 R)q]
=
1 R
R
(1  q)
8<:    (1 R)(⌘⇢R   )q
⇣
N(q)
N 0(q)   (1  q)
⌘
R(1  q)  (1 R)q
⇣
N(q)
N 0(q)   (1  q)
⌘
9=;
=
1 R
R
(1  q)
8<:    (⌘⇢R   )
24 R(1  q)
R(1  q)  (1 R)q
⇣
N(q)
N 0(q)   (1  q)
⌘   1
359=; .
Using the monotonicity property of n it can be easily shown that (1   R)( N(q)N 0(q)  
1 q
1 R )  0, and then
R(1  q)  (1 R)q
✓
N(q)
N 0(q)
  (1  q)
◆
> R(1  q)  (1 R)q
✓
1  q
1 R   (1  q)
◆
= R(1  q)2 > 0
and in turn |R(1  q)  (1 R)q
⇣
N(q)
N 0(q)   (1  q)
⌘
| > R(1  q)2. Thus     ⇧⇤V CxV C
     6 |1 R|R |1  q|
8<:| |+ |⌘⇢R   |
24 R|1  q|
R(1  q)  (1 R)q
⇣
N(q)
N 0(q)   (1  q)
⌘ + 1
359=;
6 |1 R|
R
|1  q|
⇢
| |+ |⌘⇢R   |

R|1  q|
R(1  q)2 + 1
  
=
|1 R|
R
{| ||1  q|+ |⌘⇢R   | [1 + |1  q|]}
6 K1
for some K1 > 0 since |1  q| is bounded on q 2 [q⇤, q⇤].
On the other hand,
⌘yV Cy
V C
=
⌘
G(p)
[(1 R)pG(p) + p(1  p)G0(p)] = ⌘w(h)
h
= ⌘(1 R)W (h)
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and then |⌘yV
C
y
V C | 6 ⌘|1 R|q⇤ =: K2.
Recall the notation VC(x, y, ✓, t) = e  tV C(x, y, ✓), and define a process D =
(Dt)t>0 via Dt = lnVC(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t , t) = lnV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t )   t. Then
Dt = D0  
Z t
0
1
1 R
(V Cx )
1 1/R
V C
ds+
Z t
0
 ⇧⇤sV Cx
V C
dBs +
Z t
0
⌘YsV Cy
V C
dWs
  1
2
Z t
0
1
(V C)2
⇥
 2(⇧⇤s)
2(V Cx )
2 + 2 ⌘⇢Ys⇧
⇤
sV
C
x V
C
y + ⌘
2Y 2s (V
C
y )
2
⇤
ds
and hence the value process admits a representation of
VC(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t , t) = V C(x, y, ✓) exp
✓
 
Z t
0
1
1 R
(V Cx )
1 1/R
V C
ds
◆
Ht
with
Ht := E
 Z t
0
 ⇧⇤sVx
V C
dBs +
Z t
0
⌘YsV Cy
V C
dWs
!
where E(Zt) := exp
 
Zt   12 [Z]t
 
is the Doleans exponential of a process Z. Since
R t
0
 ⇧⇤sVx
V C dBs
and
R t
0
⌘YsV
C
y
V C dWs have bounded integrands, H is a true martingale. Now,
(e  t ⇧⇤tV
C
x )
2 6 K21V C(Xt, Yt,⇥t)2
6 K21V C(x, y, ✓)2H2t
= K21V
C(x, y, ✓)2E
 
2
Z t
0
 ⇧⇤sVx
V C
dBs + 2
Z t
0
⌘YsV Cy
V C
dWs
!
⇥ exp
✓Z t
0
1
(V C)2
⇥
 2(⇧⇤s)
2(V Cx )
2 + 2 ⌘⇢Ys⇧
⇤
sV
C
x V
C
y + ⌘
2Y 2s (V
C
y )
2
⇤
ds
◆
6 K21V C(x, y, ✓)2E
 
2
Z t
0
 ⇧⇤sVx
V C
dBs + 2
Z t
0
⌘YsV Cy
V C
dWs
!
⇥ exp  ⇥K21 + 2⇢K1K2 +K22⇤ t 
and therefore
E
 
(e  t ⇧⇤tV
C
x )
2
 
6 K21V C(x, y, ✓)2 exp
 ⇥
K21 + 2⇢K1K2 +K
2
2
⇤
t
 
.
We conclude E
⇣R t
0 (e
  s ⇧⇤sV Cx )2ds
⌘
< 1 and hence N4t =
R t
0 e
  s ⇧⇤sV Cx dBs is a true
martingale. Similarly, we can show that N5t =
R t
0 e
  s⌘V Cy YsdWs is also a true martingale
using the fact that (e  t⌘V Cy Yt)2 6 K22V C(x, y, ✓)2H2t .
Finally, we want to show that e  tV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t ) converges to zero in L1. We have
1
1 R
(V Cx )
1 1/R
V C
=
1
G(p)
✓
G(p)  pG
0(p)
1 R
◆1 1/R
= n(q) > n(q⇤).
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Then
e  tV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥
⇤
t ) = V
C(x, y, ✓) exp
✓
 
Z t
0
1
1 R
(V Cx )
1 1/R
V C
ds
◆
Ht
6 V C(x, y, ✓) exp ( n(q⇤)t)Ht
and hence limt!1 E(e  tV C(X⇤t , Yt,⇥⇤t )) = 0 as
E(V C(x, y, ✓) exp ( n(q⇤)t)Ht) = V C(x, y, ✓) exp ( n(q⇤)t)! 0.
3.F The first order di↵erential equation
For convenience, we recall some notations, and introduce some more:
m(q) =
R(1 R)
b1
q2   b3(1 R)
b1
q + 1,
`(q) = m(q) +
1 R
b1
q(1  q) + (b2   1)R(1 R)
b1
q
(1 R)q +R,
'(q, n) = b1(n  1) + (1 R)(b3   2R)q + (2  b2)R(1 R),
E(q)2 = 4R2(1 R)2(b2   1)(1  q)2,
v(q, n) = '(q, n)  sgn(1 R)
p
'(q, n)2 + E(q)2,
D(q, n) = 2b1[(1 R)q +R][n m(q)]  q [v(q, n)  v(q,m(q))] ,
A(q, n) = (`(q)  n)
 
2b1[(1 R)q +R]  b1q
 
1  sgn(1 R) 'p
'2 + E2
!!
+D(q, n). (3.37)
We begin with a useful lemma.
Lemma 3.13. O(q, n) has an alternative expression
O(q, n) =   (1 R)nD(q, n)
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[`(q)  n] . (3.38)
Proof. Consider
b1(`(q)  n) + '(q, n)
= R(1 R)q2   b3(1 R)q + b1   b1n+ (1 R)q(1  q) + (b2   1)R(1 R)q
(1 R)q +R
+b1n  b1 + b3(1 R)q +R(1 R)[ 2q + 2  b2]
= R(1 R)

(1  q)2   (b2   1) + (b2   1)q
(1 R)q +R
 
+ (1 R)q(1  q)
= (1 R)(1  q)[R(1  q) + q]  (b2   1)R
2(1 R)
(1 R)q +R (1  q).
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Then, noting that (1 R)q +R = R(1  q) + q,
b1[(1 R)q +R](`(q)  n)
= (1 R)(1  q)[R(1  q) + q]2  R2(1 R)(b2   1)(1  q)  '(q, n)[R(1  q) + q],
and multiplying by 4(1 R)(1  q),
4b1(1 R)(1  q)[(1 R)q +R](`(q)  n)
= 4(1 R)2(1  q)2[R(1  q) + q]2   4'(q, n)(1 R)(1  q)[R(1  q) + q] + '(q, n)2
 {sgn(1 R)}2  '(q, n)2 + 4R2(1 R)2(b2   1)(1  q)2 
= {2(1 R)(1  q)[R(1  q) + q]  '(q, n)}2   {sgn(1 R)}2  '(q, n)2 + E(q)2 .
Writing this last expression as the di↵erence of two squares we find
2(1 R)(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]  '(q, n)  sgn(1 R)
p
'(q, n)2 + E(q)2
=
4b1(1 R)(1  q)[(1 R)q +R](`(q)  n)
2(1 R)(1  q)[R(1  q) + q]  v(q, n) .
Then
O(q, n) =
(1 R)n
R(1  q)  
2(1 R)2qn/R
2(1 R)(1  q) [(1 R)q +R]  '(q, n)  sgn(1 R)p'(q, n)2 + E(q)2
=
(1 R)n
R(1  q)
⇢
1  (1 R)q(1  q)
b1(`(q)  n) +
qv(q, n)
2b1[(1 R)q +R](`(q)  n)
 
(3.39)
=
(1 R)n {2b1(`(q)  n)[(1 R)q +R]  2[(1 R)q +R](1 R)q(1  q) + qv(q, n)}
2b1R[(1 R)q +R](1  q)(`(q)  n)
=
(1 R)n
n
2b1[(1 R)q +R]
h
(`(q) m(q))  (n m(q))  (1 R)q(1 q)b1
i
+ qv(q, n)
o
2b1R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R](l(q)  n) .
The result then follows since
2b1[(1 R)q +R]
⇢
`(q) m(q)  (1 R)q(1  q)
b1
 
= 2R(1 R)(b2   1)q =  qv(q,m).
⇤
Proof of Lemma 3.6. (1) Observe that
`(q) m(q) = 1 R
b1
q(1  q) + (b2   1)R(1 R)
b1
q
(1 R)q +R
=
(1 R)q
b1[(1 R)q +R]P (q)
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where P (q) = Rb2+(1 2R)q  (1 R)q2. Hence the crossing points of `(q) and m(q) away
from q = 0 are given by the roots of P (q) = 0 if such roots exist. Note that P (  R1 R ) =
P (1) = R(b2   1) > 0, since by assumption, b2 > 1.
If R < 1, then since P is inverse-U shaped and P (1) > 0 there must be two distinct
solutions of the quadratic equation P (q) = 0. As 0 < P (1) = P ( R/(1 R)), we must have
P (q) > 0 on q 2 [ R/(1   R), 1], and the two roots must be found outside this interval.
If R > 1, the minima of P (q) is given by qP :=
2R 1
2(R 1) . Note that 1 < qP < R/(R   1),
and since 0 < P (1) = P (R/(R   1)), the root(s) of P (q) = 0 must be contained on the
interval (1, R/(R   1)) if they exist. The desired results can be established easily using
these properties of P .
(2) The behaviour at q =  R/(1 R) is only relevant for R > 1 so we write this as
q = R/(R   1). Note that ` explodes at q = RR 1 . It is su cient to check the denominator
of O(q, n) is not equal to zero at q = R/(R  1). Direct calculation gives
[(1 R)q +R][`(q)  n]|q= RR 1 =  
(b2   1)R2
b1
and hence
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[`(q)  n]|q= R1 R =
2R3(b2   1)
(R  1) 6= 0. (3.40)
(3) The following lemma records some useful identities.
Lemma 3.14.
'(q,m(q)) = R(1 R){(1  q)2   (b2   1)},
'(q, `(q)) = (1 R)(1  q)
⇢
(1 R)q +R  (b2   1)R
2
(1 R)q +R
 
,
'(1, n) = b1(n  `(1)),
v(q,m(q)) =  2R(1 R)(b2   1),
v(q, `(q)) =
8><>: 
2R2(1 R)(1 q)(b2 1)
(1 R)q+R , (1  q)[(1 R)q +R] > 0,
2(1 R)(1  q)[(1 R)q +R], (1  q)[(1 R)q +R] < 0,
v(1, n) = '(1, n)  sgn(1 R)|'(1, n)|.
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Proof. Most of these identities follow easily on substitution. For v(q, `(q)) we have
v(q, `(q)) = (1 R)(1  q)
⇢
(1 R)q +R  (b2   1)R
2
(1 R)q +R
 
  sgn(1 R)
s
(1 R)2(1  q)2
⇢
(1 R)q +R+ (b2   1)R
2
(1 R)q +R
 2
= (1 R)(1  q)
⇢
(1 R)q +R  (b2   1)R
2
(1 R)q +R
 
  (1 R)|1  q|
    (1 R)q +R+ (b2   1)R2(1 R)q +R
    
which simplifies to give the stated expression. ⇤
Return to the proof of Part (3) of Lemma 3.6. Note that sgn('(1, n)) = sgn(n `(1)).
Assume we are in the range (1   R)n < (1   R)`(1). Then sgn('(1, n)) =   sgn(1   R),
v(1, n) = 2'(1, n) and
D(1, n) = 2b1[n m(1)] v(1, n)+v(1,m(1)) = 2b1[n m(1)] 2b1[n `(1)]+2b1[m(1) `(1)] = 0.
Further, after some algebra we can show @@qD(q, n)|q=1 =  2b1R(n m(1)).
Consider F (q, n) = O(q,n)n =   (1 R)D(q,n)2R(1 q)[(1 R)q+R]b1[`(q) n] . Then both the numerator
and denominator of F are zero at q = 1. Nonetheless, we can apply L’Hoˆpital’s rule to
calculate limq!1
D(q,n)
1 q to deduce the expression in (3.15).
Now consider limn!`(q) F (q, n). Suppose first 0 < q < 1. Then
D(q, `(q)) = 2(1 R)q(1  q)
⇢
[(1 R)q +R] + R
2(b2   1)
(1 R)q +R
 
which is non-zero and has sgn(D(q, `(q))) = sgn(1 R). It follows that for q < 1, and R < 1,
limn"`(q) F (q, n) =  1 and for q < 1 and R > 1, limn#`(q) F (q, n) = +1.
Now suppose q > 1, and if R > 1 that (1 R)q +R > 0. Then
D(q, `(q)) = 2b1[(1 R)q +R]
✓
1 R
b1
q(1  q) + (b2   1)R(1 R)
b1
q
(1 R)q +R
◆
  2(1 R)q(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]  2R(1 R)(b2   1)q
= 0.
Then, in order to determine the value of F (q, `(q)) via L’Hoˆpital’s rule we need
@D
@n
= 2b1[(1 R)q +R]  q @v
@n
= 2b1[(1 R)q +R]  b1q
 
1  sgn(1 R)'p
'2 + E2
!
. (3.41)
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It follows that
@
@n
D(q, n)
    
n=`
= 2b1[(1 R)q +R]

1  q[(1 R)q +R]
[(1 R)q +R]2 +R2(b2   1)
 
and hence we obtain (3.16).
(4) We prove the results for R < 1. The results for R > 1 can be obtained similarly,
the only issue being that sometimes there is an extra case which arises when (1  R)q + R
changes sign.
Note that for fixed q, the ordering of m(q) and `(q) is given by Part 1 of Lemma
3.6. The monotonicity of F in n for q = 1 can be obtained from (3.15).
If 0 < q < 1, then since
2b1[(1 R)q +R]  b1q
 
1  sgn(1 R)'p
'2 + E2
!
> 2b1[(1 R)q +R]  2b1q = 2Rb1(1  q) > 0,
we conclude from (3.41) that D(q, n) is increasing in n. Since D(q,m(q)) = 0 it follows that
D(q, n) > 0 for n > m(q) and D(q, n) < 0 for n < m(q). Hence, F (q, n) = 0 if and only if
n = m(q), and we have
sgn(F (q, n)) =   sgn
✓
D(q, n)
(1  q)[(1 R)q +R][`(q)  n]
◆
= sgn [(n m(q))(n  `(q))] .
This gives the desired sign properties of F (q, n) on the range 0 < q < 1.
Now consider the case q > 1. From Part 3 of this proof, we have D(q, `(q)) = 0. We
can compute the second derivative of D with respect to n as
@2D
@n2
= sgn(1 R)b21q
E2
(E2 + '2)3/2
so that (recall R < 1) D(q, n) is convex in n. Since D(q,m(q)) = D(q, `(q)) = 0, it follows
that on the regime of q > 1 we must have D(q, n) < 0 when n lies between m(q) and `(q)
and D(q, n) > 0 otherwise. Thus sgn(D(q, n)) = sgn [(n m(q))(n  `(q))]. Then
sgn(F (q, n)) = sgn
✓
D(q, n)
`(q)  n
◆
=   sgn(n m(q)).
Finally, note that F (q, n) can be zero only if n = m(q) or n = `(q). But for q > 1 the
limiting expression at n = `(q) is given by Part 3 of Lemma 3.6. Hence F (q, n) = 0 if and
only if n = m(q).
⇤
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The following lemma on further properties of F is key in the proofs of the mono-
tonicity property of ⌃ and in results on comparative statics:
Lemma 3.15. For q 2 (0, 1] and (1 R)m(q) < (1 R)n < (1 R)`(q), and for q > 1 and
(1 R)m(q) < (1 R)n, we have @@nF (q, n) 6 0.
Proof. Direct computation gives
(`(q)  n)2 @
@n
✓
D(q, n)
`(q)  n
◆
= (`(q)  n)@D
@n
+D(q, n)
= (`(q)  n)
 
2b1[(1 R)q +R]  b1q
 
1  sgn(1 R) 'p
'2 + E2
!!
+D(q, n)
= A(q, n)
as defined in (3.37). Di↵erentiating A we have
@
@n
A(q, n) = sgn(1 R)b
2
1E(q)
2q(`(q)  n)
('2 + E(q)2)3/2
.
Hence for q > 0 and R < 1, A(q, n) is increasing in n for n < `(q) and decreasing in n for
n > `(q). If R > 1, then A(q, n) is decreasing in n for n < `(q) and increasing in n for
n > `(q).
Now we calculate the limiting value of A(q, n) as n! ±1. Clearly '(q, n)! ±1
as n! ±1. Then,
lim
(1 R)n!+1
v(q, n) = lim
(1 R)'!+1
⇣
'  sgn(1 R)
p
'2 + E(q)2
⌘
= 0
and
lim
(1 R)n!+1
(`(q)  n)
 
1  sgn(1 R) '(n, q)p
'(n, q)2 + E(q)2
!
= 0.
Observe that
A(q, n) = 2b1[(1 R)q +R](`(q) m(q))  b1q(`(q)  n)
 
1  sgn(1 R) 'p
'2 + E2
!
  qv(q, n) + qv(q,m(q))
and thus
lim
(1 R)n!+1
A(q, n) = 2b1[(1 R)q+R](`(q) m(q))+qv(q,m(q)) = 2(1 R)[(1 R)q+R]q(1 q).
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Now we compute the limiting value of A(q, n) as sgn(1   R)n !  1. In this case
v(q, n) is no longer converging. But consider
b1q(`(q)  n)
 
1  sgn(1 R) 'p
'2 + E2
!
+ qv(q, n)
= b1q`(q) + q('  b1n)  sgn(1 R) q'p
'2 + E2
✓
b1`(q) + ('  b1n) + E
2
'
◆
.
Using the fact that '  b1n = '(q, n)  b1n is independent of n, we can obtain
lim
(1 R)n! 1
(
b1q(`(q)  n)
 
1  sgn(1 R) 'p
'2 + E2
!
+ qv(q, n)
)
= 2b1q`(q)  2q [b1   (1 R)(b3   2R)q   (2  b2)R(1 R)]
and thus
lim
(1 R)n! 1
A(q, n) = 2b1[(1 R)q +R](`(q) m(q)) + qv(q,m(q))  2b1q`(q)
+ 2q [b1   (1 R)(b3   2R)q   (2  b2)R(1 R)]
=
2R2(1 R)(b2   1)q(1  q)
(1 R)q +R
after some algebra.
Suppose R < 1. For 0 < q < 1 we have A(q, n) increasing in n for n < `(q) and
decreasing in n for n > `(q). Since on this range of q limn!+1A(q, n) = 2(1 R)[(1 R)q+
R]q(1   q) > 0 and limn! 1A(q, n) = 2R
2(1 R)(b2 1)q(1 q)
(1 R)q+R > 0, we conclude A(q, n) > 0
for all n.
If q > 1 then A(q, `(q)) = D(q, `(q)) = 0. But A(q, n) attains its maximum at
n = `(q), hence we have A(q, n) 6 0 for q > 1. Putting the cases together, (1 q)A(q, n)   0
and @F@n  0.
Now suppose R > 1. Suppose 0 < q < 1 or q > R/(R  1). Then A(q, n) decreasing
in n for n < `(q) and increasing in n for n > `(q). Since limn!+1A(q, n) < 0 and
limn! 1A(q, n) < 0, we conclude A(q, n) < 0 for all n. If 1 < q < RR 1 then A(q, n)
attains its minimum of zero at n = `(q). Hence A(q, n) > 0 for 1 < q < RR 1 . We find
(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]A(q, n)  0 and again @F@n  0.
It remains to check the result at q = 1 and, if R > 1, q = R/(R   1). At q = 1 the
result follows by considering (3.15). For R > 1 and q = R/(R   1), we obtain from (3.40)
that
F
✓
R
R  1 , n
◆
=
(R  1)2D( RR 1 , n)
2R3(b2   1) .
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Using (3.41) we have
@D
@n
    
q=R/(R 1)
=   Rb1
R  1
 
1 +
'p
'2 + E2
!
< 0
and then the monotonicity of F ( RR 1 , n) in n follows from the monotonicity of D(
R
R 1 , n)
in n. ⇤
Proof of Lemma 3.7. For any u 2 (0, qM ), since (1 R)nu(q) is decreasing in q and n0(⇣(u)) =
0, nu(q) can only cross m(q) at some q > qM . Moreover, for u  q  ⇣(u), (1  R)m(u) =
(1 R)nu(u)   (1 R)nu(q)   (1 R)nu(⇣(u)) = (1 R)m(⇣(u))   (1 R)mM .
Since nqM (qM ) = mM , we have limu"qM m(⇣(u)) = mM and in turn limu"qM ⇣(u) =
qM . Then limu"qM ⌃(u) = 0.
Now consider ⇤(u) := ln(1+⌃(u)) =
R ⇣(u)
u   R(1 R)q O(q,nu(q))nu(q) dq. From the fact that
O(u, nu(u)) = O(u,m(u)) = 0 = O(⇣(u),m(⇣(u))) = O(⇣(u), nu(⇣(u))) we have
d⇤
du
=
Z ⇣(u)
u
  R
(1 R)q
✓
@
@n
O(q, nu(q))
nu(q)
◆
@nu(q)
@u
dq < 0
where we have used Lemma 3.15 and the monotonicity of n to make the conclusion about
the sign.
We now show that limu#0 ⌃(u) = +1. We assume R < 1; the proof for R > 1 is
similar. Consider a quadratic function H(x) = (1   R)(m0(0)   x)   R(l0(0)   x)x. Then
trivially H(m0(0)) > 0. Choose a constant k such that m0(0) < k < ↵ < 0 where ↵ is the
negative root of H(x) = 0. Then H(k) > 0 and equivalently k < (1 R)(m
0(0) k)
R(l0(0) k) . Now let
b(q) = 1 + kq. It is clear from the definition of D that D(0, 1) = 0 and then
d
dq
D(q, 1 + kq)
    
q=0
=
@
@q
D(q, n)
    
q=0,n=1
+ k
@
@n
D(q, n)
    
q=0,n=1
=  2Rb1m0(0) + 2Rb1k
and
lim
q#0
O(q, b(q)) =   (1 R)
d
dqD(q, 1 + kq)|q=0
2R2b1[`0(0)  k] =
(1 R)(m0(0)  k)
R(l0(0)  k) .
Then for all ✏ > 0, there exists K✏ 2 (0, 1) such that O(q, b(q)) > (1 R)(m
0(0) k)
R(l0(0) k)   ✏ for
q < K✏. Choose ✏ such that 0 < ✏ <
(1 R)(m0(0) k)
R(l0(0) k)   k. Then we have O(q, b(q)) > k on
0 < q < K✏ and solutions to n0 = O(q, n) can only cross b(q) from below. For fixed u < K✏,
let  u = inf(q > u : nu(q) > b(q)). Then for u < q < K✏ ^  u, n0u(q) = O(q, nu(q)) >
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O(q, b(q)) > k, where we have used the property that F (q, n) = O(q,n)n is decreasing in n.
5
Moreover, there also exists Km such that m0(q) < 12 (m
0(0) + k) for q < Km. Hence on
u < q < K✏ ^ u ^Km, n0u(q) m0(q) > k  12 (m0(0)+ k) = 12 (k m0(0)) =: bk > 0 and then
nu(q) m(q) > bk(q u). On the other hand, for  u < q < K✏^Km, m(q) < 1+ q2 (m0(0)+k)
and hence nu(q)   m(q) > (1 + kq)   (1 + q2 (m0(0) + k)) = bkq > bk(q   u). We conclude
nu(q) m(q) > bk(q   u) for u < q < Q := K✏ ^Km.
Hence, using (3.38)
ln(1 + ⌃(u)) =
Z ⇠(u)
u
  R
(1 R)q
O(q, nu(q))
nu(q)
dq
>
Z Q
u
2b1 [(1 R)q +R] (nu(q) m(q))  q [v(q, nu(q))  v(q,m(q))]
2q(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[l(q)  nu(q)] dq.
For the denominator, and for u < q < Q  1 we have
2q(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[l(q)  nu(q)] < 2q(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[l(q) m(q)]
= 2q2(1  q){(1 R)(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]
+ (b2   1)R(1 R)}
< 2q2{M + (b2   1)R(1 R)}
whereM := sup0<q<1(1 R)(1 q)[(1 R)q+R]. For the numerator, note that for q < ⇣(u)
v(q, nu(q))  v(q,m(q))
= '(q, nu(q))  '(q,m(q))  {
p
'(q, nu(q))2 + E(q)2  
p
'(q,m(q))2 + E(q)2}
< '(q, nu(q))  '(q,m(q))
= b1(nu(q) m(q)).
Then,
2b1[(1 R)q +R](nu(q) m(q))  q [v(q, nu(q))  v(q,m(q))]
> {2b1[(1 R)q +R]  b1q}(nu(q) m(q))
= b1L(q)(nu(q) m(q))
5In the case of R > 1, the fact that F (q, n) is decreasing in n alone is not su cient to conclude O(q, n)
is also decreasing in n since F is positive. But one could directly compute
@O
@n
=
R  1
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1(`  n)2
✓
`D(q, n) + n(`  n)@D
@n
◆
and check the above expression is negative on 0 < q < 1 since on this range of q we have D(q, n) < 0 for
n < m(q) and @D@n > 0.
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where L(q) := {2[(1   R)q + R]   q}. Since L is linear and L(0) = 2R > 0, we can choose
to work on a small interval (0, qL) such that L(q) > min(2R,L(qL)) > 0. For su ciently
small u such that u < qL, we have b1L(q)(nu(q)   m(q)) > b1min(2R,L(qL))bk(q   u) on
u < q < Q ^ qL.
Putting everything together and setting bQ := Q^ qL ^ 1, for u < bQ we deduce that
ln(1 + ⌃(u)) >
Z bQ
u
b1min(2R,L(qL))bk(q   u)
2q2[M + (b2   1)R(1 R)]dq
=
b1min(2R,L(qL))bk
2[M + (b2   1)R(1 R)]
 
ln
bQ
u
+
ubQ   1
!
.
Letting u # 0 and noting that bQ does not depend on u we conclude that ⌃(u)!1.
⇤
3.G Comparative statics
Proof of Proposition 3.8. (1) Set m(q) = b1(m(q)   1) and similarly n(q) = b1(n(q)   1)
and `(q) = b1(`(q)  1). The idea behind this transformation is that m is constructed such
that it does not depend on b1. ` has a similar property. The free boundary value problem
can be written as to find (n, q⇤, q⇤) such that n0 = O(q, n) subject to n(q⇤) = m(q⇤) and
n(q⇤) = m(q⇤). Here O(q, n) := b1O(q, nb1 + 1) = b1O(q, n).
Note that ⇣(u) = inf{q > u : (1   R)nu(q) < (1   R)m(q)} = inf{q > u : (1  
R)nu(q) < (1 R)m(q)}.
Define '(q, n) = '(q, n) = '(q, nb1 +1), v(q, n) = v(q, n) = v(q,
n
b1
+1) and D(q, n) =
D(q, n) = D(q, nb1 +1). Then, as functions of q and n, ', v and D are all independent of b1.
We have
O(q, n) =   (1 R)(n+ b1)D(q, n)
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R][`(q)  n] .
By the above remarks the only dependence on b1 is through the term (n+ b1). Further
n0 = (n+ b1)F (q, n)
where F given by
F (q, n) = F (q, n) =   (1 R)D(q, n)
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R][`(q)  n]
does not depend on b1. By Lemma 3.15, F is decreasing in the second argument.
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Let bb1 > eb1 be two positive values of b1. Define bnu and enu the solutions to the initial
value problem n0(q) = O(q, n(q)) with n(u) = m(u) under parameters bb1 and eb1 respectively.
We extend this notation to O, ⇣, ⌃ and (q⇤, q⇤) in a similar fashion.
If nu is a solution to the initial value problem with nu(u) = m(u) we must have
(1 R)O(q, nu(q)) < 0 and hence (1 R)O is decreasing in b1. Then (1 R)bnu cannot upcross
(1 R)enu and since (1 R)bn0u(u) = (1 R) bO(u, bnu(u)) < (1 R) eO(u, enu(u)) = (1 R)en0u(u),
we must have (1   R)bnu(q) < (1   R)enu(q) at least up to q = b⇣(u) ^ e⇣(u). From this we
conclude b⇣(u) < e⇣(u). On the other hand, F (q, n) depends on b1 only through n. It follows
that
  ln(1 + ⌃(u)) =
Z ⇣(u)
u
R
q(1 R)
O(q, nu(q)b1 + 1)
nu(q)
b1
+ 1
dq
=
Z ⇣(u)
u
R
q(1 R)
O(q, nu(q))
nu(q) + b1
dq =
Z ⇣(u)
u
R
q(1 R)F (q, nu(q))dq.
But, by the monotonity of nu and ⇣ in b1Z b⇣(u)
u
R
q(1 R)F (q, bnu(q))dq >
Z b⇣(u)
u
R
q(1 R)F (q, enu(q))dq >
Z e⇣(u)
u
R
q(1 R)F (q, enu(q))dq
where we use (1 R)F (q, n) < 0 and and the fact that F is decreasing in n over the relevant
range. We conclude that ln(1+ b⌃(u)) < ln(1+ e⌃(u)) and hence bq⇤ = b⌃ 1(⇠) < e⌃ 1(⇠) = eq⇤.
To prove the monotonicity of the sale boundary q⇤, one can parameterise the family
of solutions via its right boundary point (nv(·), &(v), v). See Hobson et al. (2016) for the use
of a similar idea.
(2) Now we consider the monotonicity of the limits of the no-transaction wedge in
b3. We use a di↵erent transformation and comparison result. Set a(q) = n(q) m(q). Then
the original free boundary value problem becomes to solve a0(q) = O(q, a(q)) subject to
boundary conditions a(q⇤) = a(q⇤) = 0 where
O(q, a) =   (1 R)(a+m(q))D(q, a+m(q))
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[`(q) m(q)  a]  
2R(1 R)
b1
q +
b3(1 R)
b1
.
Observe that b1[`(q) m(q)] = (1 R)q(1  q)+ (b2  1)R(1 R) q(1 R)q+R does not depend
on b3. Further,
'(q, a+m(q)) = b1a+ '(q,m(q)) = b1a+R(1 R){(1  q)2   (b2   1)}
and v(q,m(q)) =  2R(1  R)(b2   1) are both independent of b3. Hence D(q, a+m(q)) =
2b1[(1 R)q +R]a  q[v(q, a+m(q))  v(q,m(q))] and
O(q, a+m(q))
a+m(q)
=
(1 R)D(q, a+m(q))
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[`(q) m(q)  a]
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are independent of b3. Recall we are assuming R < 1. Then O(q, n)  0 over the relevant
range and
@O
@b3
(q, a) =   (1 R)D(q, a+m(q))
2R(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]b1[`(q) m(q)  a]
@m
@b3
+
1 R
b1
=  O(q, a+m(q))
a+m(q)
⇥ 1 R
b1
q +
1 R
b1
> 0.
Supposebb3 > eb3. Using similar ideas in Part 1 of the proof we can deduce b⇣(u) > e⇣(u)
and bau(q) > eau(q) for q < e⇣(u). Hence, using the fact that O(q,a+m(q))a+m(q) does not depend on
b3
ln(1 + b⌃(u)) = Z b⇣(u)
u
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, bnu(q))bnu(q)
◆
dq
=
Z b⇣(u)
u
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q,bau(q) +m(q))bau(q) +m(q)
◆
dq
>
Z e⇣(u)
u
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q,bau(q) +m(q))bau(q) +m(q)
◆
dq
>
Z e⇣(u)
u
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q,eau(q) +m(q))eau(q) +m(q)
◆
dq
= ln(1 + e⌃(u))
where we use the monotonicity of ⇣(u) and the property that O(q,n)n is decreasing in n and
hence O(q,a+m(q))a+m(q) is decreasing in a. Thus bq⇤ = b⌃ 1(⇠) > e⌃ 1(⇠) = eq⇤. The monotonicity
property of the sale boundary can be proved in a similar fashion by parameterising the
family of solutions with their right boundary points.
⇤
Proof of Theorem 3.11. (1) We write out the proof assuming R < 1. The case R > 1 follows
similarly.
We use (3.7) to compute
@
@b1
O(q, n; b1) =   2(1 R)
2qn/R
{2(1 R)(1  q)[(1 R)q +R]  '(q, n) p'(q, n)2 + E(q)2}2
⇥
 
1 +
'(q, n)p
'(q, n)2 + E(q)2
!
@'
@b1
and hence, for q > 0, sgn
⇣
@
@b1
O(q, n; b1)
⌘
=   sgn
⇣
@'
@b1
⌘
=   sgn(n  1) = +1, since n(·) is
bounded above by 1.
Further, m(q) := b1(m(q; b1)   1) is independent of b1 and from this we deduce
@
@b1
m(q; b1) =  m(q;b1) 1b1 and hence over the continuation region q 2 [q⇤, q⇤] we have
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sgn
⇣
@
@b1
m(q; b1)
⌘
=   sgn(m(q; b1)   1) = +1. Using the signs of @@b1O(q, n; b1)|n=n(q)
and @@b1m(q; b1) together with the fact that q⇤ is decreasing in b1, we conclude n( · ; b1) is
increasing in b1. If we extend the domain of definition of n to (0,1) by setting n(q) = n(q⇤)
for q < q⇤ and n(q) = n(q⇤) for q > q⇤ then we have n( · ; b1) being increasing in b1 on
(0,1).
Starting from the fact that n(q; b1) is increasing in b1, we can deduce that each of
 (1 q)N(q; b1), hW (h; b1), w(h; b1) and (1 p)h0(p; b1) is increasing in b1. Then for bb1 > eb1
(and using the overscripts to label the functions and parameters under the corresponding
choice of b1), we have
sgn(1  p)bh0(p) > sgn(1  p)eh0(p). (3.42)
Recall that G(p) = n(q⇤) R(1 +  p)1 R and G(p) = n(q⇤) R(1    p)1 R on the
purchase and sale region respectively. Using the monotonicity of n in b1 we conclude bG(p) <eG(p) over p 2 (0, bp⇤) [ (ep⇤, 1/ ).
Suppose G(p; b1) is not decreasing in b1. Then since G is continuous, bG(p) must
cross eG(p) at least twice, with the first cross being an upcross and the last cross being a
downcross. Denote the p-coordinate of the first upcross and last downcross by ku and kd
respectively.
Away from p = 1, (3.42) implies that bG(p) cannot downcross eG(p). Then the only
possibility is that there are precisely two crossings with 0 < ku < kd = 1. But if kd = 1
such that K := bG(1) = eG(1), the relationship 1G(1) ⇣G(1)  G0(1)1 R ⌘1 1/R = n(1) gives
bG0(1) = (1 R)⇣K   (Kbn(1)) R/(1 R)⌘ > (1 R)⇣K   (Ken(1)) R/(1 R)⌘ = eG0(1)
contradicting the hypothesis that kd = 1 is a downcross.
(2) For R < 1 a similar argument to the above can be applied if we can show
that n( · ; b3) is decreasing in b3. But this follows immediately as sgn
⇣
@
@b3
O(q, n; b3)
⌘
=
  sgn
⇣
@'
@b3
⌘
=  1 = sgn
⇣
@
@b3
m(q; b3)
⌘
and q⇤ is increasing in b3.
If R > 1 we cannot use this argument. However, the monotonicity of the value
function in b3, and hence the monotonicity of C can be proved by a comparison argument.6
Consider a pair of models, the only di↵erence being that in the first model Y has drift ↵˜,
whereas in the second model Y has drift ↵ˆ where ↵ˆ > ↵˜. Write ✏ = ↵ˆ  ↵˜ > 0. Suppose that
parameters are such that Standing Assumption 3.1 holds in the first model; then necessarily
6The value function only depends on R and the auxiliary parameters, so when comparing two models
which di↵er only through b3 we may equivalently compare models which di↵er in ↵.
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Standing Assumption 3.1 holds in the second model. Let (Y˜ , Yˆ ) = (Y˜t, Yˆt)t 0 be given by
(Y˜t, Yˆt) = (ye
⌘Wt+(↵˜  ⌘22 )t, ye⌘Wt+(↵ˆ 
⌘2
2 )t)
so that Yˆt = e✏tY˜t. Let (C˜, ⇧˜, ⇥˜ = ✓ +  ˜    ˜) be an admissible strategy for an agent in
the first model. Suppose ⇥˜ is non-negative, and note that the optimal strategy has this
property, even if the initial endowment in the illiquid asset is negative, since in that case
there is an initial transaction into the no-transaction wedge which is contained in the half-
plane ✓   0. We may assume we start in the no-transaction region. Then X˜0 = x and
X˜ = (X˜t)t 0 solves
dX˜t = r(X˜t   ⇧˜t)dt+ ⇧˜t
St
dSt   C˜tdt  Y˜t(1 +  )d ˜t + Y˜t(1   )d ˜t.
Define the absolutely continuous, increasing process  by t =
R t
0
n
d ˜s ^ (d ˜s + ✏⇥˜sds)
o
and set
⇧ˆt = ⇧˜t,
⇥ˆt = ✓ +  ˆt    ˆt,
Cˆt = C˜t + ( +  )Y˜tdt + (1   )✏⇥˜tY˜tdt,
 ˆt =
Z t
0
e ✏s
⇣
d ˜s   ds
⌘
,
 ˆt =
Z t
0
e ✏s
⇣
d ˜s + ✏⇥˜sds  ds
⌘
.
Then
d⇥ˆt = d ˆt   d ˆt = e ✏td⇥˜t   ✏e ✏t⇥˜tdt = d(e ✏t⇥˜t)
which gives ⇥ˆt = ⇥˜te ✏t and in turn ⇥ˆtYˆt = ⇥˜tY˜t. Then the corresponding wealth process
solves
dXˆt = r(Xˆt   ⇧ˆt)dt+ ⇧ˆt
St
dSt   Yˆt(1 +  )d ˆt + Yˆt(1   )d ˆt   Cˆtdt
= r(Xˆt   ⇧˜t)dt+ ⇧˜t
St
dSt   Yˆte ✏t(1 +  )[d ˜t   dt] + Yˆte ✏t(1   )[d ˜t + ✏⇥˜tdt  dt]
 C˜tdt  (1   )✏⇥˜tY˜tdt  ( +  )Y˜tdt
= r(Xˆt   ⇧˜t)dt+ ⇧˜t
St
dSt   C˜tdt  Y˜t(1 +  )d ˜t + Y˜t(1   )d ˜t.
If Xˆ0 = x = X˜0 then Xˆ solves the same equation as X˜ and Xˆt = X˜t   0. Then, for any
admissible strategy in the first model for which (⇥t)t 0 is positive, including the optimal
strategy in this model, there is a corresponding admissible strategy in the second model
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with strictly larger consumption at all future times. Hence the value function is strictly
greater in the second model. ⇤
3.H The consistency condition on transaction costs
Fix positive constant ✏ > 0 and define  1(✏) := 1 W (h(1  ✏)) > 0 and  2(✏) := W (h(1 +
✏))  1 > 0. Then for
o(✏,  1,  2) := ln
✓
1  ✏
1 + ✏
◆
  ln
✓
 2(1   1)
 1(1 +  2)
◆
,
we have for p⇤ < 1 < p⇤
ln(1 + ⇠) + o(✏,  1(✏),  2(✏))
=
"Z 1 ✏
p⇤
dp
p(1  p) +
Z p⇤
1+✏
dp
p(1  p)
#
 
"Z 1  1(✏)
q⇤
dq
q(1  q) +
Z q⇤
1+ 2(✏)
dq
q(1  q)
#
=
"Z h(1 ✏)
h⇤
dh
w(h)
+
Z h⇤
h(1+✏)
dh
w(h)
#
 
"Z 1  1(✏)
q⇤
dq
q(1  q)  
Z q⇤
1+ 2(✏)
dq
q(1  q)
#
=
"Z W (h(1 ✏))
q⇤
N 0(q)dq
(1 R)qN(q) +
Z q⇤
W (h(1+✏))
N 0(q)dq
(1 R)qN(q)
#
 
"Z 1  1(✏)
q⇤
dq
q(1  q)  
Z q⇤
1+ 2(✏)
dq
q(1  q)
#
=
Z 1  1(✏)
q⇤
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, n(q))
n(q)
◆
dq +
Z q⇤
1+ 2(✏)
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, n(q))
n(q)
◆
dq.
On sending ✏ # 0, we have  1(✏) # 0 and  2(✏) # 0 and thusZ q⇤
q⇤
✓
  R
q(1 R)
O(q, n(q))
n(q)
◆
dq = ln(1 + ⇠) + lim
✏#0
o(✏,  1(✏),  2(✏)).
Now,
 2(✏)
 1(✏)
=
W (h(1 + ✏))  1
1 W (h(1  ✏)) =
W (h(1 + ✏))  1
✏
✏
1 W (h(1  ✏)) .
But
1 W (h(1  ✏))
✏
=
(1 R)h(1  ✏)  ✏(1  ✏)h0(1  ✏)
(1 R)✏h(1  ✏) = 1 
(1  ✏)G0(1  ✏)
(1 R)G(1  ✏)
and thus lim✏#0
1 W (h(1 ✏))
✏ = 1   G
0(1)
(1 R)G(1) . Similarly, we have lim✏#0
W (h(1+✏)) 1
✏ = 1  
G0(1)
(1 R)G(1) . Hence lim✏#0 o(✏,  1(✏),  2(✏)) = 0 and (3.11) holds. In case either p⇤ = 1 or
p⇤ = 1, a similar argument can be used to show that (3.11) is still valid.
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